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Abstract
Although the ASP model has been around for over a decade, it has not achieved the 
expected high level o f market uptake. This research project examines the past and 
present state o f ASP adoption and identifies security as a primary factor influencing the 
uptake o f the model. The early chapters o f this document examine the ASP model and 
ASP security in particular. Specifically, the literature and technology review chapter 
analyses ASP literature, security technologies and best practices with respect to system 
security in general. Based on this investigation, a prototype to illustrate the range and 
types of technologies that encompass a security framework was developed and is 
described in detail. The latter chapters o f this document evaluate the practical 
implementation o f system security in an ASP environment. Finally, this document 
outlines the research outputs, including the conclusions drawn and recommendations with 
respect to system security in an ASP environment. The primary research output is the 
recommendation that by following best practices with respect to security, an ASP 
application can provide the same level o f security one would expect from any other n-tier 
client-server application. In addition, a security evaluation matrix, which could be used 
to evaluate not only the security o f ASP applications but the security o f any n-tier 
application, was developed by the author. This thesis shows that perceptions with regard 
to fears o f inadequate security o f ASP solutions and solution data are misguided. Finally, 
based on the research conducted, the author recommends that ASP solutions should be 
developed and deployed on tried, tested and trusted infrastructure. Existing Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) should be used where possible and security best practices 
should be adhered to where feasible.
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Chapter I Introduction and Thesis Structure
Chapter I : Introduction and Thesis Structure
1.1 Introduction
The term Application Service Provision (ASP) is defined as the supply o f online software 
functionality to multiple clients on a subscription/rental basis, remotely via the Internet or 
via a private network [2], The ASP provider agrees a service level with several 
organisations and each client is provided access to the software on a one-to-many basis. 
The ASP model dates back to the late 1990’s, although it is still classed by many as a 
new and emerging trend. Despite the initial hype, uptake o f the ASP model has been 
slow to materialise. Several researchers highlight security, availability and scalability as 
the primary inhibitors with regard to the realisation o f an ASP solution. This thesis 
examines system security requirements in an ASP environment and provides an objective 
evaluation based on a practical implementation.
In order to gain a thorough understanding o f security in an ASP environment, the author 
adopted a multilateral view o f security. Firstly, the author examined ASP security from a 
high level perspective, by dividing security into three distinct considerations: physical 
security, solution security and the security/integrity o f client data. Secondly, the author 
reviewed ASP security from an operational perspective, by evaluating the relevance of 
both a security policy and a disaster recovery plan to ASP security. Thirdly, the author 
delved beneath the surface of ASP security and investigated security across all tiers o f the 
service architecture, through the analysis o f application, middleware, platform and 
database security technologies. Finally, the author gained an understanding o f security 
best practices, through the exploration of both current technology standards and security 
standards such as the Open Standards Interconnect (OSI) security model 7498-2 and the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) 17799 security standard.
The extensive research conducted provided the author with the knowledge required for 
the practical implementation o f a security framework for an ASP billing solution known
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formally as Billing4Rent. The Billing4Rent project was realised using the industry 
proven Java Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE) development environment, interacting 
with an Oracle 9i database, deployed on an Apache Tomcat Webserver. The practical 
implementation was supplemented through the documentation o f best practices with 
regard to the development o f both a security policy and a disaster recovery plan. The 
entire Billing4Rent security framework enabled the author to perform an objective 
evaluation o f the practical implementation o f system security in an ASP environment 
using the knowledge gained from a comprehensive system security literature and 
technology review.
1.2 Thesis Motivation
Enterprise Ireland, along with Industry partners Intec and an interested 3rd Party, 
provided the finance for the implementation o f an ASP billing solution formally known 
as Billing4Rent. It  is envisaged that the aforementioned project w ill lead to the formation 
of Billing4Rent Ltd. which w ill be tasked with bringing an ASP-based billing solution to 
market.
The Billing4Rent solution enables tier 3 and 4 network operators, content providers, 
service aggregators and other genres o f service providers to access state-of the-art billing 
functionality on a subscription or a rental basis. Despite clear market demand from small 
and entrant providers, there is no similar service currently operational. This can be 
attributed to the fact that there are significant barriers inhibiting the realisation o f such a 
solution. These include the huge amount o f intellectual property embedded in incumbent 
billing vendor’s commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products and the major technical 
challenges that need to be addressed to support a scalable, secure and robust ASP-based 
solution that can be effectively used by personnel with limited technical expertise.
The Billing4Rent solution was implemented as part o f a joint venture between The 
Telecommunications Software &  Systems Group (TSSG) at the Waterford Institute o f
2
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Technology and the Informatics Research Group at the Galway-Mayo Institute o f 
Technology.
1.3 Thesis Objectives
The Informatics Research Group at the Galway-Mayo Institute o f Technology had overall 
responsibility for two distinct areas o f research
•  An Investigation into system security requirements and Implementation in an 
Application Service Provision (ASP) environment.
•  A  Framework for high availability and optimum system performance in an 
Application Service Provision (ASP) environment.
This thesis is concerned solely with the former, ‘An Investigation into system security 
requirements and Implementation in an Application Service Provision (ASP) 
environment’ . It is expected that this investigation w ill yield a comprehensive framework 
o f best practice with respect to system security within the ASP domain.
The primary objective of the programme o f research can be broken down into five 
distinct goals -:
•  Perform a comprehensive literature review o f ASP material and system security 
requirements in particular.
•  Review o f technical material with regard to the implementation o f system 
security in general and in a J2EE application server environment, the 
development platform chosen for the realisation o f the ASP solution, in 
particular.
3
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•  Examination of security best practices, through the exploration o f both current 
technology standards and security standards such as the Open Standards 
Interconnect (OSI) security model 7498-2 and the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) 17799 security standard.
•  Implementation o f system security in the Billing4Rent ASP project based on 
the project goals and the aforementioned research.
•  An objective comparison o f the practical implementation o f system security in 
the Billing4Rent ASP environment with both the comprehensive ASP system 
security literature and technology review and established best practices in 
middleware security.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remaining chapters o f the thesis are structured as follows:
Chapter II describes the research framework used. This includes an overview o f both 
exploratory research and agile development methodologies, and their applicability to the 
programme of research.
Chapter HI details the results o f a comprehensive literature and technology review o f 
ASP and system security material, focusing primarily on security requirements in an ASP 
environment. It examines security technologies across all tiers o f the service architecture 
and outlines the role o f security policies, disaster recovery plans, service-level 
agreements and security standards in an ASP environment.
Chapter IV introduces the Billing4Rent solution prototype developed to enable tier 3 
and 4 operators and communications providers take advantage o f a low cost billing 
service. It details the implementation o f system security in the Billing4Rent project and
4
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illustrates the range and types o f technologies that are encompassed by the security 
framework.
Chapter V provides an objective comparison and analysis o f the practical 
implementation o f system security in the Billing4Rent environment using the best 
practices and frameworks described in the system security literature and security 
technical material review.
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with a summary o f the work completed, the conclusions 
drawn and provides a list o f recommendations for future work.
5
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Chapter I I : Research Framework and Methodologies
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the author’s approach to the work and the methodologies applied 
throughout the course o f the research. In order to gain an in-depth understanding o f 
Application Service Provision (ASP) and ASP security in particular, the author adopted 
an exploratory research methodology. The knowledge gained from the exploratory 
research laid the groundwork for the implementation o f a secure Billing4Rent ASP 
solution using an agile development methodology.
2.2 Exploratory Research Methodology
Exploratory research is defined by Crawford as a means o f providing a better 
understanding o f the research problem [2], “Exploratory research often relies on 
secondary research such as reviewing available literature and/or data, or qualitative 
approaches such as informal discussions with consumers, employees, management or 
competitors, and more formal approaches through in-depth interviews, focus groups, 
projective methods, case studies or pilot studies [1J. ’’
In order to fully understand the nature o f ASP and, in particular, system security 
requirements in an ASP environment, the author conducted an extensive literature review. 
The literature review was further supplemented by a comprehensive technology review to 
evaluate the practical implementation o f system security in a J2EE application server 
environment. In addition, the author examined security best practices, through the 
exploration of both current technology standards and security standards such as the Open 
Standards Interconnect (OSI) security model 7498-2 and the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) 17799 security standard. Finally, the Billing4Rent case study enabled
7
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the author to perform an objective evaluation of the practical implementation o f system 
security in an ASP environment using the knowledge gained from a comprehensive 
system security literature and technology review.
2.3 Development Methodology
The waterfall model is the classic software lifecycle model. The model describes a 
development methodology that is both linear and sequential. The agile development 
methodology provides an alternative development methodology to the popular waterfall 
model. However, agile development can actually incorporate the waterfall model on a 
small scale, by splitting the project into several iterations and repeating the entire 
waterfall cycle for each iteration. Alternatively, development can be carried out 
simultaneously so that there are no distinguishable phases e.g. extreme Programming 
(XP) [3], [4],
2.3.1 The Waterfall Model
The waterfall model is a sequential software engineering process where development is 
seen as flowing steadily downwards, like a waterfall, through the phases o f development 
life cycle. The waterfall model, documented in 1970 by W . W. Royce, was the first 
publicly documented life cycle model [5]. Ironically, Royce himself advocated an 
iterative approach to software development.
Overview of waterfall model development phases (Figure 2.1):
•  Analysis o f the problem and documentation o f requirements.
•  Documentation to describe in detail how the system should be built.
•  Development o f the system based on the design documentation.
•  Unit and system testing o f the system.
8
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•  System integration and end-user testing.
•  Software is updated to correct errors previously undetected in the testing phases 
and to meet the changing customer needs.
i  I I
Figure 2.1 -  Waterfall Model
The primary advantages o f the waterfall model are the clearly defined milestones and 
deliverables and the model’s emphasis on documentation throughout the entire lifecycle. 
A  major drawback o f the model is the difficulty o f accommodating change throughout the 
course o f the project. Figure 2.1 depicts the waterfall model.
2.3.2 The Agile Development Methodology
In 2001, a group o f seventeen software methodologists met in Utah to bring together the 
various development methodologies that had been developed over the previous decade or
9
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so. They amalgamated the principles o f those methodologies into a simple statement, 
now known as the Agile Manifesto [4], [6]:
“We are uncovering better ways o f  developing software by doing it and helping others do 
it. Through this work we have come to value:
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
•  Working software over comprehensive documentation
•  Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
• Responding to change over following a plan
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the left more 
[6]. ”
Although there are a number o f agile software development methods, this section 
concentrates solely on the XP and the iterative waterfall development methodologies.
2.3.2.1 eXtreme Programming (XP)
XP is a set o f values, principles and practices that facilitate the rapid development o f 
software that provides the highest value for the customer in the fastest way possible. 
Kent Beck, Ward Cunningham and Ron Jeffries devised XP during their work on the 
Chrysler Comprehensive Compensation System (C3) project [1]. XP takes twelve 
software development best practices and applies them to the extreme.
Overview of XP core practices:
• Planning: Customers define and prioritise the system features with user stories.
• Small Releases: Functionality is released into production early and often, 
adding additional features with each release.
• System Metaphor: XP teams use a common system o f names and descriptions.
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• Simple Design: XP teams emphasise simply written, object-oriented code that 
meets requirements.
• Continuous Testing: Designers write automated unit tests prior to 
development and run them throughout the project.
• Refactoring: XP teams frequently revise and edit the overall code design.
• Pair Programming: Programmers work side by side in pairs, continually 
seeing and discussing one another’s code.
• Collective Code Ownership: A ll programmers have collective ownership of 
the code and the ability to change it.
• Continuous Integration: XP teams integrate code and release it to a repository 
every few hours and under no circumstance hold on to it longer than a day.
• 40 Hour Work Week: Programmers work only 40 hours per week.
• On-site Customer: Development teams have continuous access to a customer 
representative throughout the development project.
• Coding Standards: Programmers must follow a common coding standard so 
all the code in the system looks as i f  a single individual wrote it.
The primary advantages o f the XP methodology are customer involvement throughout the 
project, the emphasis on teamwork and communication and the flexibility to deal with 
changing requirements. However XP is not without its flaws. The main disadvantages o f 
the XP methodology is that it is code-centered instead o f design-centered and the lack o f 
emphasis on project documentation.
2.3.2.2 Iterative Waterfall Development Model
The iterative waterfall agile development methodology subdivides the development 
lifecycle into several iterations. Each iteration is in itself a self-contained subproject 
composed o f activities such as requirements analysis, design, implementation, testing, 
integration, and maintenance [4]. The iterative waterfall agile development methodology 
benefits from the advantages of the pure waterfall model such as clearly defined
11
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milestones/deliverables and its emphasis on documentation throughout the entire life 
cycle. However, this model supplements the pure waterfall model through incremental 
development and by facilitating changing requirements throughout the course o f the 
project.
2.4 Chapter Summary
Due to the unpredictable nature o f the Billing4Rent project the author elected to adopt an 
agile development methodology. The iterative waterfall agile development methodology 
was chosen over the XP agile development methodology as the development team did not 
have continuous access to a customer representative and the team was separated 
geographically. The Billing4Rent project was subdivided into a number o f distinct 
iterations. Each iteration was in turn subdivided into the six waterfall phases i.e. 
requirements analysis, design, implementation, testing, integration, and maintenance. 
The industry standard Unified Modelling Language (U M L ) was used by the author to 
design the Billing4Rent security framework. As the development platform was subject to 
change, the author adopted an iterative approach to the development o f a loosely-coupled 
architecture.
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Chapter I I I : Literature and Technology Review
3.1 Introduction
This chapter details the results o f a comprehensive literature and technology review of 
Application Service Provision (ASP) and associated system security material, focusing 
primarly on security requirements in an ASP environment. The chapter is further broken 
down into a number o f distinct sections that:
•  Provide an overview o f the ASP model by drawing comparisons with 
traditional technology models, such as time-sharing and outsourcing. ASP 
solution implementations past, present and future, in the technology sector are 
examined, in order ascertain the risks and benefits o f the ASP model.
•  Examine ASP system security, paying particular attention to physical security, 
solution security and the security and integrity o f customer data. The roles 
played by Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and independent trust service 
providers are reviewed from an ASP environment perspective.
•  Explore existing security technologies and how they ensure the privacy, 
security and integrity o f data stored locally and transferred over the Internet. In 
particular, the security provided by both the Java platform and Oracle’s 9i 
database offering are investigated in order to ascertain best practice with regard 
to security.
•  Detail existing network and information security standards such as the Open 
Standards Interconnect (OSI) security model 7498-2 and International 
Standards Organisation (ISO) 17799.
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3.2 Application Service Provision (ASP)
ASP refers to the supply o f online software functionality to multiple clients on a 
subscription or rental basis, remotely via the Internet or a private network. Application 
Service Providers (ASPs) agree service levels with several organisations and each client 
is provided with access to the software on a one-to-many basis. On-demand and utility 
computing are alternative terms for ASP. However, these models often incorporate 
concepts such as server or storage leasing. The ASP model dates back to the late 1990’s, 
although it is still classed by many as a new and emerging trend [7], [8], [9],
3.2.1 Comparisons of ASP with Traditional Technology Models
Although ASP is still a nascent technology, the concept stems from both traditional 
technology models o f time-sharing and outsourcing. Traditional mainframe systems are a 
prime example o f time-sharing, given that multiple users share the mainframe resources. 
Technology may have changed dramatically over the past 40 years, but its application 
appears to have come full circle. Substitute ‘application service provider’ for ‘time­
sharing’ and this 1967 definition still works well: "timesharing is a communication- 
oriented method o f  using computers” [10]. Braunstein [11] also makes a comparison 
between the ASP model and time-sharing, by specifying that although the term ASP is 
relatively new, the concept o f application hosting dates back to the 1960s. Known then 
as time-sharing, corporations and educational institutions would take turns renting 
mainframe-processing capabilities, as no single organisation could afford the total cost of 
computing [11].
Traditionally many businesses found it cost effective to outsource certain business 
functions. Outsourcing typically involves employing a 3rd party to provide services on 
behalf o f an organisation. Most outsourcing initiatives are driven by both economic and 
strategic motives [12]. ASP gives a new dimension to outsourcing and is thus perceived
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by many, as the third wave o f outsourcing (B. Desai et al 2003, refers to Currie and 
Seltsikas 2001) [7],
3.2.2 Implementation of the ASP Model Past, Present and Future
In spite o f the promise and potential o f improving the way organisations develop, operate 
and maintain Information Technology (IT ) applications, ASPs have fared poorly in terms 
o f attracting a large client base [13]. High growth level predictions, by leading 
consulting firms such as Dataquest, Tankee Group, Forrester Research and International 
Data Corporation (ID C ) group varied considerably to anywhere between $7 billion and 
$23 billion by 2003 [14], [12], [8], [15]. Although ASPs have not achieved the rapid 
market acceptance foreseen by many researchers, some proponents argue that the 
attractiveness o f the ASP model is currently on the increase [16], [17]. Seltsikas and 
Currie believe the future is still bright for ASPs, stating that the ASP industry remains 
immature and w ill likely evolve into a more consolidated market, where the term ASP is 
likely to be superseded by software-as-a-service (SaaS) [17]. Current estimates indicate 
that worldwide spending on SaaS and associated software license revenue w ill reach 
$13.4 billion by 2007 [8], [18],
3.3 Application Service Provision (ASP) System Security
Several researchers refer to security as one o f the key factors influencing the uptake o f 
the ASP model [10], [7], [19]. Fears of inadequate security and privacy have prevented 
many firms from fully investigating and integrating the ASP business model [7]. Winch 
[19] outlines data security and integrity, along with disaster recovery and backup, as the 
two most important Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for potential and existing ASP 
customers. A  survey conducted by B. Desai and W. Currie [20], designed to capture the 
KPIs used to evaluate the benefits and risks relating to the ASP model, further 
strengthens the notion that data security and integrity, along with disaster recovery,
15
Chapter HI Literature and Technology Review
backup and restoration as key reasons why customers are reluctant to adopt the ASP 
model [20]. Although many researchers touch on the area o f security on examination of 
the ASP model, surprisingly there is a distinct lack o f in-depth research into the key 
factors influencing the adoption of the ASP model and ASP security in particular.
Tao [14] specifies that ASP security can be divided into both client data and server 
availability. However, Linthicum [21] and Anderson [22] take the concept o f ASP 
security one step further, breaking down server availability into hardware and software 
security breaches. Anderson [22] examines security problems through its classification 
into three areas: hardware, software and data. Linthicum [21] adds weight to the above, 
citing examples of each type o f security breach. Firstly, inadequate solution security may 
result in unauthorised network access. Secondly, inadequate physical security may result 
in internal security breaches. Finally, he poses a question as to protection o f sensitive data 
from competitors using the same ASP solution [21].
Anderson [22] and Linthicum [21] subdivide ASP security into three distinct 
considerations: physical security, solution security and the security and integrity o f client 
data. However, no overview o f system security would be complete without an 
examination o f a security policy and a disaster recovery plan, and their direct correlation 
with each o f the above considerations. Based on the results o f the aforementioned survey 
conducted by B. Desai and W. Currie [20]; disaster recovery, backup and restoring 
procedures were equally relevant as data security and integrity with regard to the uptake 
o f the ASP model.
3.3.1 Physical Security
Physical security is concerned with securing the ASP solution hardware and its location 
against theft, tampering and damage, either intentional or unintentional [23], [24]. 
Bhagyavati and Hicks [25] add weight to this definition, stating that physical security 
involves the locking up o f assets such as networking infrastructure, computing systems
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and data storage, in order to provide protection from unauthorised monitoring, theft, 
corruption, and natural disasters. An organisation wishing to protect valuable data in a 
computing system should devise a physical security policy, which offers deterrence to an 
attacker and controls access to the system. [23]. Wang [26] defines hardware security as 
the physical protection o f devices through the provision o f a secure environment. In 
general, data centers are used to house electronic equipment, such as computer systems 
and communications equipment. ASPs may choose to maintain their own data centers, or 
alternatively they may opt to outsource data center services to a third party. The major 
benefit o f adopting an outsourcing strategy is that organisations are free to concentrate on 
core business [27], [28]. In either case it is a primary responsibility o f the ASP hosting 
company to safeguard electronic and telecommunications equipment against 
environmental damage, in addition to physical damage or theft by both employees and 
individuals external to the organisation. Baldwin, Shiu and Mont [29] highlight the fact 
that contrary to popular belief, the majority o f security problems are, o f course, not 
results o f external intruders but are the result o f internal attacks. Anderson [22] furthers 
this hypothesis stating that employee actions, both intentional and unintentional can be 
extremely damaging to the organisation.
Examples of physical security breaches:
•  ASP solution hardware and communications equipment may be damaged or
destroyed by natural disasters, electrical surges, fire or water.
•  Access to the data center may be compromised and ASP solution hardware may 
be damaged, tampered with or stolen by unauthorised personnel.
•  ASP solution hardware may be damaged, tampered with or stolen by
disgruntled or former employees.
•  Authorised personnel may inadvertently damage ASP solution hardware.
Decisions made with regard to the location, construction and layout o f the data center, are 
often based on efficient workflow, with security being a secondary consideration [30], 
The location and layout o f the data center is relevant to physical security from 
environmental, internal and external security perspectives. In areas prone to natural
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disasters such as floods, earthquakes and tornados, special care needs to be given to the 
construction and the layout o f the data center. Data centers meet the security needs of 
ASPs as they invest heavily in security systems including sophisticated personal controls. 
Personal controls include fingerprint or IR IS identification, along with passwords and 
armed guard protection o f facilities [10]. It  is often the creation of a secure and 
survivable operational environment that proves to be a challenge, rather than the creation 
or integration of the software system [29].
Recommendations for ensuring physical security of ASP solution hardware:
•  ASP solution hardware should be placed in a secure data center.
•  ASP solution hardware should be further secured physically, through the use of
security cables, padlocks and other such devices.
•  Access to the data center should be restricted to authorised personnel, through
the use o f biometric scanners plus user pins or passwords.
•  Access control policies and procedures should be implemented and adhered to
by all personnel e.g. a policy o f two-in-two-out should be implemented in order
to gain access to the data center.
•  Closed circuit television should be installed in order to monitor activities
throughout the data center.
3.3.2 Solution Security
Solution security is concerned with restricting access to the ASP solution to authorised 
personal and securing both the exchange and the storage of customer data within the ASP 
environment. As ASPs supply online software functionality on a subscription/rental 
basis, they are particularly vulnerable to penetration by outsiders. ASP solutions are 
susceptible to threats at the remote terminal and along the communications link, in 
addition to threats at the physical machine [31]. Particular attention should be paid to the 
security risk associated with badly written software and poorly configured solutions, as 
many of the well-publicised computer security and virus problems relate to bugs in
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software, errors in code or application logic [32], [33], [34] and poorly configured 
solutions. As such it is not surprising that best practices recommend considering security 
early in the Software Design Life Cycle (SDLC), knowing and understanding common 
threats, designing for security, and subjecting solutions to thorough objective risk 
analyses and testing [35].
Examples of solution security breaches:
•  Software bugs (errors in code or application logic) and poorly configured 
systems leave the computer systems open to external attacks.
•  Computer systems may become infected by viruses (malicious applications 
loaded onto a computer system without ones knowledge) and worms (malicious 
applications that can replicate themselves across a network). Both viruses and 
worms could compromise ASP solution usability or availability.
•  Computer systems may become infected by spyware (software that gathers 
information from a computer system without ones knowledge and relays that 
information via the internet to the creator) and adware (software that gathers 
information from a computer system without ones knowledge and uses that 
information to display relevant advertisements). Both spyware and adware 
could compromise sensitive data stored on machines in an ASP environment in 
addition to solution usability or availability.
•  Hackers or crackers (individuals who attempt to gain unauthorised access to 
computer systems with the sole purpose o f causing damage or stealing 
information) may gain unauthorised access to sensitive data stored in the ASP 
environment.
•  The security and integrity o f sensitive data exchanged over communication 
links may be compromised i f  unencrypted data is intercepted by external 
entities.
•  Denial-of-service attacks such as the:
o Consumption o f scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources, 
o Destruction or alteration o f configuration information, 
o Physical destruction or alteration o f network components.
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•  Other attacks such as ‘ping o f death’ and ‘teardrop’ may compromise ASP 
environment usability or availability, by overloading or crashing the computer 
system.
It is a primary responsibility o f ASPs to guard against malicious attacks that monopolise 
communications and server resources [14] and compromise system usability or 
availability. On a technical level, the solution needs to take care o f identity management, 
authentication, authorisation, audit, assurance of communication, information retention 
and disaster recovery [29], Identity management, authentication, authorisation and 
assurance o f communication are all relevant to our exploration o f solution security. 
Access to computer systems and authorisation for use o f computer systems services and 
software components in an ASP environment should be kept to an absolute minimum. 
Both auditing or logging and disaster recovery w ill be dealt with in the discussion with 
regard to the documentation and implementation o f an ASP security policy and disaster 
recovery plan.
Recommendations for ensuring the physical security of an ASP solution:
•  The ASP solution should be tested rigorously to ensure that neither the software 
nor the configuration o f the ASP environment pose a security risk.
•  Appropriate service packs and patches should be applied to both the operating 
system and applications as soon as they are made available.
•  Anti-virus and anti-spyware software should be installed on all machines and 
updated periodically.
•  Firewalls should be configured to filter undesired traffic between the Internet 
and the ASP solution.
•  Ensure there are no unnecessary services running on the ASP solution hardware 
by shutting down unused ports and daemons.
•  Access to ASP computer systems should be restricted to authorised personnel 
by enforcing strong passwords.
•  Remote access to ASP solution hardware should be limited to an absolute 
minimum.
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•  Data sent over the Internet should be encrypted to ensure the security and 
integrity o f the data being transmitted.
3.3.3 Security and Integrity o f Client Data
Data security is also concerned with ensuring the privacy and integrity o f client data in an 
ASP environment. Data security is intrinsically twofold: it includes the privacy 
protection and the soundness o f the stored information [36]. ASP clients ascribe a 
significant amount o f risk to trusting an external organisation with vital data and critical 
applications [10]. As each client is provided access to the ASP solution software on a 
one-to-many basis, it is critical that the ASPs reassure clients that their data is protected 
from their competitors.
Examples of data security and integrity breaches:
•  Sensitive customer data may be compromised i f  data stored on ASP solution 
hardware is not permanently erased prior to disposal.
•  Software bugs and poorly configured systems may result in sensitive data 
falling into the wrong hands.
•  Poor solution security may result in sensitive data falling into the wrong hands.
There is a distinct overlap between both ASP physical and solution security, and the 
security and integrity o f customer data, as unauthorised access to the ASP hardware 
and/or solution may result in the security and integrity o f client data being compromised. 
ASPs must establish stringent procedures to avoid compromising the integrity o f 
customer data while it is under their care [14]. ASPs need to be aware o f their legal 
obligations with regard to the protection o f client data. In Europe this legislation comes 
in the form o f the ‘Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive’ and the ‘Data 
Protection Directive’:
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Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC):
Directive 2002/58/EC is composed o f a set o f European Union (EU) rules to 
ensure the protection o f privacy and personal data in electronic communications. 
The directive includes provisions on security o f networks and services, 
confidentiality o f communications, access to information stored on terminal 
equipment, processing o f traffic and location data, calling line identification, 
public subscriber directories and unsolicited commercial communications [37].
The Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC):
Directive 95/46/EC is composed of a set o f EU rules to safeguard personal data by 
providing technology-neutral legislation that is applicable to all types o f current 
electronic communications. Under this directive, EU member states are 
responsible for the protection o f a persons fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. 
However, in doing so they must ensure that they do not restrict or prohibit the free 
flow o f personal data between member states [38].
Recommendations for ensuring data security in an ASP environment:
•  Ensure redundant hardware is disposed o f in an appropriate manner. Software 
and data should be uninstalled and erased to guarantee that sensitive data is not 
accessible to unauthorised individuals.
•  The ASP solution software and the configuration o f the ASP environment 
should be tested rigorously to ensure the security and the integrity o f client 
data.
•  Solution security threats should be identified and the appropriate action should 
be taken to combat unauthorised access to sensitive data.
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3.3.4 ASP Security Policy and Disaster Recovery Plan
“The only system which is truly secure is one which is switched o ff  and unplugged, 
locked in a titanium lined safe, buried in a concrete bunker, and is surrounded by nerve 
gas and very highly paid armed guards. Even then, I  wouldn't stake my life on i t” (G. 
Spafford). Although Spafford’s [39] statement may seem very far-fetched, the underlying 
meaning is well grounded in reality. Unfortunately, no system w ill ever be 100% secure 
and thus it is crucial that ASP hosting companies identify potential security issues and 
follow up by documenting and implementing an effective security policy and an efficient 
disaster recover plan. Avolio [40] strengthens the above hypothesis stating that there is 
no such thing as complete security in a usable system and consequently, it is important to 
concentrate on reducing risk as opposed to wasting resources trying to eliminate risk 
completely.
3.3.4.1 Security Policy
ASPs and, where appropriate, data centers are advised to devise a security policy, which 
meets the needs of the ASP and their clients. The function of a security policy is to 
outline guidelines for ensuring optimal security o f the ASP solution. The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) [41] defines a security policy in the form o f a formal 
statement o f the rules by which people who are given access to an organisation’s 
technology and information assets must abide. A  security policy is an ever-changing 
document, constantly amended to cater for updates to an organisation’s systems and 
procedures. The security policy should be composed o f a combination o f guidelines with 
regard to physical security, solution security and the security and integrity o f information.
Both risk analysis and system monitoring are essential to the creation o f an effective 
security policy. Risk analysis is defined as the identification o f the most probable threats 
to an organisation and the analysis o f the related vulnerabilities o f the organisation to 
these threats [42]. The objective o f risk analysis is to identify business processes and
23
Chapter III Literature and Technology Review
supporting technologies, examine the possible threats to both with a view to at best 
eliminating the threat, or at worst minimising the potential impact o f the threat. Although 
risk analysis is an efficient means o f protection from known threats, it is generally 
ineffective against unperceived threats. System monitoring, both passive and active, 
provides a successful means of highlighting unforeseen threats in a timely manner and 
thus limits their impact [41], [43]. In both cases, system and network activity is 
continuously logged. However, active monitoring provides the added benefit o f 
triggering an event when a pre-specified condition is met.
3.3.4.2 Disaster Recover Plan
A  disaster recovery plan is defined by Toigo [44] as a set o f activities intended to prevent 
avoidable instances o f unplanned interruption, regardless of cause, and to minimise the 
impact o f interruption due to unavoidable events. A disaster recovery plan should be 
implemented, to ensure ease o f recovery in the event o f a natural disaster, a man-made 
disaster or any event, which causes interruption to normal business processes. 
Earthquakes, hurricanes and tornadoes are examples of natural disasters; terrorism, theft 
and arson are examples of man-made disasters; viruses, security breaches and denial-of- 
service attacks are examples o f interruption to normal business processes. A  disaster 
recovery plan should incorporate ASP business processes in addition to systems, 
networks and information, given their importance to the success o f the ASP solution.
Recommendations for creating an optimal disaster recovery plan:
•  Prioritise ASP business processes according to their criticality to the 
organisation.
•  Design a complete network diagram that includes details o f system redundancy 
and failover procedures.
•  Provide in-depth detail o f backup procedures for ASP solution hardware, 
software and business processes. This detail should include the method and 
frequency o f backups and the location o f remote backup facilities.
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• Detail recovery procedures for ASP solution hardware, software and business 
processes to ensure a timely recovery in the event o f a disaster.
It is essential that down-time in an ASP environment be kept to an absolute minimum. In 
order to meet this requirement, it is imperative that the disaster recovery plan is updated 
regularly to reflect changes to ASP systems and business processes, and tested regularly 
to ensure both validity and ease of recovery in the event o f a disaster.
3.3.5 Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and Trust Service Providers
The success o f the ASP model depends on the establishment o f trust between the parties 
involved. SLAs are essential to the success of the ASP model and are fundamental to 
meeting or exceeding client expectations and developing a high degree o f trust between 
both parties. SLAs outline the relationship between the service provider and the client. 
They detail the agreed ASP solution and outline expectations with regard to availability, 
performance and security [45].
Independent Trust Service Providers also play a significant role in establishing trust, by 
alleviating client concerns with regard to security and privacy. ASPs who display a trust 
seal obtained from an Independent Trust Service Provider, demonstrate that they have 
undertaken an independent auditing process to verify their solution meets International 
Trust Services Standards. Both SLAs and trust seals assist in the elimination o f fears o f 
inadequate security and privacy.
3.4 Security Technologies
The increasing growth in the number o f computer networks, the use o f the Internet and 
the use of distributed computing applications, has increased concerns with regard to 
privacy, security and integrity o f information exchange, and further increased interest in
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the use o f technologies to protect information transferred over these networks [46], This 
section examines the various system, network and information security technologies in 
use today.
3.4.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is the practice and the study o f encryption and decryption and comes from 
the Greek word ‘kryptos’ meaning hidden and ‘graphia’ meaning writing [47]. 
Encryption is the translation o f data into an unintelligible form through the use o f a secret 
code, in order to ensure confidentiality. Encrypted data is referred to as ‘cipher’ or 
‘cipher text’ , whereas unencrypted data is commonly known as ‘plain text’ . Decryption 
is the process o f restoring data to its original form through the use o f a secret code. 
Encryption is an effective means o f ensuring the privacy and integrity o f information 
stored locally or transferred over a network.
Data stored locally:
Sensitive data stored locally should be encrypted to ensure that data cannot be interpreted 
by individuals gaining unauthorised access to the computer system. Encryption thus 
provides additional protection in the event local or remote computer system security 
breaches.
Data transmitted over a network:
Sensitive data transmitted over a network should be encrypted to ensure that data cannot 
be interpreted should a third party intercept it. Figure 3.1, adapted from [48], provides an 
example o f how the privacy and integrity o f data transferred over the Internet may be 
compromised. Joe could intercept unencrypted data transferred over the Internet from 
Mary to John. Both John and Mary would be unaware that Joe has read or updated 
Mary’s personal message.
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Figure 3.1 -  Interception of unencrypted data
The interception o f unencrypted sensitive data (i.e. credit card details, bank details, 
sensitive company data etc.) transferred over the Internet, could have disastrous 
consequences. The solution is for both parties to agree on a method of encryption, which 
can be used to encode the data prior to it being sent over the Internet.
This section examines two alternative strategies for data encryption: conventional
encryption otherwise known as symmetric encryption and public key encryption 
otherwise known as asymmetric encryption.
3.4.1.1 Symmetric key encryption
Computers wishing to communicate securely, agree on a secret key, which w ill be used to 
both encrypt and decrypt data in the form o f packets sent over a network [49], [50], [51],
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[48], [52]. Figure 3.2 highlights the use o f symmetric key encryption in network 
communication.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) and 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are the three most prominent symmetric key 
encryption algorithms. DES was developed by IB M  and was adopted by the National 
Institute o f Standards and Technology (N IST) as a standard in 1977 [49], [50], [51], [48], 
DES divides plaintext into 64 bit blocks and uses a cipher key consisting o f 64 binary 
digits, 56 o f which are randomly generated, the remaining 8 bits are used for error 
detection. The 56-bit key is used as a parameter for the encryption/decryption algorithm 
and is composed of sixteen iterations of substitutions and transpositions. Since its 
adoption as a standard, there have been concerns with regard to the level o f security 
provided by DES. These concerns proved to be well justified. Due to advances in 
computing power, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) succeeded in breaking DES 
in 1998, using a special purpose DES cracking machine costing less than $250,000 [49],
[50], [51], [48], DES was eventually superseded by 3DES, which was incorporated as 
part o f the Data Encryption Standard in 1999 [49]. 3DES uses three separate 56-bit 
cipher keys and three executions of the DES algorithm instead of one, thus giving an 
overall key length of 168 bits. 3DES was popular due to its enhanced security and reuse
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of the DES algorithm; however due to its limited block size and inefficient 
implementation it in-tum was superseded by AES. In 2001 N IS T  published the AES 
standard based on the Rijndael algorithm submitted by Belgian cryptographers Joan 
Daemen and Vincent Rijmen [50], [48]. AES consists o f 128-bit blocks with a 128-bit, 
192-bit or alternatively a 256-bit cipher key length. The number o f rounds/iterations of 
the encryption/decryption algorithm is dependent on the cipher key length. A  major 
drawback o f symmetric key encryption is the security risk associated with the distribution 
o f the encryption/decryption key to all system users.
3.4.1.2 Public key encryption
In 1976, Whitfield D iffie and Martin Heilman, researchers at Stanford University, 
proposed a radically new kind of cryptosystem, one in which the encryption and 
decryption keys were different [49]. Known as public key encryption or asymmetric 
encryption, it provides a solution to the above key distribution problem through the use of 
a public key, which can be widely distributed and a private/secret key known exclusively 
by the recipient. Data encrypted using an encryption/decryption algorithm and public 
key, can only be decrypted using the encryption/decryption algorithm and the 
corresponding private key [49], [50], [51], [48], [52]. Figure 3.3 highlights the use o f 
public key encryption in network communication.
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Figure 3.3 -  Public key encryption
RSA encryption is an example o f public key encryption and was developed in 1977 at the 
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (M IT ), by professors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and 
Len Adleman [49], The acronym RSA is constructed from the first initial o f each o f the 
researchers surnames. RSA encryption security is based on the difficulty in factoring 
large numbers, with a key that varies depending on the implementation used. RSA can 
also be used as a digital signature to authenticate the originator and ensure the integrity o f 
the data. This thesis further examines digital signatures with regard to authentication in 
section 3.4.3.
3.4.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
A  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) comprises a system o f certificates, certificate 
authorities, subjects, relying partners, registration authorities, and key repositories that 
provide for safe and reliable communications [53]. Certificate authorities and digital 
certificates play a major role in the distribution of public keys used for public key 
encryption. A  certificate is a digitally signed binding between a public key and one or 
more attributes o f its owner, such as name, e-mail address Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL) or properties that can be used to grant permissions or capabilities [54], A
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certificate authority is any organisation or individual that issues digital certificates i.e. 
signed certificates with a public key [50], I f  party A  and party B wish to communicate 
securely using public key encryption, how does party B know that the public key belongs 
to party A  and not party C masquerading as party A? The solution to this problem is to 
obtain a digital certificate, which verifies details o f the individual, organisation or server 
that owns the corresponding public key. A  certificate authority is responsible for the 
issue of digital certificates and must confirm the identity o f the certificate applicant. As 
the certificate authority is a trusted third party, anyone wishing to communicate securely 
with the owner o f public key can confirm his or her identity through the digital 
certificate. The digital certificate also contains the digital signature o f the issuing 
certificate authority, so that a recipient can verify that the certificate itself is valid. On 
receipt o f the certificate, the recipient uses the certificate authority’s public key to decode 
the certificate and retrieve the owner’s identity information and public key. The public 
key is in turn used to send a secure message to the certificate owner. X.509 is the most 
widely used standard for digital certificates.
3.4.2.1 X.509 Standard
The International Telecommunications Union (IT U ) developed X.509, the most widely 
used standard for digital certificates, in 1988 [49]. X.509 certificates are generated by 
trusted certificate authorities and are stored in an X.500 global directory, which is used as 
a central storage of digital certificates. X.500 is an ISO and IT U  standard that defines the 
structure o f global directories [47]. Figure 3.4, which outlines the X.509 V3 certificate 
components and corresponding overview, has been adapted from [47], [5 1], [48].
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Public Key Information 
Issuer Unique Identifier 
Subject Unique Identifier 
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Signature
Figure 3.4 — X.509 V3 Certificate
Version:
Differentiates the version o f the X.509 certificate formats, which determines the 
data stored in the certificate. X.509 has gone through two revisions since it was 
made available in 1988. The Issuer Unique Identifier and Subject Unique 
Identifier fields were introduced in X .509 V2, and the Extensions fields were 
introduced in X.509 V3 in 1996.
Certificate serial number:
Specifies an integer value, unique within the issuing certificate authority, assigned 
to the digital certificate by the certificate authority.
Algorithm identifier:
Identifies the algorithm and the associated parameters used to sign the digital 
certificate.
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Issuer name:
Details the X.500 name o f the certificate authority that created and signed the 
digital certificate.
Period of validity:
Consists o f two dates, specifying from what date and to what date the digital 
certificate is valid.
Subject name:
Specifies the name o f the entity who owns the digital certificate and the 
private/public key pair.
Public key information:
Identifies the public key o f the entity that owns the digital certificate in addition to 
the algorithm and associated parameters used by the entity to sign messages.
Issuer unique identifier:
An optional ID  introduced in X.509 V2. It  is used to uniquely identify the 
certificate authority.
Subject unique identifier:
An optional ID  introduced in X.509 V2. It  is used to uniquely identify the owner 
of the private/public key pair.
Extensions:
A number o f optional extensions were introduced in X.509 V3, consisting of an 
extension identifier, a criticality indicator and an extension value. Extensions 
provide a more flexible approach than adding additional fields to a fixed format.
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Signature:
The certificate authorities digital signature is composed o f a hash code of the 
other fields encrypted with the certificate authorities private key. In addition this 
field contains the algorithm and the associated parameters used by the certificate 
authority to sign the digital certificate.
3.4.3 Digital Signatures
A digital signature is an electronic signature, which allows the author o f a digitally 
represented message to sign it in such a fashion that the signature has properties similar to 
a signature written in ink for the paper world [46], It confirms the claimed identity o f the 
originator and guarantees the validity o f the message.
Digital signatures must have the following properties [47] [49]:
•  The receiver can verify the claimed identity o f the originator.
•  The sender cannot later repudiate the contents o f the message.
•  It must be verifiable by third parties to resolve disputes.
Digital signatures are realised through the use o f public key encryption. Encrypting the 
entire message with the originators private key or alternatively encrypting a hash code of 
the message with the originators private key constitutes a digital signature [48], [50],
[51], [52]. In both cases, it is assumed that the recipient knows the originators public key 
and uses it to decrypt the message or hash code. By successfully decrypting the message 
or hash code with the originators public key, the recipient verifies both the originator and 
the validity o f the message, as only the corresponding public key in the private key pair 
can decrypt the message or hash code. Figure 3.5 outlines the use of private and public 
keys for authentication.
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Although the recipient can verify the author o f the message and i f  the message has been 
altered, they are unable to confirm i f  a third party has read the message. Digital 
signatures are used solely to verify identity and content and alone do not provide a means 
o f confidentiality. To ensure confidentiality, the message should be further encrypted 
using either symmetric or public key encryption strategies. Figure 3.6 outlines the use of 
a digital signature and public key encryption.
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Figure 3.6 -  Digital Signature and Encryption
Digital signature standard:
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is a cryptographic standard based on Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA), originally published by the National Institute o f Standards 
and Technology (N IST) in 1991, revised in 1993 and again in 1996 [47], [51], [48]. DSS 
only provides authentication capability, unlike RSA and some DSA implementations that 
provide both authentication and encryption. A summary o f the message data, called a 
message digest, is created through the use o f a hash code. The message digest is used in 
conjunction with the DSA algorithm and a private key in order to create a digital 
signature. On receipt o f the message and the message signature, the originator and 
integrity o f the messages is verified using the message digest, hash function, DSA  
algorithm and originators public key.
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3.4.4 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a network protocol, which was originally developed by 
Netscape Communications in 1995. However, the protocol later gained the support o f 
other Internet vendors and became the de-facto standard [47], [49], [50], [51], [55]. SSL 
is used to ensure secure communication over the Internet and provides authentication of 
the server, and where required the client, through the use o f digital certificates in addition 
to data confidentiality and integrity through the use o f encryption technologies. SSL 
operates at the transport layer, sits on top of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
and is independent o f higher-level application layer protocols such as Telnet, File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP), Hypertext Transport Protocol (H TTP) etc. Both Netscape 
Navigator and Internet Explorer along with the majority o f web servers support SSL. 
Users are able to confirm session security by the presence o f ‘https://’ as opposed to 
‘http://’ at the start o f the UR L at the top of the browser, or alternatively the presence o f 
the lock icon in the lower-left comer o f the screen.
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) working group was formed in 1996 when SSL was 
submitted to the IETF for standardisation [49], The TLS protocol supersedes SSL and 
although TLS is based on SSL 3.0 with a few extensions, the two protocols are not 
interoperable. However TLS is backward compatible with SSL 3.0 [56].
SSL/TLS consist of the following four protocols:
•  The Record Protocol
•  The Handshake Protocol
•  The Change Cipher Spec Protocol
•  The Alert Protocol
Figure 3.7, which outlines the SSL components and corresponding overview, has been 
adapted from [47], [57].
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Figure 3.7 -  SSL/TLS Protocol
The Record Protocol:
The record protocol provides both confidentiality and integrity o f data transferred 
over the Internet. The record protocol is responsible for fragmentation and the 
optional compression o f data, the application o f a message authentication code to 
ensure integrity, the encryption o f the data to ensure confidentiality, the addition 
of header data and the transmission o f the data in the form o f a TCP packet. The 
handshake protocol, change cipher spec protocol and alert protocol all sit on top 
o f the record protocol.
The Handshake Protocol:
The handshake protocol allows the server and the client to authenticate each other 
and for both parties to agree on encryption and messaged authentication code 
algorithms and exchange secret keys.
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The Alert Protocol:
The alert protocol is responsible for composing, compressing, encrypting and 
conveying alert messages. An alert consists o f two bytes, one to convey the 
severity o f the message and the other a description o f the alert. Fatal alerts result 
in the immediate termination of the connection.
The Change Cipher Spec Protocol:
The change cipher spec protocol generates a message with a single byte o f value 
1, generated by both and server and the client and used to convert the current state 
to a pending state. This conveys to the recipient that subsequent transmissions 
w ill be protected under the negotiated algorithm and keys.
Hyper Text Transport Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer (HTTPS) and File 
Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer (FTPS):
HTTPS and FTPS are both application-layer protocols, which run on top o f the 
SSL protocol. HTTP is a request/response protocol used to retrieve web resources 
from a server and render them in a client application. HTTPS is a secure version 
o f HTTP where requests and responses are encrypted using SSL or TLS prior to 
being sent over the network. HTTPS uses port 443 as opposed to port 80, which 
is used by the HTTP protocol. FTP is a fde transfer protocol used to download 
files from and upload files to an FTP server over the Internet. FTPS is a secure 
version o f FTP, which uses SSL or TLS to transfer data securely. FTPS uses port 
990 as opposed to port 21, which is used by the FTP protocol.
Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP):
S-HTTP is an extension o f HTTP, developed by Enterprise Integration 
Technologies (EIT). S-HTTP should not be confused with the HTTPS protocol. 
S-HTTP enhances the HTTP protocol with security services at the application 
level and is an alternative to SSL, the socket level security protocol. S-HTTP  
provides confidentiality, authentication, and data integrity, however is not tied to 
any particular cryptography format or key infrastructure. SSL is designed to
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establish a secure session, whereas S-HTTP is designed to send secure individual 
messages and are thus seen as complementary rather than competitive protocols.
3.4.5 Digital Identification
Digital identification is best described as the use o f technology as a means o f 
authentication and authorisation. The simplest o f the systems are based on 
usernames/IDs and passwords, while others are based on special purpose hardware that 
can measure unique distinguishing human characteristics. Earlier this thesis examined 
the role played by digital certificates in message identification, thus this section 
concentrates on passwords, physical tokens and biometrics identification techniques.
Usernames/IDs and passwords:
Identification based on ID/password combination is the most fundamental form of digital 
identification. An ID and corresponding password are stored on the system for each user 
and are used as a means of authentication and authorisation. Each user must enter their 
password in order to gain access to the system. Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) 
are a type of password that are used in every day life to access computer systems such as 
secure buildings, voice mail systems, house alarms etc. Unfortunately passwords are 
subject to various security threats such as dictionary attacks and network eavesdropping 
[58]. In addition, Sutton [52] highlights the fact that a significant degree o f responsibility 
with regard to ensuring password confidentiality is attributed to the password owner. 
Despite their well-known security weaknesses username password combinations remain 
the most common authentication mechanism [55].
Physical tokens:
Physical tokens such as magnetic access cards are an alternative means o f authentication 
and authorisation, where access is granted based on the identity o f the cardholder, which 
is determined through the use of magnetic strip readers. Every card has a unique number, 
which is associated with an identity. Physical tokens are used in order to gain access to
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buildings, rooms, toll bridges, gyms etc. Often passwords or PINs are associated with the 
physical token, providing an extra level o f security.
Biometrics:
Biometrics involves the use o f measurable physical characteristics as a means of 
authentication and authorisation. Fingerprints, retina, iris and voice prints can all be used 
as a means of biometric identification. Ongoing biometrics and absolute identification 
are two alternative biometric techniques. Ongoing biometrics involves recording 
biometric information the first time an individual accesses a system, and on subsequent 
accesses the new biometric is compared with the stored record. Absolute identification 
involves the construction o f a large database matching names and personal data with 
biometrics [50]. Although biometrics is a costly and complicated means o f authentication 
and authorisation, they provide a higher level o f security than passwords and physical 
tokens.
3.4.6 Firewalls
A  firewall is software or hardware, or a combination o f both, configured to control access 
between the Internet and hosts connected to a private network [49], [51]. Although 
access to the Internet is crucial for the ASP model, it also constitutes as a security threat 
to the organisation. The solution is to implement a firewall to filter all traffic to and from 
the organisation. However, as Wool highlights in [59], “the protection that firewalls 
provide is only as good as the policy they are configured to implement. ” Figure 3.8 
illustrates the use o f a firewall through the use o f an organisation network diagram.
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Figure 3.8 -  Firewall network diagram
Packet Filtering Firewalls, Circuit-level Proxies and Application-level Proxies are the 
most common types o f firewalls [51]. A  proxy prevents direct communication between 
local node applications and external hosts.
Packet filtering firewalls:
Packet Filters inspect all packets sent to or from the local network and accept or reject the 
packet based on the source IP address, destination IP address, port number and a pre­
defined set o f rules. The network administrator is responsible for defining the firewall 
filtering rules. Organisations may wish to block incoming packets from all IP addresses 
and port 23 (used by TELNET), or one or more specified IP addresses and port 23, or 
alternatively allow incoming packets from a combination o f one or more specified IP 
addresses and port 23. A  default policy to either accept or reject a packet i f  no rule 
exists, should also be configured.
Application-level proxies:
Application-level proxies intercept all traffic and relay data packets back and forth 
between local node applications and an external host. Application-level proxies inspect
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the entire packet and relay or reject the packet based on the header information and the 
contents of the packet.
Circuit-level proxies:
Circuit-level proxies intercept all traffic and relay data packets back and forth between 
local nodes and external hosts. However, circuit-level proxies do not examine the 
contents of the packet once the connection has been established. Circuit-level proxies 
control the flow of data at the session layer.
3.4.7 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
In 1994, the Internet Architecture Board (TAB) issued a report entitled “Security in the 
Internet Architecture”, which stated the need for better Internet security. The report 
identified the need to secure network traffic from unauthorised monitoring and access 
through the use of authentication and encryption mechanisms [51]. IP Security (IPsec) is 
a set of protocols at the network layer, developed by the IETF, to facilitate the transfer of 
packets securely over the Internet, a Local Area Network (LAN) or a Wide Area Network 
(WAN) [50], [51]. IPsec works in conjunction with Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), 
the standard version of IP used on today’s Internet and has been incorporated into 
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), the next generation IP [50]. IPsec consists of two 
alternative protocols: Authentication Header and Internet Protocol (IP) Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP) and supports two encryption modes: transport and tunnel.
Transport mode:
Transport mode encrypts only the data/payload of each packet. However, the header 
remains unencrypted. In transport mode the IPsec header is inserted just after the IP 
header and contains security information, primarily the security association identifier (i.e. 
a simplex connection between two end points and associated security identifier), a new 
sequence number, and possibly an integrity check of the payload [49],
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Tunnel mode:
Tunnel mode is the more secure option as it encrypts both the header and the 
data/payload and is useful when the tunnel ends at a location other than the final 
destination e.g. a firewall [49], [47], [51], [48]. In tunnel mode the entire IP packet is 
encrypted and encapsulated in the body of a new IP packet with a completely new IP 
header [49].












Figure 3.9 — IPsec Document Overview
IP Authentication Header (AH):
The IP Authentication Header (AH) provides authentication and integrity between 
hosts or gateways [47]. Figure 3.10, which outlines the IP Authentication Header 
(AH) transport mode, has been adapted from [49].
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IP Header AH TCP Header Payload + Padding
Figure 3.10 -  IP AH transport mode
IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP):
The IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) encrypts the data and places it as 
part of the ESP portion of the datagram/packet [47]. Figure 3.11(a) and 3-11(b), 
which outline the ESP Header in transport and tunnel mode respectively, have 
been adapted from [49].
IP Header ESP Header TCP Header Payload + Padding Authentication (HMAC)
M -----------------Encryption----------------- ►









Header Payload + Padding Authentication (HMAC)
--------------------- Encryption ■ — — - »
Figure 3.11(b) -  ESP Header tunnel mode
IPsec enhances electronic commerce built-in security protocols, secures remote access 
and branch office connectivity over the Internet or a WAN through the use of a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) [51].
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3.4.8 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
Many national and international organisations lease telephone lines from telecom 
organisations, in order to link multiple sites. Commonly known as a leased-line private 
network, it provides a very secure means of communication, as intruders have to 
physically wiretap the lines in order to compromise data [49]. Although leased-line 
private networks are very secure they are also a very expensive. Figure 3.12, which 
outlines a leased line private network, has been adapted from [49].
Figure 3.12 — Leased Line Private Network
The growth of the Internet provided a cheaper alternative to a leased line network 
solution, at the expense of network security. An effort to resolve the security issues, with 
regard to transferring sensitive data over the Internet, lead to the development of Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs). Each site hosts a firewall that creates a tunnel through the 
Internet with each additional site using IPsec ESP tunnel mode. This tunnel provides a 
means of secure communication between each of the nodes on each connected site. If
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site A and site B wish to communicate securely, their respective firewalls must negotiate 
the connection and maintain the IPsec tunnel. Once the tunnel has been established, 
machines on site A will appear as local machines to site B and vice versa. Machines on 
site A and site B appear to be on the same network, thus the name Virtual Private 
Network. Figure 3.13, which outlines a VPN, has been adapted from [49].





Figure 3 .13-V irtu a l Private Network
3.5 Middleware Security Technologies
Middleware refers to the software layer between the operating system, including the basic 
communication protocols, and the distributed applications that interact via the network
[60]. This software infrastructure facilitates the interaction among distributed software
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modules [60]. With the advent of Web Services, developing seamless interoperability 
between heterogeneous middleware technologies has become increasingly achievable
[61]. However, the diversity and openness of distributed applications systems have given 
rise to questions of trust and security [62].
This section examines the security of three competing distributed object paradigms: The 
Object Management Groups (OMG) Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
(CORBA), Microsoft’s Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) and Sun 
Microsystems’ Remote Method Invocation (RMI).
3.5.1 Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA)
Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) technology is an open standard 
facilitating distributed computing in a heterogeneous environment. CORBA enables 
programmers to design and implement distributed applications in a standardised manner 
that guarantees portability and interoperability, following the object-oriented paradigm
[62]. The OMG devised the CORBA 1.0 specification in 1991 [63]. The OMG is a 
consortium of more than 700 companies, which focuses on providing a common 
framework for developing applications using object-oriented programming techniques. 
The latest version CORBA 3.0 was released in 2002 [64].
The central component in the CORBA architecture, the Object Request Broker (ORB), 
was designed to provide only core functionality and consequently the CORBA Security 
Service Specification (CORBAsec), resides outside the ORB [62], [65]. CORBAsec 
defines a collection of core security interfaces, which are written in a consistent Interface 
Definition Language (IDL) [65]. The security interfaces that define services for 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, access control, auditing and non-repudiation 
[62], are designed to ensure a reasonable level of security of a CORBA-compliant system 
as a whole [66]. In addition, CORBAsec describes an array of interfaces that can be used 
for the crucial task of security management/administration [62].
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CORBAsec provides three distinct levels of increasing functionality:
• Level 0, which was not part of the specification in the beginning, integrates 
SSL into CORBA [62],
• Level 1, provides all the abovementioned security measures except for non­
repudiation. This is done in such a way that the applications running on top of 
the CORBA system are not aware of the security features provided underneath
[62].
• Level 2 provides all the abovementioned security measures including non­
repudiation. Level 2 deals with those applications that are security aware and 
that are consequently in a position to interact with CORBAsec in order to 
specify the exact security features used [62], [67],
3.5.2 Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)
DCOM is an extension of the Component Object Model (COM). COM objects are 
discrete components, each with a unique identity, which expose interfaces that allow 
applications and other components to access their features. DCOM interfaces are written 
in the Microsoft’s interface definition language, the Object Definition Language (ODL) 
[68]. DCOM makes COM objects location independent and adds security and 
multithreading to COM [65]. Although DCOM hides many complexities of client server 
application development it has proven difficult to deploy in corporate environments 
where communication is performed across firewalls [69].
DCOM is designed with built in security. The NT LAN Manager (NTLM) and the 
Microsoft Transaction Server (MTS) authenticate users and authorise checking via 
Access Control Lists (ACL). The Microsoft Crypto Application Programming Interface 
(MS CryptoAPI) provides both data encryption and integrity, while the Authenticode 
SDK uses digital signatures to provide non-repudiation [65]. On the downside DCOM 
uses a binary format for method invocations, and because firewalls don't understand the 
content of the exchanged binary packages, they view the packages as a potential attack
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and block the calls [70]. Though there is a way to overcome this limitation, the solution 
is regarded as weakening security [69], These problems are addressed by a new 
framework, which is known formally as SOAP.
3.5.3 SOAP
SOAP is a lightweight, operating system independent XML-based messaging protocol 
used to encode the information in Web Service request and response messages before 
sending them over a network. Initially SOAP was an acronym for ‘Simple Object Access 
Protocol’, however in June 2003 the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) dropped this 
acronym as it was considered to be misleading. SOAP is based on two common 
protocols: XML which is used as an encoding scheme for request and response 
parameters of the method calls and HTTP which defines how messages are formatted and 
transmitted [71]. While SOAP offers obvious benefits in the world of interoperability, it 
comes at a price of performance degradation and additional development efforts required 
for implementation of features missing from SOAP, such as security and state 
management [69].
The Web Services Security (WSS or WS-Security) standard outlines a standard set of 
SOAP extensions that facilitates the implementation of security token propagation, 
message integrity and message confidentiality. WS-Security is highly flexible and 
facilitates the construction of a wide variety of security models including PKI, kerberos 
and SSL. Specifically WS-Security provides support for multiple security tokens, 
multiple trust domains, multiple signature formats and multiple encryption technologies 
[72],
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3.5.4 Remote Method Invocation (RMI)
RMI is a set of protocols developed by Sun Microsystems' JavaSoft division that enables 
Java objects to communicate remotely with other Java objects. RMI has many of the 
same features of other remote procedure call (RPC) systems, letting an object running in 
one Java virtual machine make a method call on an object running in another, perhaps on 
a different physical machine [73] [74], RMI uses the Java Remote Method Protocol 
(JRMP) for remote Java object communication. RMI is a relatively simple protocol, 
however unlike more complex protocols such as CORBA and DCOM, RMI only works 
with the Java programming language. However, Java RMI over the Internet Inter-Orb 
Protocol (RMI-DOP) gives you RMI ease of use coupled with CORBA/1IOP language 
interoperability. Like RMI, RMI-IIOP provides flexibility by allowing graphs of objects 
to be serialised and transferred as pass-by-value method parameters. Like CORBA, RMI 
over HOP is based on open standards defined with the participation of hundreds of 
vendors and users in the Object Management Group [75],
As RMI sits on top of the Java Virtual Machine it leverages Java’s built-in garbage 
collection, security, and class-loading mechanisms [74], The RMlSecurityManager is an 
example security manager, which implements security policies similar to those provided 
by the security manager for applets, java applications included in a HTML page, which 
run in a browser [74]. It determines whether methods are invoked locally or remotely 
and protects against potentially unsafe operations [76], by providing a mechanism to 
“sandbox” the execution of downloaded code, so that it cannot adversely affect the local 
machine [74]. Applications must either define their own security manager or use the 
RMlSecurityManager. The Java security manager thus facilitates the definition of a fine­
grained security policy for both RMI client and server applications. It is worth noting 
that Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) (a component architecture for multi-tier client/server 
systems) and Jini (an open architecture that enables the connection and sharing of 
devices, such as printers and disk drives, on a network) are both built on top of RMI.
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3.6 Platform Security
The J2EE platform provides a secure development and runtime environment for Java 
applications. ‘'''Data type checking at compile-time and automatic memory management 
leads to more robust code and reduces memory corruption and vulnerabilities. Bytecode 
verification ensures code conforms to the JVM specification and prevents hostile code 
from corrupting the runtime environment. Class loaders ensure that untrusted code 
cannot interfere with other Java programs" [77].
The original Java platform provided two distinct levels of security. Local code was 
provided full access to vital system resources, while remote code was provided limited 
access to resources inside the sandbox. The platform was later updated to provide remote 
code, signed by a trusted entity, the same level of security as local code. Today the Java 
platform provides a much more fine-grained approach. All code regardless of whether it 
is local or remote can be subjected to a security policy [78]. The Java platform provides 
a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) spanning several major security areas 
including cryptography, public key infrastructure, authentication, secure communication, 
and access control. This section examines how the aforementioned APIs supplement 
Java’s core security architecture.
3.6.1 Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS)
Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) is composed of a set of APIs that 
enable applications to both authenticate and enforce access controls upon users or entities 
such as services. JAAS authentication is performed in a pluggable fashion, which 
permits Java applications to remain independent from underlying authentication 
technologies [79]. Java applications interact with JAAS through an object called the 
LoginContext. The LoginContext, in turn, communicates with a login module, which is 
specified at run time and is responsible for implementing and performing the 
authentication. Because the LoginContext never changes and the login module exposes a
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standard interface, no code change or recompilation is required to change authentication 
algorithms [80]. JAAS provides some reference LoginModule implementations, such as 
the JndiLoginModule, the NTLoginModule and the UnixLoginModule.
Once the user has been authenticated, the JAAS authorisation component works in 
conjunction with the existing Java access control model to protect access to sensitive 
resources. JAAS access control decisions are based on who is running the code, in 
addition to existing code-centric access controls [80] [81]. Once a user or entity, has 
been authenticated using JAAS, an associated subject is created. A subject is comprised 
of a set of principals, where each principal represents an identity for that user or entity. 
Permissions can be granted in the Java security policy for specific principals. For each 
subsequent security-checked operation, the Java runtime environment will automatically 
determine if the security policy grants the required permission to a principal associated 
with the authenticated subject [82].
3.6.2 Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) provides both a framework and implementations for 
encryption, key generation and key agreement, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
algorithms. JCE provides support for symmetric, asymmetric, block, and stream cipher 
encryption [83]. JCE supplements core Java security such as digital signatures or one­
way hash functions. The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) is included in the Java 
run-time environment distributed by Sun and includes algorithms to perform message 
digests, create digital signatures, and generate key pairs. JCE extends the JCA by 
providing algorithms to generate single keys and secret keys in addition to encryption and 
decryption cipher algorithms [84].
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3.6.3 Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE)
Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) is a set of packages that enable secure Internet 
communications. JSSE provides both a framework and an implementation for a Java 
version of the SSL and the TLS protocols and includes functionality for data encryption, 
server authentication, message integrity, and optional client authentication [85], [86], 
JSSE ensures the secure passage of data between a client and a server running any 
application protocol, including HTTP, Telnet, or FTP, over Transmission Control 
Protocol over Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). By abstracting the complex underlying 
security algorithms and "handshaking" mechanisms, JSSE minimises the risk of creating 
subtle, but dangerous security vulnerabilities. In addition, it simplifies application 
development by serving as a building block, which developers can integrate directly into 
their applications [85].
3.7 Database Security
Bankers would be considered negligent if they locked a bank's outer doors and left the 
vault's doors open at night. Likewise, it doesn't make sense for an organisation to lock 
down the network and leave databases vulnerable [87],
Database systems are the primary data management technology used today by 
organisations for both day-to-day operations and decision-making. Damage and misuse 
of data held in database systems could have disastrous consequences on the entire 
organisation [88], It is essential that database systems are protected, not only from 
external threats, but also from insider threats. An organisations database management 
system should ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. In as ASP 
environment, each client is provided access to the ASP solution software on a one-to- 
many basis, therefore it is critical that the ASPs ensure each clients data is protected from 
their competitors. In addition, auditing should be used to ensure that database security 
policies, procedures, and safeguards are working as intended.
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3.7.1 Oracle
As databases contain extremely sensitive information, restriction of access through the 
enforcement of strong authentication is one of first lines of defence. Oracle provides 
strong authentication solutions leveraging on existing security frameworks such as 
Kerberos and Public Key Cryptography [89], [90], In addition, Oracle provides several 
features to ensure data integrity whether in the case of system failure, human error, or 
malicious attacks. These features include redo log files, rollback segments, and 
LogMiner [91]. Oracle also supports the protection of selected data via encryption within 
the database. Although encryption is not a substitute for effective access control, one can 
obtain an additional measure of security by selectively encrypting sensitive data before it 
is stored in the database [90].
A critical aspect of any security policy is maintaining a record of system activity to 
ensure that users are held accountable for their actions. Oracle provides three standard 
types of auditing: Structured Query Language (SQL) statement-level, privilege-level and 
object-level auditing. Audit records can be written to the standard Oracle audit table, to 
an operating system audit trail (dependent on operating system used), or to an external 
file [92],
Based on industry standard best practices Sinha [89] provides the following guidelines 
with regard to the configuration of Oracle9i in order to maximise its security features:
• Install only what is required.
• Lock and expire default user accounts.
• Change default user passwords.
• Enable data dictionary protection.
• Practice principle of least privilege.
• Enforce access controls effectively.
• Restrict network access.
• Apply all security patches and workarounds.
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3.8 Security Standards
The Open Standards Interconnect (OSI) security model 7498-2 and International 
Standards Organisation (ISO) 17799 security standard are both relevant to this 
examination of ASP security. OSI 7498-2 deals principally with network security, 
whereas ISO 17799 is concerned predominately with information security.
3.8.1 OSI Security Model 7498-2
ISO who are credited with the development of the seven layer OSI network model 7498- 
1, are also responsible for the development of the OSI security model 7498-2. The OSI 
security model is also composed of seven layers (outlined in Figure 3.14) and provides a 
high level view of network security. OSI 7498-2 defines a set of security services based 








Assurance / Availability 
Notarisation / Signature
Figure 3.14 -  OSI Security Model 7498-2
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3.8.1.1 Authentication
Authentication provides a means of verification of claimed identity at a point in time 
[95], Username/ID and password combinations are a basic means of authentication. 
However, weak passwords may still result in unauthorised access. In order to protect 
against unauthorised access in the form of brute-force attacks, it is recommended that 
passwords be eight to ten characters and be composed of a combination of alphanumeric, 
punctuation symbols and upper and lower case [96], [97], [98]. Digital signatures are 
recommended when a higher degree of system security is required.
3.8.1.2 Access Control
Access control, is a means of authorisation, the process of granting individuals access to 
system objects, based on their identity. Stergiou [99] defines access control as the 
restricted admission to network services and resources for the users holding the 
appropriate privileges. Access control lists are used to specify the users and 
corresponding access rights e.g. read, write, execute etc., associated with individual 
system objects. Alternatively, an access control list can be composed of a set of roles and 
corresponding access rights for system objects, with individuals assigned to relevant 
roles. Access to the ASP system and systems resources in particular should be restricted 
to an absolute minimum.
3.8.1.3 Non -  Repudiation
Non-repudiation is the concept of ensuring that a transaction cannot later be denied by 
one of the parties involved i.e. the sender or recipient. Non-repudiation is analogous to 
signing a letter and sending recorded delivery [95]. It acts as a counter measure against 
fraudulent claims, denial of contracts and non-acceptance of debt liability. Digital
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signatures are a means of assuring non-repudiation, which is a legal requirement of many 
e-business solutions.
3.8.1.4 Data Integrity
Data integrity is the process of ensuring the consistency and validity of both data stored 
locally and data transferred over the network. It encompasses the protection of both the 
user and signalling data from either accidental or malicious modifications [99], An 
efficient security policy should ensure the integrity of data by defining effective access 
control lists and appropriate means of encryption. The use of encryption technologies 
such as symmetric key encryption and public key encryption ensures the integrity of data 
transferred over the Internet. Encryption is a form of cryptography with data being 
encoded prior to being sent over the network.
3.8.1.5 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the process of protecting the privacy of both data stored locally and 
data transferred over the network. When data is exchanged over the network, both the 
connection and data must be protected against unauthorised access and disclosure [99]. 
An efficient security policy should ensure the confidentiality of data by limiting local 
access to authorised personnel and adapting the aforementioned encryption techniques to 
protect the privacy of data transferred over the network.
3.8.1.6 Assurance / Availability
Assurance/availability is the process of ensuring the optimal accessibility and usability of 
systems and the data stored therein [93], [94]. It is imperative that a breach of security 
does not hinder system availability. Two different modes of protection are available:
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prevention; and detection and recovery using backup facilities [94], A disaster recovery 
plan is essential to an optimal speed of recovery in the event a security breach, thus 
limiting its overall impact.
3.8.1.7 Notarisation / Signature
Notarisation is the process where by a trusted third party acts as a legal representative to 
guarantee the data integrity, peer authentication and non-repudiation services to the users
[99], Notarisation certifies the validity of both digital data and digital signatures through 
the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI is the allocation of digital signatures, 
generally in the form of digital certificates, by trusted third parties known as certification 
authorities. Notarisation provides a means of assurance of the accuracy of data content, 
origin, time and delivery.
3.8.2 ISO 17799
ISO 17799 is composed of a comprehensive set of controls, designed by the ISO, 
outlining best practices in information security and is composed of ten sections. Together, 
the ten sections provide guidelines to organisations that strive towards optimal 
information security. Figure 3.15, which outlines ISO 17799, has been adapted from
[100], [101],
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Security policy 
System access control 
Computer and operations management 
System development and maintenance 




Asset classification and control 
Business continuity management
Figure 3.15 -  ISO 17799
3.8.2.1 Security Policy
A security policy provides guidelines to management with regard to the documentation 
and the implementation a set of rules to ensure the optimal security of information stored 
locally and transferred over the network [100], [101]. Organisations have the option of 
constructing a new security policy, altering an existing security policy to meet the 
requirements outlined in ISO 17799, or alternatively they may purchase a security policy, 
which has been written by a third party to comply with the requirements of the standard. 
This activity involves a thorough understanding of the organisation’s business goals and 
its dependence on information security [102].
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3.8.2.2 System Access Control
System access control is a means of protecting information by controlling access to 
information systems. It is achieved through the use of an access control policy, which 
provides a means of authorisation by granting individuals access to system objects and 
functionality, based on their identity [100]. The detection of unauthorised activities is 
achieved through the adoption of monitoring techniques.
3.8.2.3 Computer and Operations Management
Computer and operations management is responsible for ensuring the secure operation of 
information processing facilities along with the integrity of system software and 
information, thus preventing the loss, modification or misuse of information stored 
locally or exchanged between organisations [101]. An organisation should document a 
set of procedures for day-to-day operations and, in addition, the procedures to be used in 
the event of a security disaster.
3.8.2.4 System Development and Maintenance
System development and maintenance is responsible for maintaining the security of 
system software and data by ensuring that security is built into information systems. 
Systems should be designed and implemented with a view to ensuring the privacy, 
integrity and validity of information. Any changes to operating system software 
packages should be strictly controlled [102],
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3.8.2.5 Physical and Environmental Security
Physical and environmental security is responsible for the prevention of unauthorised 
access to computer facilities and the protection of information systems against theft, 
tampering or damage [100]. An organisation should devise a physical security policy, 
which controls access to the facility and the computer system.
3.8.2.6 Compliance
Compliance is concerned with avoiding breaches of any criminal or civil law, statutory, 
regulatory or contractual obligations and of any security requirements and ensuring 
compliance of the organisation with internal security policies and procedures [101].
3.8.2.7 Personnel Security
Personnel security involves, reducing the risk of human error, theft or fraud by providing 
appropriate training with regard to security threats and risks, and organisation policies 
and procedures [100], [101], In addition, background checks of prospective employees 
should be carried out, and confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements and employee 
contracts should be used to protect the privacy of information.
3.8.2.8 Security Organisation
Security organisation involves the overseeing of information security across the 
organisation and maintaining the security of information when the responsibility for 
information processing has been outsourced to another organisation [100]. A central 
body should be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of security policies, monitoring
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security activity and for the continuous improvement of information security throughout 
the organisation.
3.8.2.9 Asset Classification and Control
Asset classification and control is responsible for maintaining the appropriate protection 
of both corporate assets and information assets [100]. All assets within the organisation 
should be analysed and classified according to their sensitivity and criticality to ensure 
the appropriate access procedures are applied [102].
3.8.2.10 Business Continuity Management
Business continuity management counteracts interruptions to business activities and to 
critical business processes from the effects of major failures or disasters [100]. A 
business continuity process should identify security risks and threats, analyse the 
likelihood of the organisation being exposed to these threats, analyse the effects to the 
business if exposed to these threats and develop and test a business continuity plan to 
minimise impact.
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3.9 Chapter Summary
Security in the context of Application Service Provision (ASP) is multifaceted, requiring 
an analysis of the security models across all tiers of the service architecture. However, 
the discrete security components must not be analysed in isolation, but should form part 
of a holistic security model.
This chapter provided an overview of the ASP model by drawing comparisons with 
traditional technology models, such as time-sharing and outsourcing. It examined ASP 
security in general and furthered this analysis by reviewing the application, middleware 
and data layers of the service architecture. This was achieved through the analysis of 
application, middleware, platform, database and network security technologies.
Finally it examined security policies, disaster recovery plans, service level agreements 
and security standards in order to obtain a complete perspective of security in an 
Application Service Provision (ASP) environment. It is hoped that this literature review 
illustrates the importance of the privacy, security and integrity of data across all tiers of 
the service architecture.
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Chapter IV : Case Study
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes aspects of security with regard to the Application Service 
Provision (ASP) billing prototype case study, formally known as Billing4Rent. The 
Billing4Rent solution enables tier 3 and 4 network operators, content providers, service 
aggregators and other genres of service providers to access state-of-the-art billing 
functionality on a subscription or rental basis. The Billing4Rent solution was 
implemented as part of a joint venture between The Telecommunications Software & 
Systems Group (TSSG) at the Waterford Institute of Technology and the Informatics 
Research Group at the Galway-Mayo Institute of Technology.
The Billing4Rent solution prototype is subdivided into three interconnected applications: 
the Billing4Rent Ltd web application, the billing solution and an administration tool. In 
addition to providing information about the ASP service, the web application provides a 
means of accessing both the billing solution and the administration tool. The billing 
solution provides Billing4Rent clients with a means to configure and maintain customer 
and product details and to generate billing information in the form of invoices. The 
administrator tool provides Billing4Rent employees with the ability to configure and 
maintain Billing4Rent client details and to monitor both the security and the performance 
of the billing solution.
4.2 Architecture
The ASP Billing4Rent solution prototype is composed of a number of JavaServer Pages 
(JSP), Java servlets, enterprise beans and libraries, interfacing with an Oracle database. 
The solution architecture was designed based on the Model-View-Controller (MVC)
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design pattern and the solution was deployed in a Java Platform Enterprise Edition 
(J2EE) environment. The MVC architecture separates an application into three distinct 
components so that modifications to one component can be made with minimal impact to 
the others. The model encapsulates the application data, the view is responsible for 
displaying the data stored in the model and the controller facilitates the exchange of data 
between the model and the view.
4.2.1 Security Architecture
Figure 4.1 details the network architecture of the Billing4Rent ASP prototype. A 
demilitarised zone (DMZ) segregates servers requiring external access from other 
machines on the network. A DMZ is defined as a network that sits between the trusted 
internal network and the untrusted external network [105]. External access to Hyper Text 
Transport Protocol (HTTP), Hyper Text Transport Protocol/Secure Sockets Layer 
(HTTPS), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), File Transfer Protocol /Secure Sockets Layer 
(FTPS) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) services on the DMZ network is 
permitted through the outer firewall. Access to machines on the internal network is only 
allowed from machines in the DMZ through the inner firewall. All Billing4Rent 
hardware and communications equipment is located in a lockable room within the main 
monitored, alarmed and secured campus building. The Billing4Rent ASP infrastructure 
is further secured through the use of security cables, padlocks and other such devices.
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Figure 4.1 -  Biling4Rent network architecture
As an additional measure of security, the network administrator ensures all machines on 
the Billing4Rent network are protected against network attacks. All unused ports and 
daemons are shutdown. Appropriate service packs and patches are applied, as soon as 
they are made available. Finally, anti-virus and anti-spyware software are installed and 
are updated periodically by the network administrator.
4.2.2 Solution Architecture
Figure 4.2 depicts the Billing4Rent ASP solution architecture, which was deployed in a 
J2EE environment. Apache Tomcat accepts both HTTP and HTTPS requests. Tomcat 
uses a set of Java packages known as, Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE), to enable 
secure Internet communications via HTTPS. The Billing4Rent application enforces strict 
access control to both the billing solution and the administration tool through the use of 
the dynamic Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) framework. The 
Billing4Rent application uses the java.SQL.DriverManager class, to open a Java 
Database Connectivity (JDBC) connection to the tier 3 database. Jakarta FileUpload,
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JAMon and Tag libraries are used to support functionality required by the billing solution 
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Figure 4.2 -  Biling4Rent solution architecture
4.3 Authentication and Authorisation
Authentication is defined as the verification of identity [81] i.e. you are who you say you 
are. Authorisation is the process of granting or denying access to system resources based 
on identity. It is essential that access to the billing solution, the administration tool and 
associated functionality is restricted to authorised personnel. Due to the unpredictable 
nature of the Billing4Rent project, the project team deemed the dynamic Java 
Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) framework the most suitable means of 
performing authentication and authorisation. The JAAS framework simplifies Java 
security development by adding a layer of abstraction between the Billing4Rent solution
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and the underlying authentication and authorisation mechanisms. JAAS achieves 
implementation independence through an extensible framework of pluggable abstract 
classes and interfaces to which specific implementations can be developed. The billing 
solution and administration tool servlets and JSP pages have been designed to ensure that 
the user has been authenticated and has the required permissions prior to rendering the 
page on their browser. If an unauthenticated user tries to access a page, by typing the 
path directly into address bar or using the back button, they will automatically be 
redirected to the login page. If an unauthorised user tries to access a page, they will be 
presented with a message indicating they do not have the privileges required to access the 
page.
4.3.1 Authentication
JAAS authentication is used in order to determine who is currently executing Java code, 
regardless of whether the code is running as an application, an applet, a bean or a servlet 
[80] [81]. Figure 4.3, which provides a high-level overview of the JAAS architecture has 
been adapted from [103]. The application layer code instantiates both the 
CallbackHandler and the LoginContext objects. The CallbackHandler interacts with the 
application to retrieve the data required to perform the authentication. The LoginContext 
subsequently communicates with one or more, dynamically configured login modules, 
which handle the actual authentication using the appropriate security infrastructure. Sun 
Microsystems supplies a number of LoginModule implementations in the 
com.sun.security.auth package i.e. JndiLoginModule, KeyStoreLoginModule, 
Krb5LoginModule, NTLoginModule and UnixLoginModule. Alternatively, it is possible 
to develop custom login modules that implements the LoginModule interface e.g. a 
database login module.
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Figure 4.3 - JAAS high-level architecture
The following steps are required to implement authentication using the JAAS 
framework:
• If required, implement custom LoginModule and CallbackHandler classes.
• If an implementation exists, instantiate the appropriate CallbackHandler object.
• Instantiate a LoginContext object passing in the CallbackHandler object, where 
applicable, and the name of the index to the JAAS configuration file, in order to 
determine which LoginModule object(s) should be used. The LoginContext is 
responsible for instantiating the appropriate LoginModule object(s).
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• Perform authentication by calling the LoginContext object’s login() method. The 
LoginContext subsequently calls each LoginModule object’s login() method. 
Each login() method performs the authentication or enlists the help of a 
CallbackHandler.
• If the login is successful, a new Subject object is instantiated and populated with 
authentication details such as principals and credentials.
The Billing4Rent project team chose to authenticate user login details based on data 
stored in an Oracle 9i database. The team implemented two login modules: a 
RdbmsClientLoginModule and a RdbmsAdminLoginModule in the 
com.B4R.library.security.JAAS package, to authenticate Billing4Rent clients and 
administrators respectively. Figure 4.4 provides a high level overview of Billing4Rent 
client authentication, constructed using Unified Modeling Language (UML) sequence 
diagram components.
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Figure 4.4 — Authentication Sequence Diagram
Figure 4.5 contains a snippet of code extracted from the B4RClient business class. The 
B4RClient object is envoked from the Client Login servlet, when a client attempts to login 
to the billing solution via the Billing4Rent client login JSP page. The clientID and 
password, input by the client, and the login time, generated by the system at runtime, are 
used to instantiate the passiveCallbackHandler. On instantiation the LoginContext 
searches for the CLIENTORACLE configuration in a JAAS configuration file, named 
jaas.config (Figure 4.6), to determine which login module(s) to load. The JAAS 
configuration file name and path are configured in the Java.security file (Figure 4.7). The 
B4RClient calls the LoginContext object’s login() method. The LoginContext 
subsequently calls the RdbmsClientLoginModule object's loginQ method. The login()
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method performs the authentication by enlisting the help of the PassiveCallbackHandler 
(Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9). If the login is successful, a new Subject object is instantiated 
and populated with authentication details such as the username and password (Figure 
4.10), otherwise an exception is thrown.
try {
// Use the clientid/password to initialise the callback handler
PassiveCallbackHandler cbh = new PassiveCallbackHandler(clientId,
password, loginTime);
// Create a new loginContext
LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("CLEENTORACLE", cbh);
// Attempt authentication
lc.login();
} catch (LoginException ex) {
throw new LoginException(new StringBuffer("[B4RClient]") 
.append(ex.getMessage())
.toStringO);
} catch (Exception e) {




Figure 4.5 -  Extract from the B4RClient business object
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4.3.1.1 Login configuration file
The login configuration file contains one or more <LoginModule> specification entries. 
Figure 4.6, an extract from the jass.config login configuration file, contains an Oracle 
(CLIENTORACLE) <LoginModule> specification entry. The structure of each entry in 




The <name> property is an index into the JAAS configuration and is used by the 
LoginContext to retrieve authentication details. The <LoginModule> property is the full 
path of a class that implements the LoginModule interface. The <flag> property indicates 
whether success of the LoginModule is required, requisite, sufficient or optional. If only 
one LoginModule is configured, the <flag> property must be set to required. The 
<options> property specifies a list of name-value-pairs, which are passed to the 
corresponding LoginModule. Each login configuration file entry facilitates the use of 
multiple entries, e.g. optional additional <LoginModules>, <flag> and <option> 
properties. The login configuration file can be specified either on the command line or in 
the Java security properties file. As the ASP billing solution was designed around a web 
interface, the Billing4Rent project team specified the login configuration file in the Java 
security properties file. Figure 4.6 defines the RdbmsClientLoginModule in the 
com.B4R.library.security.JAAS package and a number of configuration options. The 
debug flag, oracle database URL, oracle driver, oracle username and oracle password 
properties are all defined as name-value-pairs required by the RdbmsClientLoginModule 
to perform authentication.








Figure 4.6 — Extract from jaas.config
4.3.1.2 Java security file
The Java security manager uses the master security properties file, Java, security, to 
enforce security based on what code is running and, more importantly, who is running the 
code. Figure 4.7, an extract from the java.security file, specifies the name and the 
location of the default login configuration file. It is worth noting that it is possible to 
specify several login configuration files by incrementing the numeric value of the 
property e.g. login.config.url.l, login.config.url.2, login.config.url.3 etc. If more that one 
login configuration file is specified, the security manager concatenates the files into a 
single login configuration file.
#
# Default login configuration file
#
login.config.url.l=file:${java.home}/lib/security/jaas.config
Figure 4.7 -  Extract from java.security
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4.3.1.3 PassiveCallbackHandler
Callbacks provide the JAAS framework with the ability to interact with the calling 
application to retrieve specific authentication data, such as usernames and passwords, or 
to display certain information, such as error and warning messages. Figure 4.8 contains a 
snippet of code extracted from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class library, which 
initialises a Callback array with a NameCallback, a PasswordCallback and a 
TextlnputCallback, and passes this array as a parameter to the handle() method of the 
CallbackHandler.
// Setup default callback handlers.
Callback[] callbacks = new Callback[] { 





String username = ((NameCallback)callbacks[0]).getName();
String password = new String(((PasswordCallback)callbacks[l]).getPassword());
((PasswordCallback)callbacks[l]).clearPassword();
String loginTime = ((TextInputCallback)callbacks[2]).getText();
Figure 4.8 -  Extract from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class library
From a software development perspective, there are various means of communicating 
with a user, e.g. command-line, Graphical User Interface (GUI), web interface. In order 
to provide independence from the different means of user interaction, the LoginModule 
invokes a CallbackHandler in the javax.security.auth.callback package to perform the 
user interaction and obtain the requested information. As the Bi!ling4Rent solution was 
built around a web interface, the Billing4Rent project team implemented a 
PassiveCallbackHandler. Figure 4.9 contains a snippet of code extracted from the
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PassiveCallbackHandler class library. The constructor takes a usemame/userLD and 
password, retrieved from the user via the JSP login page, and a system generated login 
time, so its handle() method does not have to prompt the user for input. The 
PassiveCallbackHandlers handle() method uses the usemame/userlD, password and login 
time, that were supplied to the constructor, to popluate the NameCallback, 
PasswordCallback and the TextlnputCallback respectively.
/**
* Assigns the username and password input via login page
* to local variables.
* @param user the username to be authenticated.
* @param pass the password to be authenticated.
* @param loginTime System generated login time
*/
public PassiveCallbackHandler(String user, String pass, String loginTime) { 
this.username = user; 
this.password = pass.toCharArray(); 
this.loginTime = loginTime;
}
* Handles the specified set of Callbacks. Uses the
* username and password that were supplied to our
* constructor to popluate the NameCallback and
* PasswordCallback.
* @param callbacks array of callbacks to handle.
* @throws IOException if an input or output error occurs.
* @throws UnsupportedCallbackException if the callback
* is not an instance of NameCallback or PasswordCallback.
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*/
public void handle(Callback[] callbacks)
throws java.io.IOException, UnsupportedCallbackException { 
for (int i = 0; i < callbacks.length; i++) {
// Check if this is a NameCallback 
if (callbacks[i] instanceof NameCallback) {
((NameCallback)callbacks[i]).setName(username);
// Check if this is a Password Callback 
} else if (callbacks[i] instanceof PasswordCallback) {
((PasswordCallback)callbacks[i]).setPassword(password);
// Check if this is a Password Callback 
} else if (callbacks[i] instanceof TextlnputCallback) {
((TextInputCallback)callbacks[i]).setText(loginTime);
// Otherwise throw an unsupported callback exception 
} else {
throw new UnsupportedCallbackException( 
callbacks [i],
"[PassiveCallbackHandler] Callback class not supported");
}
}
}      ____________
Figure 4.9 - Extract from the PassiveCallbackHandler class library
4.3.1.4 Subject, principals and credentials
If the login is successful, a new Subject object is instantiated and populated with 
authentication details such as the username and password. A Subject object represents a 
group of related information for a single entity such as a person or an organisation. The 
Subject is composed of principals, one or more identities, and corresponding credentials, 
one or more security-related attributes, e.g. passwords and cryptographic keys.
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Credentials are classed as either private containing sensitive information, or public 
containing information intended to be shared. Figure 4.10 contains a snippet of code 
extracted from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class library, which stores the principals 
and credentials in temporary variables. Two RdbmsAdminPrincipal objects are created 
for the client, based on the client’s full name and role identities, both of which are 
extracted from the database. In addition, a RdbmsPrivateCredential object and a 
RdbmsPublicCredential object are created to store the user’s password and public key 
certificate respectively. Both the public and the private credentials are also extracted 
from the database. The RdbmsAdminPrincipal, RdbmsPublicCredential and 
RdbmsPrivateCredential objects are stored temporarily in private vectors.





p = new RdbmsAdminPrincipal(dbRole); 
this.tempPrincipals.add(p);
publicCredential = new RdbmsPublicCredential(); 
publicCredential.setProperty("credential", dbCredential); 
this .tempPubl i cCredentials. add(publicCredential );
privateCredential = new RdbmsPrivateCredential(); 
privateCredential.setProperty("password", dbPassword); 
this.tempPrivateCredentials.add(privateCredential);
Figure 4.10 -  Extract from the RdbmsClientLogiuIVIodule class library
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Finally, the data stored in the temporary vectors is added to the Subject objects principals 
and credentials members (Figure 4.11).
subj ect.getPr incipals() ,addAll(tempPrinci pals);
subject.getPublicCredentials().addAll(tempPublicCredentials);
subject.getPrivateCredentials().addAll(tempPrivateCredentials);
Figure 4.11 -  Extract from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class library
4.3.2 Authorisation
JAAS authorisation enables system administrators to ensure that users have the 
appropriate permissions to perform required actions and access requested resources. 
JAAS extends the existing Java security architecture that uses a security policy to specify 
what access rights are granted to executing code. JAAS enables the administrator to 
grant access rights based on who is running the code, in addition to what code is running 
[80], [81]. After the client has been authenticated, a Subject object is instantiated and 
populated with authentication details such as principals and credentials. A Subject is 
comprised of one or more principals, where each principal represents an identity for that 
user or entity and a set of credentials. A credential is taken to represent any object used 
to perform authorisation, e.g. a certificate, password, or kerberos ticket. The Java 
security manager uses a policy file to associate authenticated principals with permissions. 
If a principal associated with a particular Subject object has the required permission, then 
the action is permitted, otherwise the action is denied and a SecurityException is thrown.
4.3.2.1 Policy file
The security policy, used by tomcat and implemented by the Java security manager, is 
configured in the $CATALINA_HOME/conf/catalina.policy file. The catalina.policy file
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is used instead of the java.policy file, located in the Java development kit (JDK) systems 
directory, for web applications. Figure 4.12 contains an extract from the catalina.policy 
file used by the Billing4Rent case study. The entries in the catalina.policy file adhere to 
the following format:
grant <signedBy "signer_names">, <codeBase "URL">, <principal "principal name"> { 
permission permissionclassname "target name", <"action">,
<signedBy "signer_names">;
permission permissionclassname "target_name", <"action">,
<signedBy "signer_names">;
Each ‘grant’ entry contains one or more permission sub entries. The <signedBy>, 
<codeBase> and <principal> properties are optional. The <permission> property is 
composed of the full path of a Permission class, the actual permission specified by the 
target name, and where required, the action, e.g. type of file access permitted. The Java 
API provides several subclasses of the java.security.permission class. For example, 
AllPermission, BasicPermission and FilePermission. Alternatively, it is possible to 
extend the java. security.permission class to handle the type of authorisation required.
As the ASP billing solution was designed around a web interface, the Billing4Rent 
project team implemented a java.security.permission class, URLPemission, in order to 
permit or deny access to URLs. The URLPermission class, which resides in the 
com.B4R.library.security.JAAS package, extends the java.security.permission class. The 
URLPermission class is capable of validating both absolute paths and wild cards, i.e. 
paths that ends in 7*’.
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grant Principal com.B4R.library.security.JAAS.RdbmsAdminPrincipal "admin" { 
permission com.B4R.library.security.JAAS.URLPermission 7b4r/admin/*";
};
Figure 4.12 — Extract from catalina.policy
4.32.2 Privileged actions and the security manager
After the client has successfully logged into Billing4Rent, a Subject object is instantiated 
and populated with authentication details such as principals and credentials. For each 
subsequent page request, the application calls the Subject classes static doAsPrivileged() 
method, in order to determine if the client has the privileges required to access the 
resource. Figure 4.13 provides a high level overview of Billing4Rent client authorisation, 
constructed using Unified Modeling Language (UML) sequence diagram components.
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Figure 4.13 -  Authorisation Sequence Diagram
Figure 4.14 contains a snippet of code extracted from the ClientCheckPrivilagedAction 
servlet, which retrieves a Subject object from a LoginContext, instantiates a 
ClientURLAction object and passes both as parameters to the Subject class’ static 
doAsPrivileged() method. The doAsPrivileged() method invokes the run() method of the 
ClientURLAction object, which uses the Java security manager and the catalina.policy file 
to verify the client has the required permissions. Figure 4.4 provides a high level 
overview of client authentication, using Unified Modeling Language (UML) sequence 
diagram components.
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II Retrieve the LoginContext from the session object 
LoginContext clientlc = (LoginContext) session.getValue("clientlc");
// Retrieve LoginContext subject and store in subject object 
Subject mySubject = clientlc.getSubject();
// Execute URLAction as an authenticated Subject 
PrivilegedAction action = new ClientURLAction();
Object result = Subject.doAsPrivileged(mySubject, action, null);
// Convert result from object to boolean
boolean success = ((Boolean)result).booleanValue();
Figure 4.14 - Extract from the ClientCheckPrivilagedAction servlet
Figure 4.15 contains a snippet of code extracted from the ClientURLAction class library. 
ClientURLAction is an implementation of the PrivilegedAction interface, which 
determines if the user has the required permission to access the requested webpage. The 
ClientURLAction object’s run() method retrieves a SecurityManager object if one exists 
or alternatively instantiates a new SecurityManager object. It instantiates a 
URLPermission object and passes it as a parameter to the SystemManager object’s 
checkPermissionO method. The SystemManager object’s checkPermission() method in 
turn calls the AccessController object’s checkPermissionO method which determines 
whether access to the requested resource should be allowed or denied. This decision is 
based on the permission to be validated and the security policy currently in effect. If 
access is allowed, checkPermissionO returns quietly, i.e. returns boolean true. 
Alternatively an exception is thrown. Finally, the ClientURLAction object’s run() method 
returns true if the client has the required permissions. Otherwise it returns false. It is 
worth noting that the URLPermission class is capable of validating both absolute paths 
and wild cards, i.e. paths that ends in 7*’.
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II If a security manager does not exist create a new security manager object 
final SecurityManager sm;
if (System.getSecurityManager() =  null) 
sm = new SecurityManager();
else
sm = System.getSecurityManager();
// Create a new URLPermission object in order to permit/deny
// access to URL pages based on user permissions.
final Permission urlPerm = new URLPermission("/b4r/client/*");
// Throws a SecurityException if the requested access, specified 
// by the given permission, is not permitted based on the security 
// policy currently in effect. This method calls 
// AccessController.checkPermission with the given permission. 
sm.checkPermission(urlPerm);
Figure 4.15 — Extract from the ClientURLAction class library
4.4 Secure Login and navigation
In an ASP environment, both the security of the client login details and the security and 
the integrity of the client data transmitted over the network are imperative. In order to 
ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the solution data, the Billing4Rent project team 
designed the billing solution to use HTTPS. HTTPS is a secure version of the HTTP 
where requests and responses are encrypted using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) prior to being sent over the network. In the Billing4Rent 
solution, the HTTPS protocol is used for the login to (Figure 4.16, Figure 4.17) and 
navigation of both the billing solution and the administration tool. It is worth noting that
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as the Billing4Rent prototype was also designed to ensure optimal performance, access to 
general information that does not warrant security is permitted via HTTP.
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Figure 4.17 -  Billing4Rent Client Login
The Billing4Rent solution was deployed in an Apache Tomcat environment, which uses a 
set of Java packages known as Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE), to enable secure 
Internet communications. HTTPS is configured in Tomcat by creating a certificate 
keystore (Figure 4.18) and defining a SSL HTTP connector in the server.xml 
configuration file (Figure 4.19).
Keytool is Sun Microsystem’s command-line, key and certificate management utility. It 
facilitates the administration of public/private key pairs and associated certificates for use 
in self-authentication or data integrity and authentication services, using digital 
signatures. A keytool is used to store the keys and certificates in a keystore - a special 
file type that can hold keys and certificates. The keystore is subsequently encrypted with 
a password for security.
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The following steps are required to create a new certificate keystore:
• Ensure the JAVAHOME environment variable is configured to point to the Java
Development Kit (JDK).
• Open a command prompt and type the command in Figure 4.18. This command
will create a new file, in the home directory of the user under which it is run, 
named ‘.keystore’. Alternative, it is possible to use the keystore parameter to
specify the complete pathname to the keystore file.
• Enter the keystore password when prompted. The default password used by 
Tomcat is ‘changeit’, although it is possible to specify a custom password.
• Complete the general information with regard to this certificate, such as company, 
contact name etc.
• Finally, enter the key password, which is the password specific to this certificate.
%JAYA_HOME%\bin\keytool -genkey -alias tomcat -keyalg RSA
Figure 4.18 -  Call Keytool from the command line
To complete the Tomcat HTTPS configuration, uncomment the SSL HTTP connector 
element in the server.xml configuration file and update the connector attributes. Change 
the default port number from 8443, the port on which Tomcat listens for secure TCP/IP 
connection, to 443 the default port for HTTPS communication. Figure 4.20, adapted 
from [104] details several attributes, which may need to be updated based on the options 
specified during creation of the keystore.
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<!— Define a SSL HTTP/1.1 Connector on port 443 -->
<Connector port="443" maxHttpHeaderSize="8192"
maxThreads-'150" minSpareThreads="25" maxSpareThreads="75" 
enableLookups-'false" disableUploadTimeout-'true" 
acceptCount-TOO" scheme="https" secure="true" 
clientAuth="false" sslProtocol="TLS" />
Figure 4.19 — Extract from server.xml
Attribute Details
ClassName The fully qualified class name of the Java class that 
implements this socket factory. Do not change the default 
value.
ClientAuth Set this value to true if you want Tomcat to require all SSL 
clients to present a client Certificate in order to use this socket.
KeystoreFile Add this attribute if the keystore file you created is not in the 
default place that Tomcat expects (a file named .keystore in 
the user home directory under which Tomcat is running). You 
can specify an absolute pathname, or a relative pathname that 
is resolved against the $CATALINA_BASE environment 
variable.
KeystorePass Add this element if you used a different keystore (and 
Certificate) password than the one Tomcat expects (changeit).
Protocol The encryption/decryption protocol to be used on this socket. 
Do not change the default value.
Figure 4.20 -  Connector properties adapted from 1104]
As the Billing4Rent billing solution and administration tool both use HTTPS, the first 
time a user attempts to access a secured page on the Billing4Rent site, they will be 
presented with a dialog containing the details of the certificate and asked if they wish to 
proceed with the transaction (Figure 4.21). If the user chooses to proceed, the server
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renders the appropriate login page on the browser. Otherwise the current page will 
continue to be displayed.
Security  Alert XJ
Infotmation you exchange with this site cannot be viewed or 
changed by others. However, there is a problem with the site's 
security certificate.
/? \  The security certificate was issued by a company you have 
not chosen to trust. View the certificate to determine whether 
you want to trust the certifying authority.
/ t \  The security certificate has expired or is not yet valid.
/ t \  The name on the security certificate is invalid or does not 
match the name of the site
Do you want to proceed?
Yes No View Certificate
Figure 4.21 -  Accept/reject certifícate dialog
4.5 Secure Logout
After the user has logged out of a password-protected system, they should be redirected 
to the login page. Under no circumstances should a user be granted access to the system 
without re-logging into the system. In order to achieve this level of security, it is 
imperative that all pages of a password-protected site ensure the user has been 
authenticated prior to the page being rendered on the browser. Secondly, pages must not 
be cached on the client i.e. HTML documents should not be stored temporarily for ease of 
retrieval later.
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4.5.1 Logout
When the user chooses to logout of either the billing solution or the administration tool, 
the appropriate Subject object is destroyed and the user’s session is invalidated. Figure 
4.22 contains a snippet of code extracted from the ClientLogout servlet, which retrieves 
the LoginContext object from the session and calls the LoginContext object’s logout() 
method. This method in turn invokes the logoutO method of the 
RdbmsClientLoginModule object (Figure 4.23). If logout is successful, the method 
returns quietly, i.e. returns boolean true. Alternatively an exception is thrown. Finally, 
the servlet removes both the LoginContext and the clientID from the HttpSession object, 
invalidates the session and unbinds any objects coupled to it.
// Retrieve the LoginContext object from the session object 
LoginContext clientlc = (LoginContext) session.getValue("clientlc");
client = (String) session.getValue("clientId");
// Call the LoginContext logout method 
clientlc.logoutO;
// Remove LoginContext session attribute 
session.removeAttribute("clientlc");
session.removeAttribute(client);
// Invalidate the session 
session.invalidateQ;
Figure 4.22 — Extract from the ClientLogout servlet
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Figure 4.23 contains a snippet of code extracted from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class 
library, which uses an Iterator to remove all of the principals and the credentials from the 
Subject object.
// remove the principals the login module added
Iterator it = subject.getPrincipals(RdbmsAdminPrincipal.class).iterator(); 
while (it.hasNextO) {
RdbmsAdminPrincipal p = (RdbmsAdminPrincipal)it.next(); 
subject.getPrincipals().remove(p);
}
// remove the public credentials the login module added
it = subject.getPublicCredentials(RdbmsPublicCredential.class).iterator();
while (it.hasNextO) {
RdbmsPublicCredential c = (RdbmsPublicCredential)it.next(); 
subj ect. getPu bl i cCredenti al s() .r emo ve(c);
}
// remove the private credentials the login module added
it = subject.getPrivateCredentials(RdbmsPrivateCredential.class).iterator();
while (it.hasNextO) {
RdbmsPrivateCredential c = (RdbmsPrivateCredential)it.next(); 
subject.getPrivateCredentials().remove(c);
}
Figure 4.23 — Extract from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class library
A primary requirement of the Billing4Rent solution is to ensure that sensitive data 
remains confidential. After the user has logged out of either the billing solution or the 
administration tool and the session has been invalidated, the user is redirected to the 
appropriate login page. The billing solution and administration tool servlets and JSP 
pages have been designed to ensure that the user has been authenticated prior to rendering
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the page on the user’s browser. If an unauthenticated user tries to access a page by typing 
the path directly into address bar, they will automatically be redirected to the login page. 
However, further action was required to ensure that the browsers back button could not 
be used in order to access cached pages.
4.5.2 Disable B ack Button
When the Back button is clicked, by default the browser does not request the page from 
the web server. Instead, the browser simply reloads the page from its cache. The 
solution to this problem was to disable caching on all billing solution and administration 
tool servlets and JSP pages. This is achieved by appending headers to the HTTP 
response using the HTTPServletResponse interface. Figure 4.24 contains a snippet of 





Figure 4.24 -  Extract from Billing4Rent solution servlets
The Billing4Rent solution has been designed to ensure that the user must be authenticated 
in order to access the billing solution or the administration tool and, in addition, the pages 
are not cached. Therefore, attempts to use the back button after the user has logged out of 
the system will not result in the page being rendered. If the user attempts to access a page 
which was created using a POST request, a page expired message will be displayed 
(Figure 4.25). If the user elects to refresh the page, they will be redirected to the 
appropriate login page.
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Unfortunately, if the user elects to refresh the login page the username and password 
parameters are resubmitted from cache by default and the browser has no means of 
knowing that this is in fact a security breach. In order to resolve this issue, the login page 
was updated to include a hidden field that is dynamically initialised at runtime with the 
current system time. Each time a user attempts to login to the system, the current login 
time is compared to the last successful login time for the corresponding user, which is 
stored in the USER table in the database. If the current login time is greater than the last 
successful login time, the user is permitted access to the system. Otherwise they are 
redirected to the login page. Figure 4.26 contains a snippet of code extracted from the 
RdbmsClientLoginModule class library, which stores the last successful login time in the 
B4RCLIENT table in the oracle database.
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if ((currentLoginTime > previousLoginTime) || (dbLoginTime =  null)) {
SQLUpdate = new StringBuffer("UPDATE B4RCLIENT set last login time = ")
. append(loginTime)




// Execute the sql insert statement 
stmt.executeUpdate(SQLUpdate);
}
Figure 4.26 — Extract from the RdbmsClientLoginModule class library
4.6 Encryption
Encryption is the translation of data into an unintelligible form through the use of a secret 
code, in order to ensure confidentiality. Encrypted data is referred to as ‘cipher’ or 
‘cipher text’, whereas unencrypted data is commonly known as ‘plain text’. Decryption 
is the process of restoring data to its original form through the use of a secret code. 
Encryption is an effective means of ensuring the privacy and integrity of information 
stored locally or transferred over a network. In order to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of data transferred over public networks, the Billing4Rent project team designed 
the billing solution and the administration tool to use HTTPS. For an overview of the use 
of HTTPS in order to facilitate secure login and navigation see section 4.4. It is equally
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important that sensitive data stored in secondary storage is protected from both external 
and internal threats. Although encryption is not a substitute for effective access control, 
one can obtain an additional measure of security by selectively encrypting sensitive data 
before it is stored in the database [90]. The Billing4Rent solution has been designed to 
encrypt solution passwords, using a one-way hash function, prior to inserting a password 
into the Oracle database.
Figure 4.27 contains a snippet of code extracted from the Password class library, which 
uses Message Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) encryption and BASE64 encoding to encrypt 
passwords. An encryptO method generates a MessageDigest object that implements 
MD5. A message digest is the representation of text in the form of a single string of 
digits. MD5 is a widely used cryptographic hash function with a 128-bit hash value. The 
password is encoded into a sequence of bytes using the 8-bit Unicode Transformation 
Format (UTF-8) character set. The result is subsequently used as a parameter into the 
MessageDigest update() method. UTF-8 encodes each Unicode character as a variable 
number of 1 to 4 octcts, where the number of octets depends on the integer value assigned 
to the Unicode character. The updateO method fills the digest’s buffer with data. Once 
the buffer contains all the necessary data the MessageDigest digest() method completes 
the hash computation by performing final operations such as padding. Finally the 
BASE64Encoder encode() method encodes the byte array into Base64 format. Base64 
encoding takes three bytes, each consisting of eight bits, and represents them as four 
printable characters in the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) 
standard.
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String ALGORITHM = "MD5";
MessageDigest md = null;
try {
// Generate a MessageDigest object that implements
// the specified digest algorithm.
md = MessageDigest.getInstance(ALGORITHM);
// Fill the digest's buffer with data to compute a
// message digest from
md. update(password. getBytes("UTF - 8"));
// Generate the digest. This does any necessary padding 
// required by the algorithm 
byte raw[] = md.digest();
// Undocumented java class to Encode bytes to base64 to 
// get a string
String hash = (new BASE64Encoder()).encode(raw);
return hash;
} catch (Exception e) {




Figure 4.27 -  Extract from the Password class library
Subsequently when the user attempts to login to either the Billing4Rent billing solution 
or the administration tool, the login module uses MD5 encryption and BASE64 encoding 
to encrypt the password input by the user. Thus the username and password input by the
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user can be compared to the username and the encrypted password stored in the Oracle 
database.
4.7 Strong Passwords
Access to both the Billing4Rent web application and computer systems is restricted to 
authorised personnel through the enforcement of strong passwords. The stronger the 
password is the more difficult it is for both humans and machines to figure it out. Best 
practices denote that a strong password should be at least eight characters long and 
should be composed of a combination of uppercase, lowercase, numeric and punctuation 
characters [96], [97], [98].
Figure 4.28 contains a snippet of code extracted from the Password class library, which 
ensures that all billing solution and administration tool passwords adhere to the above 
guidelines. Firstly, a regular expression representing a strong-password is initialised 
(Figure 4.28, Figure 4.29). A regular expression is a means of describing a set of strings 
based on common characteristics shared by each string in the set. It is worth noting that 
there are several different types of regular expression syntax e.g. Perl, Python and PHP. 
The regular expressions in the Java java.util.regex package are very similar to Perl 
syntax. Java regular expressions are based on peri regurlar expressions as a result of their 
popularity and the power of the peri approach.
A(?=.*\\d)(?=. * [a-z])(?=. * [A-Z])(?=. * [AWw])(? !. *\\s). * $
Figure 4.28 -  Strong Password regular expression
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Construct Matches
A The beginning of a line
(?=.*\\d) Must contain at least one digit
(?=.*[a-z]) Must contain at least one lower case character
(?=.*[A-Z]) Must contain at least one upper case character
(?=.*[A\\w]) Must contain at least one non word character
(?!.*\\s) Allow whitespace characters
.* $ The end of a line
Figure 4.29 -  Strong Password regular expression construct
Secondly, the password is validated to ensure that it is greater than eight characters long. 
If the password is not greater than eight characters, the method returns false and an 
appropriate message is displayed to the user (Figure 4.30). Thirdly, a Pattern object is 
created and the regular expression is compiled into a pattern. The Pattern object is used 
to create a Matcher object by calling the Pattern object’s matcher() method. Finally, the 
matchesO method attempts to match the entire input sequence against the pattern. If the 
password does not match the strong password pattern, the method returns false and an 
appropriate message is displayed to the user (Figure 4.31).
// Pattern to ensure a string is composed of a numeric ,
// an uppercase, a lowercase and a punctuation char
String pattern = "A(?=.*\\d)(?=.*[a-z])(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[A\\w])(?!.*\\s).*$";
try {
// Passwords must be greater than 8 characters in length 




// Create a pattern object and compile the given regular 
// expression into a pattern
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Pattern p = Pattem.compile(pattem);
// Create a matcher object that will match the given input
// against this pattern
Matcher m = p.matcher(password);
// Attempt to match the entire input sequence against the 
// pattern on success return true otherwise false 
success = m.matches();
}
// return true/false 
return success;
} catch (Exception e) {




Figure 4.30 -  Extract from the Password class library
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Figure 4.31 — Biliing4Rent administration tool add new client
4 .8  T im eou t
As a security measure, the Billing4Rent billing solution and the administration tool 
timeout after a specified period of inactivity. In Apache Tomcat the session timeout is 
configured in web.xml, the deployment descriptor of the web application. Alternatively, 
the timeout can be specified using the HITPSession object’s setMaxInactiveInterval() 
method. The timeout internal, the time period a session can remain idle for before the 
server terminates it is specified in minutes. Both the billing solution and the 
administration tool have been configured to timeout after ten minutes of inactivity 
(Figure 4.32). When either the billing solution or the administration tool timeout due to 
inactivity the Subject object is destroyed, the session is invalidated and the user is
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presented with the login page. If the user tries to use the back button or type the path 




Figure 4.32 -  Extract from BiUing4Rent web.xml
4.9 File Upload
The Billing4Rent team elected to use a combination of Apache Commons FileUpload and 
HTTPS in order to facilitate the secure uploading of client collateral. Figure 4.33 
contains a snippet of code extracted from the ClientFileUpload servlet, which uses the 
Apache Commons FileUpload package in order to provide the client with a means of 
securely uploading electronic resources. Firstly, a DiskFileUpload object is instantiated 
and used to parse the request, in order to obtain a list of items to stream to the web 
application. Secondly, an Iterator object is used to loop through the list. If the list item 
is an uploaded file, the list getName() method, which returns the full path of the file on 
the client machine, is used to create a File object. The File object’s getNameO method, 
which returns only the file name, is subsequently used to create a new File object by 
concatenating the full destination path with the filename. Finally, the uploaded file is 
written to disk. Figure 4.34 and Figure 4.35 contain screenshots from the Billing4Rent 
billing solution depicting the selection of the file to be uploaded and display of the said 
file respectively. For security reasons, the uploaded file should be checked for viruses 
prior to being written to disk. Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition can be configured 
for real-time scanning and on-demand scans.
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II Create a new DiskFileUpload object 
DiskFileUpload upload = new DiskFileUpload();
// Use the handler to parse this request 
// Giving us a list of items from the request 
List items = upload.parseRequest(request);
// Create an iterator object 
Iterator itr = items.iterator();
while(itr.hasNextO) {
Fileltem item = (Fileltem) itr.nextO;
// Check if the current item is a form field or an uploaded file 
if(!item.isFormField()) {
if(item.getName().equals("")){
String msg = "File name required!";
// Store error msg in in a request object 
request.setAttribute("msg", msg);
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File fullFile = new File(item.getName());
// Construct destination path for the file to be uploaded 




// Write the file to disk 
item.write(savedFile);
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4.10 Logging
In the event o f a security breach, logging helps determine the extent of the damage 
caused. Both the Billing4Rent billing solution and the administration tool have been 
developed to support audit, error and security logging. After examining a number of 
logging applications, the Billing4Rent development team elected to implement a custom 
logging system, due to the unique nature o f the Billing4Rent ASP logging requirements. 
Figure 4.36 contains a snippet of code extracted from the ClientLogin servlet, which 
concatenates a string using a StringBuffer object and uses a B4Rlogger object to add data 
to the B4RSECURITYLOG table in an oracle database. The B4RSECUR1TYLOG table 
is composed of the following fields: LOG ENTRY, USER ID, DATE LOGGED, 
STATUS, MODULE and LOG MSG. The B4Rlogger object is used to manipulate the 
error, audit and security logs. The error log details any errors that occur throughout the 
Billing4Rent web application. The audit trail provides an overview of client activity, e.g.
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when they logged in and what actions they performed. Finally, the security log outlines 
access to secure resources and the performance o f operations deemed to be o f a sensitive 
nature.
securitymsg = new StringBuffer(" Successfully logged in B4RClient [")
.append(client)
,append("] into b4r application")
.toStringO; 
log = new B4Rlogger(debug);
log.addToLogger("Sys Admin", "1", MODULE, securitymsg,
"B4RSECURITYLOG");
F igu re 4 .36 — E xtract from  th e  C lien tL ogin  serv let
The administration tool provides Billing4Rent administrators with the ability to view and 
delete logs, which are stored in audit, error and security tables in the oracle database. 
Figure 4.37 provides a snap shot o f the B4RsecurityLog, which can be filtered based on 
the UserlD, Date Logged or Status fields.
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4.11 Prototype
The Billing4Rent solution prototype is subdivided into three interconnected applications: 
the Billing4Rent Ltd. web application, the billing solution and the administration tool. In 
this section, the author provides an overview of the technologies used and outlines the 
functionality o f each of the applications. Relevant Billing4Rent prototype screenshots 
are included as appendix II.
The ASP Billing4Rent solution prototype is composed of a number o f JSPs, Java servlets, 
enterprise beans and libraries, interfacing with an Oracle database. The solution 
architecture was designed based on the Model-View-Controller (MVC) design pattern 
and the prototype was deployed in a J2EE environment. The prototype was developed in 
order to facilitate the testing of security libraries and to optimise configuration. Due to
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the unpredictable nature of the Billing4Rent project, the prototype architecture was 
designed to enable loosely coupled components to interact by using high-level 
abstractions and established object oriented design principles and patterns. MVC is a 
composite design pattern that can be used at both an architectural macro level and at a 
finer grained micro level. The MVC architecture provides loose coupling by dividing the 
application into three distinct components. Modifications to one component can be made 
with minimal impact to the others. The model component encapsulates the application 
data, the view component is responsible for displaying the data stored in the model and 
the controller component facilitates the exchange of data between the model and the view 
(Figure 4.38). A high level of abstraction was achieved by designing library classes to 
implement interfaces and abstract classes and by developing polymorphism into the 
design to facilitate loose coupling and change.
J2EE Server Database Server
F igure 4 .38 -  M od el-V iew -C on tro ller  arch itecture
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4.11.1 The Billing4Rent Ltd. Web Application
In addition to providing information about the ASP service, the Billing4Rent Ltd. web 
application provides a means of accessing both the billing solution and the administration 
tool. As the Billing4Rent prototype was also designed to ensure optimal performance in 
addition to security, access to the Billing4Rent Ltd., is permitted via HTTP. As the 
Billing4Rent billing solution and administration tool both use HTTPS, the first time a 
user attempts to access a secured page on the Billing4Rent site, they will be presented 
with a dialog containing the details o f the certificate and asked if they wish to proceed 
with the security transaction (Figure 4.39).
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4.11.2 The Billing Solution
The primary functionality o f the Billing4Rent billing solution is to provide billing 
functionality on a subscription or rental basis. The billing solution provides Billing4Rent 
clients with a means to configure and maintain their customer and product details and to 
generate billing information in the form o f invoices (Figure 4.40).
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F igure 4 .40  -  Bill in g4 R ent b illin g  so lu tion
Figure 4.41 provides Billing4Rent clients with a means to view and update the data held 
by Billing4Rent with regard to their organisation.
Client Data 
1 Display C lient D etails 
Update C lient Details
Figure 4.41 -  Client Data menu
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Figure 4.42 allows Billing4Rent clients to manage their customer base. The ‘Display All 
Customers’ menu option details all customers the client has configured to date. Customer 
ID, company name, contact name and a field to indicate if this profile is enabled or 
disabled are displayed for each customer. The company name links to a page containing 
additional customer contact data such as address, email and phone number. The ‘Register 
New Customer’ menu option allows the client to configure additional customers. The 
‘Update Existing Customer’ menu option enables the client to select an existing customer 
from a dropdown list. The client can thus update the corresponding customer details 
displayed on the update customer form. The ‘Delete Customer’ menu option provides the 
client with a means to delete one or more customers configured to date. However, 
invoices associated with deleted customers are not removed from the system by default.
Customers 
Display All Custom ers 
R eg iste r New C ustom er 
Update Existing Custom er 
Delete Custom er
F igure 4.42 -  C u stom ers m enu
Figure 4.43 facilitates the configuration of client products. The ‘Display All Products’ 
menu option displays a list of client products under the headings product ID, name, unit 
charge and enabled flag. The flag is used to indicate which products are currently 
enabled. Each product name can be used as a link to additional product data, such as 
description, invoice string, tax percentage etc. The ‘Register New Product’ menu option 
displays a form which can be used, by the client, to input new product details. The 
‘Update Existing Product’ menu option allows the client to select a product, to be 
updated, from a dropdown list. Subsequently, the selected product details are displayed 
and the application provides the client with the ability to update one of more properties, 
with the exception of the product ID. The ‘Delete Product’ menu option allows the client 
to delete one or more products. As with the deletion o f customers, associated invoices 
are not deleted by default.
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Products
Display All P roducts 
R eg iste r New Product 
Update Existing Product 
Delete Product
F igure 4 .43 — P rod u cts m enu
Figure 4.44 provides Billing4Rent clients with a means to generate billing information in 
the form of invoices. The ‘Display All Invoices’ menu option provides the client with the 
ability to select from a drop down list of customers and displays a summary of invoices 
generated to date for that customer. The invoice number provides a link to the 
corresponding invoice header and line item details. The ‘Create New Invoice’ menu 
option provides the client with the ability to select from a dropdown list o f customers and 
subsequently create an invoice for the selected customer. The invoice number and date 
are generated automatically. The client must supply a corresponding purchase order and 
must add one or more line items to the invoice. The ‘Delete Invoices’ menu option 
provides the client with the ability to select from a dropdown list of customers and 
subsequently facilitates the deletion o f one or more invoices created for that customer.
Invoices
Display All Invoices 
Create New Invoice 
Delete Invoices
F igure 4 .44 -  In vo ices m enu
The ‘File Upload’ menu option permits the secure uploading o f client collateral. The 
‘Logout’ menu option invalidates the session and redirects the client to the client login 
page. For an in-depth look at the functionality provided by the Logout and File Upload 
menu options see section 4.5 and 4.9 respectively.
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4.11.2.1 Privacy statement
In an ASP environment, the privacy protection o f client information is critical. Figure 
4.45 details the privacy practices of Billing4Rent Ltd. Users can access the privacy 
statement by clicking the link at the bottom left hand comer o f the client login tab.
The following provides and overview of Billing4Rents privacy statement:
• Billing4Rent respects the client’s right to privacy and upholds both the Privacy 
and Electronic Communications Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC) and the Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC).
• Billing4Rent takes all reasonable security steps to protect the information 
provided by their clients.
• Billing4Rent will only process personal data with clear permission from the 
client. Any data submitted to Billing4Rent will not be disclosed to a third party 
without explicit and unambiguous consent.
•  Registration is an entirely voluntary process.
• All registered clients have secure direct access to their own set of data. Clients 
have the right to amend their own data if  it contains errors, or if  some data 
requires updating.
• All registered clients have the right to de-register from Billing4Rent at any time.
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4.11.2.2 Security statement
Figure 4.46 details the security practices of Billing4Rent Ltd. Users can access the 
security statement by clicking the link at the bottom left hard comer of the Client Login
The following provides and overview of Billing4Rents security statement:
• Security and your privacy are of the utmost importance to Billing4Rent.
• Billing4Rent web services are only accessible through secured networks designed 
to prevent unauthorised activity.
•  Client data is stored on separate database machines that are further protected and 
have no direct public access.
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• Clients must login using their username and password in order to gain access their 
personal information. Provided clients keep their password secret their personal 
information will be protected.
• The Billing4Rent web application uses encryption technology to ensure that the 
personal information being passed between the client and Billing4Rent is 
scrambled and therefore cannot be read or understood by third parties.
• Billing4Rent uses cookies to help strengthen security. A cookie is a piece of 
information saved on a client machine by a web application. The cookies used on 
the Billing4Rent web application allows the web-server to identify which page 
they should send to the user next and to verify that the person who is asking for 
the next page in the secure area is actually the same person who passed the 
customer login.
'■Vrovkil Inltrrrwrt FKpforcr - _ -lO lx f
g b  £dt 5¿Scw f averias loafs D
^Bat* -  *+ Ji j) & ^Search JjFAWrt** .0MmU _J
Address | ^j ht^ ://tocal»st/b4r/tfcnULfcr<5ocir(ty5íaU-merit,ííp *J (i>&J Lhks H
b i l l i n g  O r i e n t . c o m
S tir  ¡ v e  p r o i/ ii ie r
Adminiiir.itiim
Client Data
Display C lien t D etails 
Update C lient D etails 
Customers
Display All C ustom ers !
R eg is te r N nv C ustom er 
Update Existing C astom er 
Delete C ustom er 
Prodnets
Display A ll P roducts 
R eg is te r New P ro d u c t 
lod a te  Fvis tin»  P roduct 
Delete Product [
Invilir os 
Display A ll Im vices 
C reate New litro ice 
Delete Invoices 
R ie  Upload
Logout
Security  S tatem ent
• Security and your privacy are of the utmost importance to BiUmg4Rent
• Our web services are only accessible through secured networks designed to prevent 
unauthorised activity
■ None ofyoui personal information is stored on our web serveis It is held on separate 
database machines that are further protected and have no duecl public access
• You cannot access your personal infortnation without passing our customer password- 
protected login Provided you keep youi passwoid secret your personal information will be 
protected
• Encryption means that the personal information being passed between you and us is scrambled 
and so cannot be read or understood by thu d patties The Billing-4 Rent website incorporates
' si long' meiypwofc IcibnoJoay yrfmcti means that the peri«»« »kfoniuvii,--» btuvs 
bfiwccn you find us i; scrambled and so tnrmof be re«4 c-t latdrti jto<i«l by tbi4 pjtttus*
• ii&ig4Krrpf alio cookie* foftlp istretglbiw wtunty A cookK «  .1 p i t 'i  of uifotinutaui 
sent to yo-w F C  whfnyoti a t t c i i  a w tb sm . T k t c o o b tf  ^  «iii we&jite illoM'i eiii 
v/ebicivtT to rirat^V wtuth page Iht'y t lw M  «i»d to  Uk uiw wiit .rnd to Verify tluii liie 
p a te n  who if .vkmgfoi ihr itcn  HiV ibe M ttue j^ jn  it u tu iijy  (lie jjrue who 
pOFiiedlb& ttirtc-tnii legit' 1T>? cookiei tiw4 <«■(!» we i*: tie da w i  co>utM pi-rf-NKil 
information, and cannot be access by other web sites
If you have have any questions with tegard to Billing4Rent security 01 pnvacy please contact 
biliing4rent via email at mfo@billiiig4teiit.ie.
(tel 1§2 Locai htranet
zi
Figure 4.46 -  Security Statement
115
Chapter IV Case Study
4.11.3 The Administration Tool
The administration tool provides Billing4Rent employees with the ability to configure 
and maintain Billing4Rent client details and to monitor both the security and the 
performance of the billing solution (Figure 4.47).
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Figure 4.48 provides Billing4Rent administrators with the ability to manage the 
administration tool users. The ‘Display All Users’ menu option displays the name, 
username, role and public credentials of all users configured to date. The profile field 
indicates whether a profile is currently enabled or disabled. The ‘Register New User’ 
menu option allows the administrator to configure addition administration tool users. 
The ‘Update Existing User’ and ‘Delete Users’ menu options enable the administrator to 
update or delete existing users respectively.
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User Admin I Cli
Display All Users 
Register New User 
Update Existing User 
Delete Users
F igu re 4 .48  — U ser  adm in istration  m enu
Figure 4.49 facilitates the configuration of Billing4Rent clients. The ‘Display All 
Clients’ menu option displays a list all clients configured to date. The ‘Register New 
Client’ menu option allows the administrator to configure new clients. The password 
configured by the administrator should be updated by the client the first time they access 
the billing solution. The ‘Update Existing Client’ menu option enables the administrator 
to update existing client details. Alternatively the client can update their details using the 
billing solution ‘Update Client Data’ menu option. The ‘Delete Clients’ menu option 
provides the administrator with a means to delete Billing4Rent clients. As a result all 
invoices and products associated with this client are deleted by default.
Client Admin I Stai
Display All Clients 
Register New Client 
Update Existing Client 
Delete Clients
F igure 4.49 -  C lien t ad m in istration  m enu
Figure 4.50 provides Billing4Rent administrators with the ability to view statistical data 
with regard to the billing solution.
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B4R Tables Sizes
B 4R  U ser Number o f  R ow s in  T able: 2
B 4R  C lient Number o f  R ow s in Table 1
B 4R  Custom er Number o f  Rows in T able: 2
B 4R  Product Number o f  Rows in  Table: 3
B 4R  Invoice Header Number o f  R ow s in  Table: 4
B 4R  invoice D etails Number o f  Rows in  Table' 6
B 4R  E rror Log Number o fR o w sin T a b le :4
B 4R  Audit Log Number o f  Rows in Table: 201
B 4R  Security Log Number o f  R ow s in Table: 13
B 4R  Admin Error Log Number o f  Rows in T ab le-1
B 4R  Admin Audit Log Number o f  R ow s in T able 112
F igu re  4 .53 — B 4R  T ab le  S izes
The ‘Launch JAMon’ menu option opens a new window and displays performance data 
with regard to the Billing4Rent billing solution e.g. page hits, access times and module 
completion times (Figure 4.54). The performance monitor can be configured to monitor 
servlets, JSP pages and specific sections o f code.
1 1 9
Chapter IV Case Study
f >  t «  * « *  Fffvorf« lo d i wm
JÌ JJF-flw W *« i^ ’Modka lì£ ^ *. J  ' J
■* j f^G o  liifcs **|
----------------------------- — ----------    '------------   3








J S J » .  M i  H u i l W J » ! » Ì  30 C l 43
J S P .  C l i o  i i l D i s p l . i V l i i v o k v , l 5| J i j  u [ 10 ° [
J S P .  C k ) t l U } » 9« > < ^ I W U i C O H 0« d ( N  K J S |1 2  45 a o 49
J S P  * 1 10 t o 0
. r S f  » ,  d i n n l H n f 3  3 (0 9
, f S P ,  d t u r d l n t f n j s p 0  0 0 0
. I S P .  c S m r t R f / J V c v S t i H f i n r r v l . i t i p 4 20 E D 11




F igure 4 .54  -  JA M on p erform an ce m on itor
Figure 4.55, the JAMon performance monitor provides the ability to view and delete the 
audit, error and security logs for both the billing solution and the administration tool. For 
an in-depth look at logging functionality provided see section 4.10.
«J    ________
¿ J  'St jO iM rs for Ì 5 F . d rn d > a p ^ !I irr tW B ,|^
120
Chapter IV Case Study
Audit: View All 
Error: View All 
S en ility : View All 
Admin Audit: View All 
Admin Error: View All 
Audit: Delete Single 
Error: Delete Single 
Security: Delete Single 
Admin Audit: Delete Single 
Admin Error: Delete Single 
Audit: Delete All 
Error: Delete All 
Security: Delete All 
Admin Audit: Delete All 
Admin Error: Delete All
F igure 4 .55 -  JA M on p erform ance m on itor
Finally, the ‘Home’ menu option provides links to all pages in the Billing4Rent 
administration tool and the ‘Logout’ menu option invalidates the session and redirects the 
client to the administration tool login page. For an in-depth look at the functionality 
provided by the Logout menu option see section 4.5.
4.12 Security Policy
The primary function of the Billing4Rent security policy is to outline guidelines for 
ensuring optimal security o f the ASP solution. The Billing4Rent security policy is an 
ever-changing document, constantly amended to cater for updates to the organisation’s 
systems and procedures. The Billing4Rent security policy is composed of a combination 
of guidelines with regard to general security, physical security, host security, network
Logger
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security and data security. This section provides a high level overview of the 
Billing4Rent security policy. For further information please see appendix III.
4.12.1 General Security
The general security section o f the Billing4Rent security policy provides security 
guidelines for the organisation. It describes the nature o f the security policy and the 
actions required in order to ensure the Billing4Rent solution adheres to security best 
practices.
The general security section outlines the need to:
• Periodically audit the Billing4Rent infrastructure to ensure compliance with the 
security policy for the Billing4Rent ASP solution.
• Maintain a complete architecture document that includes a full network 
diagram of the Billing4Rent ASP environment, illustrating the relationship 
between the ASP environment and any other relevant networks. The document 
should include a full data flowchart detailing where client data resides, the 
applications that manipulate it, and the security thereof.
•  Provide the ability to disable all or part o f the functionality o f the ASP solution 
should a security issue be identified.
•  Perform non-intrusive network audits (basic portscans, etc.) randomly, without 
prior notice, and both intrusive network and physical audits, with 24 hours 
notice.
4.12.2 Physical Security
The physical security section details the protection of both ASP infrastructure and its 
location against theft, tampering and damage, either intentional or not. It recommends 
that Billing4Rent ASP infrastructure should be located in a physically secure data center.
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Access to the facility should be restricted to authorised personnel, through the use of 
biometric scanners plus user pins or passwords. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
should be configured in order to monitor activities throughout the data center. The 
infrastructure should be further secured physically, through the use o f security cables, 
padlocks and other such devises. In order to achieve optimal security, a CCTV policy 
and an access control Policy should be devised and maintained. The CCTV policy should 
detail the type o f system used and security footage storage methods. The access control 
policy should document stringent access control policies and procedures, outlining who is 
authorised to enter the data center, in addition to who is authorised to access the 
Billing4Rent ASP infrastructure.
4.12.3 Host Security
Host security is concerned with restricting access to the ASP solution to authorised 
personal. Appropriate service packs and patches should be applied to the Billing4Rent 
ASP operating systems and applications as soon as they are made available. The 
corporate standard anti-virus/anti-spyware software should be installed on all 
Billing4Rent machines. The anti-virus/anti-spyware site should be checked periodically 
for a list o f updates, which should be installed as they become available. Access to 
Billing4Rent ASP solution should be restricted to authorised personnel by enforcing 
strong passwords and ensuring the implementing o f an account maintenance policy. In 
order to facilitate the above Billing4Rent should document the following policies:
• Service packs/Patches policy
• Anti-virus/Anti-spyware policy
• Password policy
• Account maintenance policy
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4.12.4 Network Security
The network security section provides guidelines for both the protection of hosts on the 
Billing4Rent network and the data transmitted over the Internet. The Billing4Rent ASP 
solution firewall should be configured to filter undesired traffic between the Internet and 
Billing4Rent ASP infrastructure. All unnecessary services running on the ASP 
infrastructure should be disabled, by shutting down unused ports. Remote access to 
Billing4Rent ASP solution hardware should be limited to an absolute minimum. 
Billing4Rent should document in the Billing4Rent ASP Remote and Dial-in Access 
Policies, standards for connecting to Billing4Rent's network from remote hosts. Data 
sent over the Internet should be encrypted to ensure security and integrity o f data being 
transmitted as outlined in the Billing4Rent ASP Cryptography Policy.
4.12.5 Data Security
Data security is also concerned with ensuring the privacy and integrity of client data in an 
ASP environment. Redundant Billing4Rent ASP hardware should be disposed o f in an 
appropriate manner. Software and data should be uninstalled and erased to guarantee that 
sensitive data it is not accessible to unauthorised individuals. Billing4Rent ASP solution 
software and the configuration of the Billing4Rent ASP environment should be tested 
rigorously to ensure the security and the integrity o f client data. ASP solution security 
threats should be identified and the appropriate action should be taken to combat 
unauthorised access to sensitive data.
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4.13 Chapter Summary
The ASP BiIling4Rent solution prototype is composed o f a number o f JSPs, Java servlets 
and Java libraries, interfacing with an Oracle database. The solution architecture was 
designed based on the MVC design pattern and the solution was deployed in a J2EE 
environment. The Billing4Rent solution tackles security on a number o f fronts (Figure 
4.56).
Solution Security Description
Architecture Solution configured to use a demilitarised zone (DMZ). The 
DMZ segregates servers requiring external access from other 
machines on the network.
Hardware Secure premises and the use o f security cables and padlocks to 
further secure Billing4Rent infrastructure.
Operating System Service packs, patches, anti-virus and anti-spyware installed and 
kept up to date.
Authentication Implemented using the Java Authentication and Authorisation 
Service (JAAS) framework and custom pluggable login module.
Authorisation Access control verified using Java Authentication and 
Authorisation Service (JAAS) framework security policy and 
URLPermission class.
Login and navigation Hyper Text Transport Protocol/Secure Sockets Layer (HTTPS) 
encrypts network traffic.
Logout Subject object is destroyed and the user’s session is invalidated.
Data encryption Uses MD5 encryption and BASE64 encoding to encrypt 
passwords.
Auditing Due to the unique nature of the Billing4Rent ASP logging 
requirements, the Billing4Rent development team implemented 
a custom logging system.
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Timeouts
The web applications timeout after ten minutes of inactivity. 
The timeout is configured in web.xml, the deployment 
descriptor of the web application.
Strong passwords
All passwords must be at least eight characters long and should 
be composed o f a combination o f uppercase, lowercase, 
numeric and punctuation characters.
File upload
Apache Commons FileUpload and HTTPS facilitate the secure 
uploading of client collateral.
F igu re  4 .56  — Solution  secu rity  overview
This chapter details all aspects of security with regard to the ASP Billing4Rent prototype 
case study, through a combination o f code snippets, configuration details, diagrams, 
tables and screen shots. In order to demonstrate how the security is incorporated into the 
larger solution we provided an overview o f the core functionality o f the BilIing4Rent 
prototype case study.
Finally it examines the Billing4Rent security policy, which is composed of a combination 
of guidelines with regard to general security, physical security, host security, network 
security and data security
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Chapter V : Research Evaluation
5.1 Introduction
Chapter three detailed the results of a comprehensive literature and technology review of 
Application Service Provision (ASP) with a particular emphasis on system security. 
Chapter four introduced the Billing4Rent solution prototype. It examined the 
implementation of system security in the Billing4Rent case study and illustrated the range 
and types o f technologies that encompass the security framework. This chapter draws on 
the knowledge gained from both the literature and technology review and the 
Billing4Rent case study to provide an objective comparison and analysis of the practical 
implementation of system security in an ASP environment.
Tao [14] defines ASP security as a combination of both client data and server availability. 
Linthicum [21] and Anderson [22] delve a little deeper, breaking down server availability 
into hardware and software security breaches. In order to provide an in-depth evaluation 
of security in an ASP environment, the author further subdivides security as follows:
• Software security, including application, middleware, platform, data and 
network security.
•  Hardware security, in particular, physical and network security.
•  The security and the integrity of client data.
Although the Billing4Rent team incorporated a high level of security into the 
development o f the Billing4Rent solution, best practice dictates that security should be 
continually monitored and improved on an ongoing basis [34], [43], This chapter 
examines the Billing4Rent case study with regard to each o f the aforementioned software 
components and the requirement for ongoing security enhancements.
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5.2 Security Evaluation M atrix
The literature and technology review identified two security standards relevant to the 
examination of ASP security: the Open Standards Interconnect (OSI) security model 
7498-2 and International Standards Organisation (ISO) 17799 security standard. OSI 
7498-2 deals principally with solution security, whereas ISO 17799 is a generic 
information security standard predominately concerned with information security within 
an organisation. As this thesis is primarily concerned with system security requirements 
and implementation in an ASP environment, the author elected to evaluate the 
Billing4Rent case study based on the former.
The security evaluation matrix, depicted by Figure 5.1, lists the seven security services 
identified by OSI 7498-2, based on generally agreed security objectives. It indicates the 
method of protection required, i.e. software or hardware and the security technologies 
used. It identifies the need to supplement hardware and software security through the 
documentation and enforcement of a security policy. The Billing4Rent security policy is 
composed of a number of guidelines for ensuring optimal security of the ASP solution. It 
is an ever-changing document, constantly amended to cater for updates to the 
organisation’s systems and procedures. Finally, the matrix provides an overall picture o f 
the security of the Billing4Rent case study by rating the level o f security provided by the 
solution as strong, medium, weak or not applicable. In the remaining sections o f this 
chapter, the author examines the software and hardware technologies used to secure the 
Billing4Rent case study and the reasons pertaining to the security ratings outlined in the 
security evaluation matrix.
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Physical security Yes Medium
Non -
Repudiation
Software Digital signature No
Not
applicable
Data integrity Software JSSE/ HTTPS No Strong
Confidentiality Software
JSSE/ HTTPS No Strong
Message digest No Strong





System monitoring Yes Medium
Notarisation / 
Signature
Software PKI No Medium
Figure 5.1 -  Security Evaluation matrix
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5.3 Software Security
In this context, software security is a generalised expression used to describe the security 
of all software components that encompass an ASP solution. Software security 
incorporates the operating system software, the development environment software, the 
ASP application software, the middleware in a distributed environment, the database 
management system and the network communication software. This section examines 
the security of each of these discrete software applications in order to provide a complete 
appraisal of the overall solution.
5.3.1 Platform Security
The term platform can be taken to mean either solution hardware or solution software or a 
combination o f both. The physical security section focuses primarily on hardware 
security; therefore this section examines platform security purely from a software 
perspective. Platform security, in a software context, can be used to denote both the 
operating system and the development environment.
Howard and LeBlanc [32] highlight the fact that several o f the well-publicised computer 
security and virus problems relate to bugs in software, due to badly written software and 
poorly configured solutions. The Billing4Rent project team address this issue in their 
security policy. The security policy recommends that appropriate service packs, patches, 
anti-virus and anti-spyware software are installed on all Billing4Rent machines and are 
continually kept up to date by the system administrator. It proposes the adoption of 
authentication and authorisation mechanisms and provides guidelines for the enforcement 
of strong operating system passwords. Although the security policy is geared primarily 
towards the commercial stage o f the project, where feasible the Billing4Rent team 
adhered to the recommendations therein throughout the implementation stage. By 
following best practices with regard to host security, Billing4Rent minimises the security 
risks attributed to poorly configured solutions.
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The Billing4Rent ASP solution was developed and deployed in a Java 2 Platform 
Enterprise Edition (J2EE) environment. J2EE is composed o f a set o f standards for 
developing and deploying enterprise Java applications [105]. J2EE provides a multi-tier 




• Business logic tier
• Enterprise Information Systems (EIS) tier
The client tier incorporates various client application e.g. browsers, applets or standalone 
application clients. The presentation tier composes JSP and servlet web components, 
deployed in web containers. Business logic components implement business rules and 
access enterprise data. The Enterprise Information Systems (EIS) tier, commonly 
referred to as the back-end, is composed o f database management systems and other 
legacy systems.
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F igu re 5 .2  -  M ulti-tier  app lication  m odel ad ap ted  from  [105]
The J2EE platform provides a secure development and runtime environment for Java 
applications. “Data type checking at compile-time and automatic memory management 
leads to more robust code and reduces memory corruption and vulnerabilities. Bytecode 
verification ensures code conforms to the JVM specification and prevents hostile code 
from corrupting the runtime environment. Class loaders ensure that untrusted code 
cannot interfere with other Java programs” [77], In addition, the J2EE platform 
provides mechanisms for enforcing security both declaratively and programmatically. 
Declarative security is specified external to the application whereas programmatic 
security is embedded in an application. Declarative security is achieved through the 
specification o f a security policy using the Extensible Markup Language (XML) within 
J2EE deployment descriptors. J2EE provides a number of extensible Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) to facilitate the development of secure communications, 
cryptography, authentication and access control security features. The Billing4Rent
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solution was developed to make use o f Java APIs where feasible, as they represent best 
practice and it would be unlikely that they could be improved upon. The Billing4Rent 
solution benefits from the code validation and memory management provided by the Java 
platform. The solution further benefits from a high level of abstraction provided through 
the use o f declarative security, APIs and configuration files.
5.3.2 Application Security
Application security is concerned with restricting access to the ASP solution to 
authorised personal and minimising the security risks associated with badly written 
software. According to Morris and Thompson [31], an ASP solution is susceptible to 
threats at the remote terminal, along the communications link and at the physical 
machine. The ASP Billing4Rent solution prototype is composed of a number o f JSPs, 
Java Servlets, enterprise beans and libraries, deployed in a  J2EE environment. This 
section details a number o f measures undertaken by the Billing4Rent team to safeguard 
the Billing4Rent solution against unauthorised access via the remote client.
5.3.2.1 Client Authentication
Joyce [95] defines authentication as a means o f verification o f claimed identity at a point 
in time. Access to the Billing4Rent solution, via a browser is restricted through the use 
o f the dynamic Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) framework. JAAS 
is composed o f a set of APIs that facilitate the authentication and authorisation o f users or 
entities such as services. Although the JAAS framework can be used for both 
authentication and authorisation, this section focuses exclusively on client authentication. 
The JAAS API supplies a number o f dynamically configured LoginModules, which 
perform the authentication using several disparate security infrastructures. Alternatively, 
it is possible to develop custom LoginModules that implement the LoginModule interface. 
The Billing4Rent project team chose to implement a custom LoginModule, responsible
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for the authentication o f login details against data stored in a tier 3 database. The primary 
benefits of the implementation of authentication using JAAS are the ease o f development 
through the reuse o f existing code libraries, the level o f abstraction provided by the 
dynamically configured LoginModules and the ability to use multiple independent 
LoginModules simultaneously.
In order to gain access to the Billing4Rent solution, the client must first successfully log­
in to the web application. The Billing4Rent team designed the solution to use form-based 
login to source a username and password from the user. The login details are 
subsequently verified, by the LoginModule, against validation data stored in the tier 3 
database. Despite well-known security weaknesses, username and password 
combinations remain the most common means of authentication [55]. Passwords are 
subject to security threats such as brute force attacks and network eavesdropping [31],
[55], [58]. In addition, passwords written down, stored online as cleartext or divulged to 
unauthorised individuals may result in compromised security [52]. In an attempt to 
minimise the aforementioned security risks, Billing4Rent adhered to best practices with 
regard to the creation of passwords [96], [97], [98]. The Billing4Rent solution enforces 
strict password selection guidelines. For example, all Billing4Rent passwords must 
contain more than eight characters and must be composed of a combination of 
alphanumeric characters, punctuation symbols and upper and lower case characters. In 
order to prevent attackers from checking several passwords, Pinkas and Sander [55] 
recommend that accounts should be locked after a predefined number of unsuccessful 
login attempts. As an additional security measure, the Billing4Rent solution has been 
designed to disable an account after three unsuccessful login attempts. The Billing4Rent 
administrator is responsible for re-enabling the account at the client’s request. As such 
the Billing4Rent solution provides adequate protection against unauthorised access in the 
form of brute force attacks. A brute force attack is an attempt by a user or a program to 
try multiple combinations of characters, words or other commonly used strings to gain 
unauthorised access to a system. The author would like to highlight that the Billing4Rent 
solution uses the Hyper Text Transport Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer (HTTPS)
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protocol to protect the privacy o f login data transferred over the network. The protection 
o f data security and integrity shall be reviewed in a section dedicated to network security.
5.3.2.2 Server Authentication
In an ASP environment, authentication is intrinsically twofold and as such includes the 
authentication of the application service provider in addition to user authentication as 
outlined above. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a network protocol, which is used to 
ensure secure communication over the Internet. SSL provides authentication of the 
server and, where required, the client. HTTP is a request/response protocol used to 
retrieve web resources from a server and render them in a web browser. HTTPS is a 
secure version of HTTP where requests and responses are encrypted using SSL prior to 
being sent over the network. An X.509 certificate is used in order to facilitate server 
authentication. A server certificate contains information about the server that allows a 
client to identify the server prior to sharing sensitive information. The Billing4Rent 
project team generated a public/private key pair and corresponding X.509 certificate 
using Sun Microsystems’ Keytool, a key and certificate management command-line 
utility. This self-signed certificate is used to verify the identity o f the Billing4Rent 
organisation. Although self-authentication is acceptable as a means of proof of identity, 
in a prototype environment, the author recommends that this certificate should be 
replaced with a digital certificate sourced from a trusted third party, such as a certification 
authority, prior to deploying the service in a production environment. A digital certificate 
generated by a certificate authority it is deemed more secure than self-signed certificates, 
as certificate authorities confirm the identity o f the applicant prior to issuing the 
certificate [106].
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5.3.2.3 Authorisation
Once the user has logged into the Billing4Rent solution, access to resources are managed 
through the adoption o f a stringent authorisation and access control policy. Stergiou [99] 
defines access control as the restriction of admission to resources to the users holding the 
appropriate privileges. Access to sensitive data displayed on Billing4Rent solution web 
pages is restricted through the use of the JAAS framework. JAAS enables the 
administrator to grant access rights based on who is running the code, in addition to what 
code is running [80], [81]. After the Billing4Rent user has been authenticated, a Subject 
object is instantiated and populated with one or more principals, where each principal 
represents an identity for that user. The Java security manager uses a security policy to 
grant or deny principals access to privileged resources. The Billing4Rent project team 
chose to implement a custom URLPermission class, which implements the Permission 
interface. The URLPermission class is used in conjunction with the security policy to 
permit or deny access to URL resources. Again, the JAAS framework facilitates ease of 
development through the reuse o f existing libraries and provides a high level of 
abstraction through the use of a security policy. Access policies are declared in a single 
file that can be easily updated by the system administrator, without the need for code 
changes.
5.3.2.4 Errors in the Code or Application Logic
Software bugs such as errors in the code or application logic leave the computer system 
vulnerable to external attacks [32], [33], McGrath [34] furthers this hypothesis, stating 
that “vulnerabilities typically fa ll into two categories: bugs at the implementation level 
and flaws at the design level". Ideally, applications should be rigorously tested to 
minimise the associated security risks. Ravi et al [35] emphasise the fact that best 
practice recommends considering security throughout the entire Software Design Life 
Cycle (SDLC). Potter and McGraw [33] in turn reveal the benefits that can be achieved 
by identifying security risks in the system and creating tests driven by those risks.
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Unfortunately, there is no such thing as complete security in a usable system and 
consequently it is important to concentrate on reducing risk as opposed to wasting 
resources trying to eliminate it completely [40], The Billing4Rent solution was 
developed using an iterative waterfall model, with security being a foremost 
consideration throughout the project life-cycle. The Billing4Rent team identified 
potential security risks from the offset, incorporated security into both the design and the 
development phases and created a number o f corresponding test cases, with a view to at 
best eliminating or at worst minimising the risk associated with errors in the code or 
application logic. The author would like to highlight that security is also o f utmost 
importance in the integration phase and throughout the entire life-time of the solution.
5.3.2.5 Logging and System Monitoring
Best practice dictates that security should be continually monitored and improved on an 
ongoing basis [34], [43]. Software logs help determine the extent of the damage caused 
by security breaches and assist in meeting the aforementioned objective. In addition, 
logging provides the system administrator with the data required to proactively monitor 
the system for security anomalies [41]. System monitoring provides a successful means 
o f highlighting unforeseen threats in a timely manner and thus limits their impact [43]. 
The Billing4Rent solution has been designed to generate audit, error and security logs. 
The administration tool provides Billing4Rent administrators with the ability to access 
logs, which are stored in audit, error and security tables in an Oracle database. Although 
the current Billing4Rent system monitoring process is quite effective, the author believes 
there is scope here for improvement through automation. The author recommends further 
research into the feasibility o f the Billing4Rent solution automatically generating a 
notification, such as an email, when it uncovers a suspected security breach.
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5.3.2.6 Additional Recommendations
As discussed previously, the Billing4Rent solution uses the dynamic JAAS framework to 
handle both authentication and authorisation. JAAS uses the login configuration file to 
retrieve the name of a class which implements the LoginModule interface, the associated 
Java package and optional configuration options. The debug flag, Oracle database URL, 
Oracle driver, Oracle username and Oracle password properties are all defined, in the 
Billing4Rent login configuration file, as name-value-pairs. As both the Oracle user name 
and password are stored as cleartext in an unencrypted configuration file, the database is 
susceptible to attack should an unauthorised individual gain access to the host and 
subsequently, the configuration file. The author highlights the need for further 
development to enhance the overall security o f the solution. All sensitive configuration 
options should be stored as encrypted data in the login configuration file and 
subsequently decrypted by the associated LoginModule.
5.3.3 Middleware Security
Middleware refers to the software layer between the operating system, including the basic 
communication protocols, and the distributed applications that interact via the network. 
This software infrastructure facilitates the interaction among distributed software 
modules [60]. In general, ASP refers to the supply o f online software functionality to 
multiple clients on a subscription or rental basis, remotely via the Internet or a private 
network. However, a thin client could indeed be used instead o f or in combination with, 
a web browser. Therefore, for completeness, the author elected to perform a review of 
middleware and corresponding technologies. The ASP Billing4Rent solution prototype 
was developed using web technologies and was deployed entirely in a J2EE environment. 
As such the solution benefited from the middleware provided by the web server.
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5.3.4 Data Security
Bertino and Sandhu [88] emphasise the fact that damage and misuse of data held in 
database systems could result in disastrous consequences. The Billing4Rent solution 
prototype interacts with an Oracle 9i Relational Database Management System 
(RDBMS). Although Oracle 9i provides a high level of out-of-the-box security, the 
author believes it would be prudent to follow Oracle’s security checklist [89] with regard 
to the configuration of Oracle9i, in order to maximise its security features.
As an additional means of security, the Billing4Rent solution has been designed to 
encrypt solution passwords, using a one-way hash function, prior to storing the password 
in the Oracle database. Subsequently, when the user attempts to login to Billing4Rent, 
the password they enter is encrypted, using the aforementioned hash function and 
compared against the password stored in the database for the specified user. In [90] 
Oracle suggest that encryption technologies could be used to obtain an additional 
measure of security, by selectively encrypting sensitive data prior to storing it in a 
database. The author suggests that the use of encryption to enhance the security o f 
sensitive data warrants further research, especially with regard to the anticipated 
performance overhead.
5.3.5 Network Security
The Billing4Rent solution was deployed on a J2EE server, which uses a set of Java 
packages known as Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE), to enable secure Internet 
communication. Best practice dictates that sensitive data transmitted over a network 
should be encrypted to ensure that data cannot be interpreted, should it be intercepted by 
a third party [46]. The Billing4Rent solution uses the HTTPS protocol for both login to 
and navigation of the Billign4Rent web application once the user has been authenticated. 
HTTPS is a secure version o f the HTTP where requests and responses are encrypted 
using SSL or TLS prior to being sent over the network. SSL is the de-facto standard
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[49], [47], [50], [51] used to secure communication over the Internet. As discussed 
earlier, the Billing4Rent project team used Sun Microsystems’ Keytool utility to generate 
a public/private key-pair and associated X.509 certificate. The public/private key-pair is 
used to initiate secure communication between a server and a browser. Subsequent 
transmissions are encrypted with a random symmetric key generated by the browser. As 
the Billing4Rent prototype was also designed to ensure optimal performance, access to 
general information that does not warrant security is permitted via HTTP. The section 
dedicated to software security highlighted the fact that HTTPS also facilitates the 
authentication o f the server, and where required, the client, through the use o f digital 
certificates.
5.4 Hardware Security
As discussed previously, the term platform is often attributed to system hardware, system 
software or a combination o f both. Since this thesis has already examined platform 
security from a software context, this section focuses on the evaluation of the 
Billing4Rent case study from a hardware security perspective. Wang [26] defines 
hardware security as the physical protection o f devices through the provision o f a secure 
environment. This section examines the physical security of computer systems and 
communications equipment and the use of networking devices to protect all machines on 
the network.
5.4.1 Physical Security
Physical security focuses on the security o f all hardware components that encompass the 
ASP solution. Bhagyavati and Hicks [25] define physical security as the locking up of 
assets such as networking infrastructure, computer systems and data storage, in order to 
provide protection from unauthorised monitoring, theft, corruption, and natural disasters. 
In the literature and technology review, the author identified four distinct hardware
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threats. Firstly, ASP solution hardware and communications equipment could be 
damaged or destroyed by natural disasters, electrical surges, fire or water. Secondly, 
unauthorised access to the facility could result in ASP solution hardware being damaged, 
tampered with or stolen. Thirdly, the ASP solution hardware could be damaged, 
tampered with or stolen by disgruntled or former employees. Finally, authorised 
personnel could inadvertently damage ASP solution hardware.
The Billing4Rent security policy provides guidelines with regard to the physical 
protection o f hardware devices and network media against the aforementioned threats, 
through the provision of a secure environment. The author recommends that the housing 
of hardware and communications equipment should be outsourced to a third party. The 
major advantage o f adopting an outsourcing strategy is that organisations are free to 
concentrate on their core business [27], [28]. In addition, Billing4Rent can expect to 
benefit from economies o f scale and a high degree of security, as data centers specialise 
in both the security and the availability o f hardware and communications equipment. As 
outlined in the solution security section 3.3.2, although the security policy is more 
relevant to the commercial stage o f the project, where feasible the Billing4Rent team 
adhered to the recommendations therein throughout the implementation stage. As such, 
the Billing4Rent hardware and communications equipment was stored, throughout the 
implementation stage of the project, in a lockable room within the main monitored, 
alarmed and secured campus building. Where feasible, the Billing4Rent ASP 
infrastructure was further secured through the use o f security cables, padlocks and other 
such devices.
5.4.2 Network Security
The section dedicated to solution security examined network security from a software 
perspective. This section deals exclusively with the use of networking devices to protect 
network resources. A firewall is undoubtedly the most important security device on the 
organisation’s network, as it creates a secure barrier between the organisation’s internal
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network and the outside world. A firewall can be composed o f software or hardware, or a 
combination of both, configured to control access between the Internet and hosts 
connccted to a private network [49], [51]. A firewall is responsible for filtering incoming 
and outgoing IP packets, depending on the rules configured by the administrator. These 
rules can be configured based on different network protocols, the network address of the 
destination or source, the port number, IP packet headers etc. [107]. Although access to 
the Internet is crucial for the ASP model, it can also constitute as a security threat to the 
organisation. The optimal solution is to use one or more firewalls to filter all traffic to 
and from the organisation.
Based on best practice outlined in [108], the author recommends the use o f a 
demilitarised zone (DMZ) to protect devices on the Billing4Rent network. A DMZ is 
defined as a network that sits between the trusted internal network and the untrusted 
external network. All servers requiring external access are placed in the DMZ. External 
access to HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, FTPS and SMTP services on the DMZ network should be 
permitted through the outer firewall. Access to machines on the internal network should 
be permitted solely from machines in the DMZ through the inner firewall. Sun 
Microsystems, Microsoft and IBM all propose two-tier DMZ network architectures. 
Figure 5.3 adapted from [105] provides a high-level overview o f the two-tier DMZ 
network architecture.
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F igure 5.3 -  T w o-tier  D M Z design  ad ap ted  from  [105]
Although a two-tier architecture provides adequate protection o f the internal network, a 
three-tier architecture would provide an additional layer of abstraction and could thus be 
deemed more secure. META Group [109], which was acquired by Gartner in April 2005, 
outlines best practices pertaining to the design o f secure network architectures. The 
three-tier architecture has been a popular choice for many organisations as it affords the 
opportunity to apply different security filters and services between each tier o f common 
three-tier web applications, thereby facilitating a defense-in-depth strategy (Figure 5.4).
F igure 5.4 — T hree-tier  D M Z  design  ad ap ted  from  (109]
META group [109] highlight the fact that although the three-tier DMZ design is still 
adequate, it is not ideally suited to today’s objectives, such as minimising the amount of 
exposed infrastructure and economically accommodating access by both internal and 
external users to the same set o f applications. Meta Group [109] expects to see many 
organisations migrate to the two-tier proxy-enabled design depicted in Figure 5.5. This 
design provides a greater level of security than both the two-tier DMZ and the three-tier 
DMZ designs as both web servers and application servers are no longer visible, as they 
reside on the internal network.
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F igu re 5.5 -  T w o-tier , proxy-en ab led  D M Z  design  adapted  from  [109]
As an additional measure o f security, many firewalls incorporate a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) server. VPNs provide secure remote access to network resources 
through the encryption of traffic between the firewall and remote users.
5.5 Client Data Security
Data security is intrinsically twofold: it includes the privacy protection and the soundness 
of the stored information [36]. Tao [14] outlines the need for ASPs to establish stringent 
procedures to ensure the security and integrity o f customer data while it is under their 
care. As illustrated in the literature and technology review, there is a distinct overlap 
between both ASP physical and solution security, and the security and integrity of 
customer data. In addition, ASPs need to be aware o f their legal obligations with regard 
to the protection of client data. In Europe, this legislation comes in the form of the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC and the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC. These regulations outline conditions for processing personal data 
and provide legislation to permit individuals and organisations to inspect personal data 
and to ensure this data is valid. The author suggests that by following best practices with
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regard to the security of both hardware and software, the organisation ensures the security 
and integrity o f data transmitted over the Internet. The Information Sensitivity Policy in 
turn provides guidelines with regard to what information can be disclosed to non­
employees, as well as the relative sensitivity o f information that should not be disclosed 
outside o f the Billing4Rent organisation without proper authorisation. Although the 
Information Sensitivity Policy details the protection required for information at varying 
sensitivity levels, the author suggests that the Billing4Rent team should relate the levels 
o f sensitivity specifically to the client data.
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5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter the author uses the knowledge gained from both the literature and 
technology review and the Billing4Rent case study to provide an in-depth evaluation of 
the practical implementation o f system security in an ASP environment. The author 
evaluated the security of the Billing4Rent case study from a hardware, software and data 
perspective, across all tiers o f the service architecture. The author paid particular 
attention to best practices with regard to the consideration o f security throughout the 
entire Software Design Life Cycle (SDLC) and the need to monitor and improve security 
throughout the lifetime o f the solution.
The author devised a security evaluation matrix based on the Open Standards 
Interconnect (OSI) security model 7498-2, which in turn is based on generally agreed 
security objectives. It provided a detailed picture of the security of the Billing4Rent case 
study and enabled the reader see at a glance the level of security provided by the solution.
Finally, the author examined the security and integrity o f client data based on legal 
obligations with regard to the protection o f data outlined in the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Directive 2002/58/EC and the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
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Chapter V I : Conclusion
This thesis focused on ‘An Investigation into System Security Requirements and 
Implementation in an Application Service Provision (ASP) Environment’. The research 
conducted yielded a comprehensive framework of best practice with respect to system 
security within the ASP domain.
The literature and technology review identified security as one o f the key factors 
influencing the uptake o f the ASP model. It highlighted the fact that fears o f inadequate 
security and privacy have prevented many firms from fully investigating and integrating 
the ASP business model. In the case study, the author examined system security in detail, 
through the research and development of all aspects o f security with regard to the ASP 
model. In the evaluation chapter, the author used the knowledge gained from both the 
literature and technology review and the case study to provide an in-depth evaluation of 
the practical implementation of system security in an ASP environment. This chapter 
concludes the thesis with a summary of the research outputs, the conclusions drawn and 
provides a list of recommendations for future work.
6.1 Research Outputs
The research results can be divided into a number o f distinct outputs:
1) The ASP solution prototype, a sample implementation o f security in an ASP 
environment, based on proven infrastructure and best practices with respect to 
security.
2) A number o f security libraries, designed to facilitate both change and reuse, 
achieved through the development o f loosely-coupled components and the 
implementation o f a high degree o f abstraction.
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3) A security policy, which outlines best practice with regard to general security, 
physical security, host security, network security and data security in an ASP 
environment.
4) A security evaluation matrix, which provides a high-level view o f system security 
requirements in an ASP environment. It is envisaged that the matrix could be 
used to evaluate not only the security o f ASP applications, but the security of any 
n-tier application.
6.2 Conclusions Drawn
The author concludes that security considerations in an ASP solution are the same as the 
security considerations of any other n-tier application such as banking or e-business.
1) Perceptions with regard to fears o f inadequate security of ASP solutions and 
solution data are misguided and unfounded.
2) The technologies and mechanisms used to secure an ASP solution are in fact the 
tried and tested security technologies and mechanisms used to secure other n-tier 
applications.
3) ASP solution hardware and communications equipment, like other n-tier 
applications, can be outsourced to a third party such as a data center, as data 
centers specialise in both the security and the availability o f such equipment.
4) Access to the ASP solution can be restricted through the adoption of strong 
authentication and stringent access control policies. Applications should be 




5) Standard HTTP security protocols should be used to secure any sensitive data 
transmitted from an ASP client to the hosted application. In the context o f ASP, 
sensitive data is semantically broader than the conventional use o f the term.
6.3 Recommendations
The author provides the following recommendations with respect to the research and 
development of system security in an ASP environment:
1) ASP solutions should be developed and deployed on tried, tested and trusted 
infrastructure. Proven infrastructure performance and security improves the 
overall likelihood o f a successful solution deployment.
2) Existing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) should be used where 
possible. Java provides a number o f APIs, which facilitate the development of 
secure communications, cryptography, authentication and access control security 
features.
3) Security best practices should be adhered to, where feasible. Best practices 
represent techniques or methodologies, based on experience and research, that 
have resulted in optimal solution security practices.
4) Careful consideration should be given to how customer data is secured in an ASP 
environment. Such consideration should encompass how customer information is 
manifested in the middleware and how such data is secured in tier three database 
applications.
5) An effective security policy should be designed, implemented and maintained. 
The security policy should result in the protection of the organisation’s assets 




6.4 Future Research Potential
The author identifies significant further research potential, with regard to ASP system 
security:
1) The examination of the feasibility o f using digital certificates, in an ASP 
environment, for client authentication, in addition to server authentication. 
Digital certificates could be used in combination with other authentication 
mechanisms to verify that the client is in fact who they claim to be. Special 
consideration should be given to the difficulty managing client certificates.
2) An investigation into the necessity o f using digital signatures, in an ASP 
environment, to confirm the claimed identity o f the originator and guarantee the 
validity of messages. Digital signatures enable security, and more importantly, 
accountability for electronic transactions.
3) An exploration into the use o f encryption techniques to enhance the security of 
sensitive data stored in file systems and databases. Particular consideration must 
be given to what data should be encoded and the expected performance overhead. 
Database lookups are designed to facilitate searching through millions of rows for 
specific items in seconds. A database cannot afford to encrypt and decrypt each 
piece of data it must search.
In summary the author concludes that by following best practices with respect to security 
an ASP application can provide the same level o f security one would expect from any 
other application. ASPs may in-fact provide greater levels of security than that which 
could be provided by a customer organisation.
150
References
[ 1 ] Exploratory research
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploratory_research
[2] I.M. Crawford
Marketing Research and Information Systems 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W3241E/w3241e00.htm - Contents
[3] Agile software development
http://www. 1 stcustomsoftware.com/Agi le_softwaredeveIopment-44.html
[4] Iterative and Incremental Development
http://www.liberty.edu/informationservices/development/index.cfm?pid=6355
[5] Winston W. Royce
Managing the development o f large software systems: concepts and techniques 
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Software Engineering
[6] Manifesto for Agile Software Development 
http://agilemanifesto.org/
[7] Bhavini Desai, Vishanth Weerakkody, Wendy Currie, D. E. Sofiane Tebboune, 
Maureen Khan
Market Entry Strategies of Application Service Providers: Identify Strategic 
Differentiation
Proceedings o f the 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences - 
2003
[8] Nozar Daylami, Terry Ryan, Lome Olfman, Conrad Shayo 
Determinants o f Application Service Provider (ASP) Adoption as an Innovation 
Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences - 
2005
[9] Anjana Susarla, Anitesh Barua, and. Andrew B. Whinston 
Making the Most Out of an ASP Relationship
IEEE IT Professional - Volume 3, Issue 6, Pages 63-67, November-December 2001
[10] Kenneth R. Walsh
Analysing the application ASP concept: technologies, economies, and strategies 
Communications of the ACM -  Volume 46, Issue 8, August 2003
151
[11] A. Bernstein 
The State of ASPs
Robert Frances Group - 1999 
http://www.cio.com/analyst/122799_rfgonline.html
[12] Thomas Kern and Jeroen Kreijger
An Exploration of the Application Service Provision Outsourcing Option 
Proceedings o f the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences - 
2001
[13] Anjana Susarla, Anitesh Barua, and Andrew B. Whinston
Understanding the Service Component o f Application Service Provision: An Empirical
Analysis of Satisfaction with ASP Services
MIS Quarterly -  Volume 27, Issue 1, pages 91-123, March 2003
[14] Lixin Tao
Shifting Paradigms with the Application Service Provider Model 
IEEE Computer -  Volume 34, Issue 10, pages 32-39, October 2001
[15] Greg Goth
The Next Gold Rush: Application Service Providers Stake Their Claims in a Red-Hot 
Market
IEEE Software -  Volume 17, Issue 2, Pages 96-99, March/April 2000
[16] Roland Klueber
ASP Strategies and Solutions for eProcurement Process Offered by an eMarket 
Proceedings o f the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences - 
2002
[17] Dr Philip Seltsikas and Prof. Wendy L. Currie
Evaluating The Application Service Provider (ASP) Business Model: The Challenge of 
Integration.
Proceedings o f the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences - 
2002
[18] A. Konary - 2004,
“Presentation to the ITAA”, IDC Analyst Presentation to the ITAA - February 12, 2004, 
http://www.idc.com/
[19] Graham Winch, Wendy L. Currie and Philip Joyce
Making the ASP model work: using SD to explore trade-offs in IT service product design 
22nd International System Dynamics Conference, Keble College, Oxford - July 2004
[20] B. Desai and W. Currie
Application Service Providers: A model in Evolution
Proceedings o f the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce - 2003
152
[21] David S. Linthicum
To ASP or Not to ASP? -  2002 
http://www.softwaremag.com/
[22] Troy E. Anderson 
Management Guidelines for PC Security
ACM SIG1CE Bulletin - Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 7-14, July 1994
[23] S. Weingart and G. Double
An Evaluation System for Physical Security of Computing Systems 
Sixth AnnualComputer Security Applications Conference -1990
[24] A. Mader and S. Srinivasan
Curriculum development related to information security policies and procedures 
Proceedings of the 2nd annual conference on Information security curriculum 
development InfoSecCD - 2005
[25] Bhagyavati and Glenn Hicks
A basic security plan for a generic organisation
Journal of Computing Sciences in Colleges -  Volume 19, Issue 1, October 2003
[26] Andy Ju An Wang
Security Testing in Software Engineering Courses 
34th ASEE/IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference
[27] Kate Gerwig
Apps on Tap: Outsourcing hits the web
Source netWorker archive -Volume 3, Issue 3, September 1999
[28] Chris Lonsdale and Andrew Cox
llie historical development o f outsourcing: the latest fad?
Industrial Management and data systems, PART 8/9, pages 444-450, 2000
[29] Adrian Baldwin, Simon Shiu and Marco Casassa Mont 
Trust Services: A Framework for Service-Based Solutions
26th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference
[30] Leonard H. Fine
Computer Security -  A Handbook for Management 
Irish Management Institute Dublin -  1983
[31] Robert Morris and Ken Thompson
Password Security: A Case History
Communications of the ACM -  Volume 22, Issue 11, Pages 594-597, November 1979
153
[32] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc 
Writing Secure Code
Microsoft Press -  2001
[33] Bruce Potter and Gary McGraw 
Software security testing
IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine - Volume 2, Issue 5, Pages 81-85, September- 
October 2004
[34] G. McGraw 
Software security
IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine -  Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 80-83, Marrch-April
2004
[35] Paul Kocher, Ruby Lee, Gary McGraw, Anand Raghunathan and Srivaths Ravi 
Security as a new dimension in embedded system design.
Proceedings of the 41st annual conference on Design automation, June 2004
[36] S. Miranda
Aspects o f data security in general-purpose data base management systems 
Proceedings of the 1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy -  April 1980.
[37] Commission launches infringement proceedings against nine Member States for not 
adopting new privacy rules for digital networks and services.
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1663&format=HTML 
&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en - f i le .tm p R e f l, 18th May 2005
[38] DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=E 
N&numdoc=31995L0046&model=guichett, 18th May 2005
[39] G. Spafford
Internet Security Know the Risk and Control it!
Director, Computer Operations, Audit, and Security Technology (COAST) Project, 
Purdue University
[40] Frederick M. Avolio
Best Practices in Network Security 
CMP Media, March 20, 2000.
http://www.dushkin.com/text-data/articles/27509/body.pdf
154
[41] The Internet Engineering Task Force 
Site Security Handbook
http ://www. ietf.org/rfc/rfc2196 .txt?Number=2196
[42] Geoffrey H. Wold and Robert F. Shriver
“RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES - The risk analysis process provides the foundation 
for the entire recovery planning effort”, Disaster Recovery World© 1997 
http://www.drj.com/new2dr/w3_030.htm, 18th May 2005
[43] Ravi Sandhu and Pierangela Samarati 
Authentication, Access Control, and Audit
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1996
[44] Jon Toigo
Disaster Recovery Planning -  Preparing for the unthinkable -  3rd Edition - 2003 
Prentice Hall PTR
[45] Anjana Susarla, Anitesh Barua and Andrew B. Whinston 
Myths about outsourcing to application service providers
IEEE IT Professional - Volume 3 Issue 3, Pages 32-3, May-June 2001
[46] Gerald J. Popek, Charles S. Kline 
Encryption and Secure Computer Networks
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) - December 1979 - Volume 11 Issue 4
[47] Vijay Ahuja
Network & Internet Security - 1996 
Academic Press Inc.
[48] William Stallings
Network Security Essentials, Applications and Standards — Second Edition -  2003 
Prentice Hall PTR, by Pearson Education Inc.
[49] Andrew S. Tanenbaum 
Computer Networks -  4th Edition -  2003 
Prentice Mall PTR, by Pearson Education Inc.
[50] Simson Garfinkel with Gene Spafford
Web Security, Privacy, and Commerce — 2nd Edition -  2002 
O’Reilly and Associates Inc.
[ 5 1 ]  W i l l i a m  S t a l l i n g s
Cryptography and Network Security, Principles and Practices -  2003 
Prentice Hall PTR, by Pearson Education Inc.
155
[52] Roger J. Sutton
Secure Communications -  Applications and Management -  2002 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
[53] Ray Hunt
PKI and Digital Certification Infrastructure
Ninth IEEE International Conference on Networks (ICON'Ol) - October 2001
[54] Albert Levi, M. Ufuk Caglayan, Cetin K. Koc
Use of nested certificates for efficient, dynamic, and trust preserving public key 
infrastructure
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Volume 7, Issue 1, 
February 2004
[55] Benny Pinkas and Tomas Sander 
Securing Passwords Against Dictionary Attacks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, 
November 2002
[56] Wesley Chou
Inside SSL: The Secure Sockets Layer Protocol
IEEE IT Professional -  Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 47-52, July/August 2002
[57] Southern Methodist University (SMU)
School of Engineering
http://engr.smu.edu/~nair/courses/7349/ssl.ppt, 18th May 2005
[58] Liang Fang, Samuel Meder, Olivier Chevassut, Frank Siebenlist 
Secure password-based authenticated key exchange for web services 
Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Secure web service SWS, October 2004
[59] Avishai Wool
A quantitative study of firewall configuration errors 
IEEE Computer - Volume37, Issue 6, Pages 62-67, June 2004
[60] Kurt Geihs 
Middleware Challenges Ahead
IEEE Computer - Volume34, Issue 6, Pages 24-31, June 2001
[61] Simon N. Foley, Thomas B. Quillinan, Maeve O’Connor, Barry P. Mulcahy, and 
John P. Morrison
A Framework for Heterogeneous Middleware Security
Proceedings of the 18th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium - 
2004
156
[62] A. Alireza, U. Lang ;, M. Padelis, R. Schreiner, and M. Schumacher 
The Challenges of CORBA Security
Darmstadt University o f Technology
[63] Zhonghua Yang and Keith Duddy
CORBA: A Platform for Distributed Object Computing
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - Volume 30, Issue 2 - April 1996
[64] Object Management Group 
History of Corba
http://www.omg.org/gettingstarted/history_of_corba.htm
[65] Dionisis X. Adamopoulos, George Pavlou, Constantine A. Papandreou and 
Emmanuel Manolessos
Distributed Object Platforms in Telecommunications: A Comparison Between DCOM 
and CORBA 
Managing the Network
[66] Chris Cleeland and Rob Martin 
CORBA Security: An Overview 
Object Computing Inc - 2002
http://www.omg.org/technology/documents/formal/omg_security.htm - Security Service
[67] August Mayer
VI. Overview: CORBA security
Bowling Green State University - Summer 2001
http ://student cosy.sbg.ac.at/~amayer/proj ects/corbasec/sec_overview.html
[68] Chris Exton, Damien Watkins and Dean Thompson
Comparisons between CORBA IDL COM/DCOM MIDL: Interfaces for Distributed 
Computing
Monash University, Australia -  1997
[69] Alexander Davis and Du Zhang
A comparative study o f DCOM and SOAP
Proceedings o f the IEEE Fourth International Symposium on Multimedia Software 
Engineering - 2002
[70] Juval Lowy
Web Services Hurdle the Firewall




A Young Person's Guide to The Simple Object Access Protocol: SOAP Increases 
Interoperability Across Platforms and Languages 
MSDN Magazine - March 2000
http://msdn.microsoft.eom/msdnmag/issues/0300/soap/default.aspx
[72] OASIS Web Services Security (WSS) technical committee.
Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.0 (WS-Security 2004) 
http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/documents.php?wg_abbrev=wss
[73] Jim Waldo
Remote procedure calls and Java Remote Method Invocation
IEEE IT Concurrency - Volume 6 Issue 3, Pages 5-7, July-September 1998
[74] Ann Wollrath, Jim Waldo and Roger Riggs 
Java-centric distributed computing
IEEE Micro - Volume 17, Issue 3, Pages 44 — 53, May/Jun 1997
[75] Sun Microsystems 
Java RMI over IIOP 
http://java.sun.com/products/rmi-iiop/
[76] Arnold Buss and Leroy Jackson
Distributed simulation modeling: a comparison o f HLA, CORBA, and RMI 
Proceedings of the 1998 Winter Simulation Conference
[77] Sun Microsystems 
Security and the Java Platform 
http ://j ava. sun. com/security/




Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) Overview 
http ://j ava. sun. com/product s/j aas/o verv i e w.htm 1
[80] Tarak Modi




[81 ] C. Lai, L.Gong, L.Koved, A. Nadalin and R. Schemers 
User authentication and authorisation in the Java ™ platform 
IEEE Computer Security Applications Conference, 1999




Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) Reference Guide 
http://java.sun.eom/j2se/l.5.0/docs/guide/security/jce/JCERefGuide.html
[84] Russell Meyers and Charles Frank




Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) Reference Guide 
http://java.sun.eom/j2se/l.5.0/docs/guide/security/jsse/JSSERefGuide.html
[86] Raghavan Srinivas
Java security evolution and concepts
http://www.javaworld.com/javaworld/jw-05-2001 /jw-0525-security-p3 .html
[87] Scott Nevins
Database security: protecting sensitive and critical information 
CEO of Protegrity
[88] Elisa Bertino and Ravi Sandhu
Database security - concepts, approaches, and challenges
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing - Volume 2, Issue 1, Pages 2 -  
19, January-March 2005
[89] Rajiv Sinha
A Security Checklist for Oracle9i 
An Oracle white paper - March 2001
[90] Oracle Corporation




[91] Oracle Corporation 
Oracle9i™ LogMiner™
Database Analysis Tool - Features Overview - January 2002
[92] Oracle Corporation 
Oracle9i Fine-Grained Auditing
http ://www.oracle.com/technology/products/oracle9i/daily/oct03 .html
[93] Jonathan D. Moffett and John A. Clark
An Introduction to Security in Distributed Systems 
High Integrity Systems Journal -1(1): pages 83-92, 1994
[94] Jonathan D. Moffett 
Security & Distributed Systems
Department o f Computers, University o f York, England
[95] Matthew Joyce 
IC3-1 Network Seccurity 
University of Bergen, NORWAY
[96] Jianxin Jeff Yan
A note on proactive password checking
ACM - Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on New security paradigms
[97] J.Yan, A. Blackwell, R. Anderson and A. Grant,
Password memorability and security: empirical results
IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine - Volume 2, Issue 5, Pages 25-31, September- 
October 2004
[98] Jianxin Yan, Alan Blackwell, Ross Anderson and Alasdair Grant 
The Memorability and Security o f Passwords Some Empirical Results 
Cambridge University Computer Laboratory 
http://download.lawr.ucdavis.edu/pub/CambridgePWStudy.pdf
[99] Theodore Stergiou, Mark S. Leeson, Roger J. Green:
An alternative architectural framework to the OSI security model 
Elsevier - Computers & Security - 23, 137el53, 2004
[100] Newstaff, Inc.
Information Security References, ISO 17799 
http://newstaff.info/criteria/isol7799/index.html





ISO 17799 Information and Resource Portal 
http://17799.denialinfo.com/biju.htm
[103] John Musser and Paul Feuer 
All that JAAS
http://www.javaworld.eom/javaworld/jw-09-2002/jw-0913-jaas.html




IBM WebSphere V5.1 Performance, Scalability and High Availability 
June 2004
[106] Sun Microsystems
Keytool - Key and Certificate Management Tool 
http://java.sun.eom/j2se/l.5.0/docs/tooldocs/solaris/keytool.html
[107] Mahfuzur Rahman and Prabir Bhattacharya 
Secure Network Communication using Biometrics
IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo (ICME'Ol)
[108] Gregory R. Doddrell 
Information security and the Internet
Internet Research: Electronic Networking Applications and Policy 
Volume 6, Number 1, Pages 5-9, 1996
[109] META Group







The following paper ‘Perception: The Real Inhibitor to ASP Adoption? ’ was presented by 
the author at the 2005 Information Technology & Telecommunications (IT&T) 
Conference on ‘Information Infrastructures — Systems Architecture and Content’. The 
conference was held the 26th-27th of October 2005, at the National Maritime College, 
Cork Institute o f Technology. The paper was published on pages 187-195 of the 
conference proceedings.
H
Perception: The Real Inhibitor to ASP 
Adoption?
Sabrina M cN eely1, K enneth K irrane2,
John H ealy3, Sean Duignan4 
D epartm ent o f  M aths & C om puting,
G alway-M ayo Institute o f Technology,
G alway, Ireland.
Tel: + 3 5 3 (0 )9 1  753161 
E-m ail1: sabrina.m cneelv@ gm it.ie 
E-mail2: kcnncth.kirrane;« aniit.ic, --------- i — .
E-mail : iohn.liealvitfgniit.ie 
E-m ail4: sean.duignan@ gm it.ie
Abstract: Upon its inception, many heralded the A SP paradigm  as the death knell o f  
software-as-a-product, and the birth o f  software-as-a-service. D espite the hype 
however, uptake is struggling to reach the levels many analysts predicted for the ASP 
model. This paper identifies and exam ines the key factors influencing the adoption o f  
ASP, and highlights the inconsistencies in the available literature. We identify several 
questions that remain unansw ered, w hich may be adversely influencing user 
perceptions o f  the model. In order to address these questions, areas o f  further research 
are proposed to deconstruct the inhibitors o f  the ASP paradigm, and ultim ately answer 
the m ost burning question: Is perception the primary inhibitor to the uptake o f  the 
ASP model?
1. Introduction
The Application Service Provision (ASP) model has had many guises over the years 
including software-as-a-service, on-demand computing and utility computing. However, 
its underlying premise remains unchanged: Application Service Providers (ASPs) offer
multiple users a subscription-based access model via the Internet to centrally managed 
applications [1]. ASPs provide access to software on a one-to-many basis and thus the 
cost o f ownership and maintenance o f the solution is shared by several clients. Service 
level agreements (SLAs) assist in ensuring client expectations are met with regard to the 
performance of the ASP solution.
Despite the initial hype, user uptake of the ASP model has been slow to 
materialise. In 2001 the International Data Corporation (IDC) Group forecast that
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spending on ASPs would grow to $24 billion by 2005 [2]. By 2002/2003, the ASP market 
seemed all but dead, with a 90 percent failure rate according to industry analysis [3]. IDC 
reports that the ASP market had only reached $5 billion by 2003 falling far short of that 
which was first envisaged [4]. Current estimates indicate worldwide spending on 
software as a service and associated software license revenue will reach $15.2 billion by 
2007, much lower than earlier predictions but substantial nonetheless [4] [5]. The above 
statistics suggest that ASP has been given a new lease o f life.
Although many papers are quick to quote statistics and outline the determinants of 
ASP adoption, few delve into the reasoning behind these determinants, be they positive or 
negative. The objective o f this paper is to identify and examine the key factors 
influencing the adoption o f the ASP model. To accomplish this objective, this paper 
explores the existing literature in order to formulate a consensus on the reasons pertaining 
to the uptake or otherwise o f the ASP model. Our analysis is divided into three distinct 
sections. First, we establish the key factors that individually lead to either an affirmative 
or adverse decision with regard to the uptake of the ASP model. Second, we attempt to 
expand on the research to date by examining each of these factors and their relevance to 
the adoption of the ASP as a whole. Finally, we conclude the paper by highlighting the 
required direction for further research o f the ASP model.
2. Identification of the key factors influencing ASP adoption
In depth analysis o f the literature highlights economies o f scale as the key driver o f the 
ASP paradigm [1], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], ASPs exhibit economies o f scale as the cost of 
the solution is distributed among its customers on a one-to-many basis. In addition to 
economies of scale, Walsh [10] interestingly highlights security and reliability as major 
benefits o f the ASP model, and states that for small or midsize organisations, ASPs can 
provide greater levels o f security and reliability than the customers own organisation
[10]. Walsh’s point is contrary to the norm, as uncertainties with regard to security and 
privacy as well as performance concerns in the form of availability, scalability and 
reliability, are cited as the main inhibitors to the uptake o f the ASP model [5], [11], [12].
IV
T h is  s e c t io n  is  d e d ic a te d  t o  e x a m in in g  e a c h  o f  th e  a b o v e  fa c t o r s  in  o r d e r  t o  a s s e s s  th e  
b e n e f i t s  o r  th r e a ts  t h e y  p o t e n t ia l ly  p o s e  t o  t h e  a d o p t io n  o f  t h e  A S P  m o d e l .
2.1 Economies of scale
In  e c o n o m ic  te r m s , e c o n o m ie s  o f  s c a l e  a re  a c h ie v e d  w h e n  th e  a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c in g  a  
p r o d u c t  d im in is h e s  a s  e a c h  a d d it io n a l  p r o d u c t  i s  p r o d u c e d , a s  th e  f i x e d  c o s t s  a re  sh a r e d  
o v e r  a n  in c r e a s in g  n u m b e r  o f  p r o d u c ts .  T h e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  m o d e l  is  e q u a l ly  v ia b le  
w ith  r e g a r d  to  s e r v ic e  p r o v is io n in g .  A S P s  a c h ie v e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  b y  lo w e r in g  th e  
a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  th e  s e r v ic e  th r o u g h  s h a r in g  f ix e d  c o s t s  a m o n g  m a n y  u s e r s .  A  s u r v e y  
c o n d u c te d  b y  th e  I n fo r m a t io n  T e c h n o lo g y  A s s o c i a t io n  o f  A m e r ic a  ( I T A A )  in  2 0 0 2  
in v e s t ig a t e d  k e y  u s e r  e x p e c t a t io n s  in  s e l e c t in g  A S P s .  R e s u l t s  o f  th a t  s u r v e y  in d ic a te  th a t  
3 9  p e r c e n t  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s  e s t im a t e  th e ir  retu rn  o n  in v e s t m e n t  o f  b e t w e e n  10  a n d  5 0  
p e r c e n t , w h i l e  a n  a d d it io n a l 1 4  p e r c e n t  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s  p la c e d  i t  b e t w e e n  5 1  a n d  1 0 0  
p e r c e n t  [ 1 3 ] .  T h e  c o s t  s a v in g s  h ig h l ig h t e d  b y  t h e  I T A A  s u r v e y  o f f e r  s o m e  s o la c e  to  
c o m p a n ie s  b u r d e n e d  b y  a n  in c r e a s e d  r e l ia n c e  o n  IT , a n d  it s  a s s o c ia t e d  c o s t s .  A S P s  c a n  
a l le v ia t e  th is  b u r d e n , th u s  a l lo w in g  a  c o m p a n y  t o  f o c u s  o n  o th e r  c o r e  a r e a s  o f  th e ir  
e n te r p r is e . B y  c o n tr a s t , a  s u r v e y  o f  2 5 0  I T  m a n a g e r s  c o n d u c t e d  b y  lnformationweek.com 
h ig h l ig h t s  a  h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  s c e p t ic i s m  w it h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  c la im e d  c o s t  a d v a n ta g e s  /  
e c o n o m ie s  o f  s c a le  [1 4 ] .
2.2 Performance (high availability, scalability and reliability)
D u e  to  A S P s  n e tw o r k -c e n tr ic  d e l iv e r y  m o d e l ,  p e r fo r m a n c e  c o n s id e r a t io n s  in  te r m s  o f  
h ig h - a v a i la b i l i t y ,  s c a la b i l i t y  a n d  r e l ia b i l i t y  a re  o f t e n  c i t e d  a s  th e  m a jo r  in h ib ito r s  to  th e  
w id e s p r e a d  u p ta k e  o f  th e  A S P  m o d e l  [5 ] ,  [ 1 1 ] ,  [ 1 2 ] ,  [ 1 5 ] .  H ig h  A v a i la b i l i t y  ( H A )  
r e q u ir e s  s y s t e m s  d e s ig n e d  t o  to le r a te  fa u l t s  — t o  d e t e c t  a  fa u lt ,  r e p o r t  it ,  m a s k  it , a n d  th e n  
c o n t in u e  s e r v ic e  w h i l e  th e  f a u l t y  c o m p o n e n t  i s  r e p a ir e d  o f f l in e  [ 1 6 ] .  I n  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  
c a s e s ,  a v a i la b i l i t y  i s  e x p r e s s e d  a s  a  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  s y s t e m  u p  t im e ,  w it h  “ f i v e  n in e s ”  o r  
9 9 .9 9 9 %  a v a i la b i l i t y  a  d e s ir e d  l e v e l  o f  a v a i la b i l i t y  fo r  m o s t  A S P s .  S c a la b i l i t y  r e fe r s  to  
th e  a b i l i t y  o f  a  s y s t e m  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  a n  in c r e a s in g  n u m b e r  o f  e le m e n t s  o r  o b je c t s ,  t o  
p r o c e s s  g r o w in g  v o lu m e s  o f  w o r k  g r a c e f u l ly ,  a n d /o r  t o  b e  s u s c e p t ib le  to  e n la r g e m e n t
[1 7 ] .  S y s t e m s  s h o u ld  n o t  o n ly  a d a p t  to  th e ir  n e w  c o n f ig u r a t io n s ,  th e y  s h o u ld  b e  a b le  to
V
o p e r a te  w it h  th e  s a m e  l e v e l  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  to  t h e  s a m e  sta n d a r d  o f  s e r v ic e .  R e l ia b i l i t y  
is  d e f in e d  a s  th e  a s s u r a n c e  a  p r o d u c t  w i l l  p e r fo r m  it s  in t e n d e d  f u n c t io n  fo r  t h e  r e q u ir e d  
d u r a tio n  w ith in  a  g iv e n  e n v ir o n m e n t .  R e l ia b i l i t y  i s  b e s t  d e s c r ib e d  a s  p r o d u c t  p e r fo r m a n c e  
o v e r  t im e  [ 1 8 ] .  A  r e l ia b le  s y s t e m  s h o u ld  c o n s i s t e n t ly  p r o d u c e  th e  s a m e  r e s u l t s ,  w h i l e  
m e e t in g ,  o r  e x c e e d i n g  c u s t o m e r  e x p e c t a t io n s .
K e r n  e t  a l ( 2 0 0 2 )  r e p o r t  th a t  8 5 %  o f  p o te n t ia l  A S P  c u s t o m e r s  r a te  q u a l i ty  o f  
s e r v ic e  a s  b e in g  o n e  o f  th e  k e y  fa c to r s  in  A S P  s a t is f a c t io n .  T h e  m a jo r ity  o f  p o te n t ia l  A S P  
c u s t o m e r s  a ls o  ra te  s c a la b i l i t y  a n d  f l e x ib i l i t y  a s  b e in g  v e r y  im p o r ta n t  [ 1 9 ] .  A  la r g e  fa c to r  
in  s e r v ic e  q u a li ty , a v a i la b i l i t y  a n d  s c a la b i l i t y ,  f o r  w e b - h o s t e d  a p p lic a t io n s  i s  th e  q u a li ty  
a n d  s p e e d  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  n e t w o r k  in  d e l iv e r in g  th e  s e r v ic e  o f f e r in g  to  it s  c u s t o m e r s .  
M a n y  fa c to r s  in f lu e n c e  n e tw o r k  q u a li ty , s u c h  a s  b a n d w id th  l im ita t io n s ,  n e tw o r k  la t e n c y  
a n d  r e l ia b il i t y  o f  th e  In te r n e t . T h is  i s  e s p e c ia l ly  tru e  in  th e  A S P  p a r a d ig m  a s  a ll th e  
a p p lic a t io n  p r o c e s s in g  t a k e s  p la c e  o n  t h e  a p p lic a t io n  s e r v e r , w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  r e tu r n e d  to  
g e o g r a p h ic a l ly  d is p e r s e d  u s e r s  o v e r  th e  n e tw o r k  in  a  t h in - c l i e n t  m o d e l .  T h e s e  f in d in g s  a re  
c o r r o b o r a te d  b y  I T A A ’s  ( 2 0 0 1 )  s u r v e y  o f  k e y  u s e r  e x p e c t a t io n s  w it h  r e s p e c t  t o  A S P  -  
o v e r  8 0 %  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s  c la im e d  th a t g u a r a n te e s  o n  n e tw o r k  r e l ia b il i t y  w e r e  a  v e r y  
im p o r ta n t  fe a tu r e  o f  S e r v ic e  L e v e l  A g r e e m e n t s  ( S L A s )  b e t w e e n  A S P  a n d  c l i e n t s  [2 ] ,
A v a i la b i l i t y  a n d  p e r fo r m a n c e  a r e  p r o b a b ly  t w o  o f  t h e  m o s t  im p o r ta n t  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  a n  A S P .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  A S P s  w i l l  g e n e r a l ly  in v e s t  h e a v i ly  in  b a c k u p  
a n d  r e d u n d a n t s y s t e m s  in  o r d e r  to  m in im is e  s e r v ic e  d is r u p t io n . W a ls h  n o t e s  th a t  t h e s e  
s a fe g u a r d s  g o  b e y o n d  w h a t  m a n y  s m a ll  t o  m i d s iz e  c o m p a n ie s  c a n  a f fo r d , a n d  a re  th u s  
s e e n  a s  a  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  A S P  m o d e l  [ 6 ] ,  T a o  a ls o  s u g g e s t s  th a t  m o s t  o n l in e  s e r v ic e  
p r o v id e r s  d o  a  b e tte r  j o b  o f  e n s u r in g  2 4 /7  a p p l ic a t io n  a v a i la b i l i t y  th a n  c u s t o m e r s  c o u ld
[ 2 0 ] .  W a ls h  a n d  T a o ’s  p o s i t io n  i s  fu r th er  s t r e n g th e n e d  b y  v a r io u s  o th e r  r e f e r e n c e s  in  th e  
l ite r a tu r e  p e r ta in in g  t o  a v a i la b i l i t y ,  s c a la b i l i t y  a n d  r e l ia b i l i t y  a s  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  A S P  m o d e l  
[8], [11], [21], [22],
2.3 Security
S e v e r a l  r e se a r c h e r s  r e fe r  to  s e c u r i ty  a n d  p r iv a c y  o f  d a ta  a s  o n e  o f  th e  p r im a r y  a r e a s  fo r  
c o n c e r n  w it h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e a l i s a t io n  o f  an  A S P  s o lu t io n  [ 6 ] ,  [ 8 ] ,  [ 5 ] ,  [ 1 2 ] ,  [ 2 3 ] .  F e a r s  o f  
c o m p r o m is e d  s e c u r i ty  a n d  p r iv a c y  h a v e  p r e v e n te d  m a n y  f ir m s  fr o m  f u l ly  in v e s t ig a t in g
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a n d  in te g r a t in g  th e  A S P  b u s in e s s  m o d e l  [ 1 2 ] .  A lt h o u g h  b o th  s e c u r ity  a n d  p r iv a c y  a r e  
c o n c e r n e d  w ith  g u a r d in g  th e  c l i e n t s  s e n s i t i v e  d a ta , th e y  c a n  b e  d is t in g u is h e d  a s  f o l lo w s :
•  S e c u r ity  i s  u s e d  t o  r e fe r  t o  p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  A S P  s o lu t io n  a n d  th e  d a ta  e x c h a n g e d  
o r  s to r e d  a s  p a rt o f  th e  A S P  s o lu t io n .  A S P  s e c u r i ty  c a n  b e  b r o k e n  in to  th r e e  
d is t in c t  c o n s id e r a t io n s :  p h y s ic a l  s e c u r ity , s o lu t io n  s e c u r i ty  a n d  s e c u r i ty  a n d  
in te g r ity  o f  c l i e n t  d a ta  [2 4 ] .
•  P r iv a c y  is  e x c lu s iv e l y  c o n c e r n e d  w ith  e n s u r in g  t h e  p r o te c t io n  a n d  in te g r ity  o f  th e  
c l i e n t  d a ta  e x c h a n g e d  o r  s to r e d  a s  p a rt o f  th e  A S P  s o lu t io n  fr o m  u n a u th o r is e d  
a c c e s s .
L in th ic u m  [2 3 ]  o u t l in e s  th r e e  p o s s ib l e  s e c u r ity  is s u e s ,  w h ic h  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  c o l la b o r a te  
th e  a b o v e  d e f in it io n  o f  s e c u r ity . P o o r  n e tw o r k  s e c u r i ty  m a y  le a v e  th e  h o s t e d  s o lu t io n  
o p e n  t o  e x te r n a l in tr u s io n . S e c o n d ,  an  u n s a t is f a c to r y  p h y s ic a l  s e c u r ity  p o l i c y  m a y  r e su lt  
in  a n  in te r n a l a tta c k . F in a l ly ,  th e r e  a r e  c o n c e r n s  a r o u n d  th e  s e c u r i ty  f i r e w a l l s  th a t  a re  
p la c e d  b e t w e e n  th e  h o s t e d  a p p l ic a t io n  d o m a in s  [2 3 ] .
W h ile  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  r e s e a r c h  lite r a tu r e  f o c u s  o n  th e  n e g a t iv e  a s p e c t  o f  s e c u r ity ,  
W a ls h  [1 0 ]  lo o k s  a t  s e c u r i ty  fr o m  a  d if f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e  c o n c e n tr a t in g  o n  th e  s e c u r ity  
b e n e f i t s  th a t  c a n  b e  le v e r a g e d  fr o m  an  A S P  s o lu t io n .  A S P s  a re  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  d e f in in g  
a n d  a d h e r in g  to  a  s e c u r i ty  p o l i c y ,  w h ic h  m e e t s  th e  n e e d s  o f  th e ir  c l i e n t s .  W a ls h  [1 0 ]  
s ta te s  th a t  o f t e n  th e  s e c u r i ty  a n d  r e l ia b il i t y  s a f e g u a r d s  im p le m e n t e d  b y  A S P s  g o  b e y o n d  
w h a t  m a n y  s m a ll  t o  m id s iz e  c o m p a n ie s  c a n  a f fo r d  a n d  th u s  are  a  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  A S P  
m o d e l .
3. A nalysis o f  the key factors in fluencing A SP adoption
B a s e d  o n  a n  in -d e p th  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  a v a i la b le  l ite r a tu r e , Economies o f  Scale, 
Performance a n d  Security h a v e  b e e n  id e n t i f ie d  a s  t h e  k e y  fa c to r s  th a t  in f lu e n c e  th e  
u p ta k e  o f  th e  A S P  m o d e l .  T h e  a im  o f  th i s  s e c t io n  i s  t o  e x p a n d  o n  t h e  r e se a r c h  t o  d a te  b y  
e x a m in in g  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  fa c to r s  a n d  to  a s s e s s  th e ir  r e le v a n c e  to  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  A S P  
m o d e l  in  g r e a te r  d e ta i l .
B y  o p e r a t in g  a  o n e  t o  m a n y  b u s in e s s  m o d e l  A S P s  c a n  a c h ie v e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  
in  te r m s  o f  a p p lic a t io n s ,  n e tw o r k  c o s t s ,  s e r v e r  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  im p le m e n t a t io n  e x p e r t i s e
[8 ] .  It i s  a r g u e d  h o w e v e r  th a t  c l i e n t s  w h o  d e m a n d  a  h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  c u s t o m is a t io n  d e s tr o y
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m u c h  o f  th e  v a lu e  th a t  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a le  p r o v id e  [ 2 5 ] .  T h is  r e s u lt s  in  t h e  n e e d  to  p a y  
h ig h e r  f e e s  fo r  c u s t o m is e d  s o lu t io n s .  Do client requirements fo r  customisation need to 
adversely affect the benefits obtained through economies o f  scale? I f  th e  A S P  o f f e r in g  is  
b a s e d  o n  o p e n  s ta n d a r d s , th e n  h ig h  l e v e l s  o f  c u s t o m is a t io n  m a y  n o t  e q u a te  t o  h ig h e r  
c o s t s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  m a n y  d e d ic a t e d  c o n c e r t  a n d  e n te r t a in m e n t  v e n u e s  s e e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  
s c a le  in h e r e n t  in  o u t s o u r c in g  th e ir  t ic k e t in g  o p e r a t io n s ,  a n  i l lu s tr a t io n  th a t c u s t o m is a t io n  
c a n  b e  a c c o m m o d a te d  w it h in  a  c e n tr a l is e d  e n v ir o n m e n t  — t h e  t i c k e t in g  s o lu t io n  p r o v id e d  
b y  “A S P s ” c a n  b e  c u s t o m is e d  w ith  r e g a r d s  t o  v e n u e ,  a r tis t , d a te ,  e t c ,  w h i le  th e  u n d e r ly in g  
s e r v ic e  o f f e r in g  r e m a in s  th e  s a m e .
M u c h  o f  th e  lite r a tu r e  s u g g e s t s  th a t  p e r fo r m a n c e  c o n s id e r a t io n s  (a n d  in  p a r t ic u la r  
th e  i s s u e s  o f  h ig h - a v a i la b i l i t y ,  s c a la b i l i t y  a n d  r e l ia b i l i t y )  a r e  s ig n if i c a n t  in h ib ito r s  to  A S P  
a d o p t io n . N o t w i t h s t a n d in g  th a t , o th e r  r e s e a r c h e r s  s u g g e s t  th a t  g iv e n  th e  s i z e a b le  
in v e s tm e n t s  u n d e r ta k e n  b y  A S P  s o lu t io n  p r o v id e r s , t h e  A S P  m o d e l  m a y  a c tu a l ly  o f f e r  
e n h a n c e d  a v a i la b i l i t y ,  s c a la b i l i t y  a n d  r e l ia b i l i t y  t o  t h e  s o lu t io n  a d o p te r . I n d e e d , m a n y  
m a tu r e  a n d  in d u s tr y  p r o v e n  s o lu t io n s  c a n  b e  c i t e d  th a t  o f f e r  su p p o r t  t o  t h i s  n o t io n .  
H e w le t t  P a ck a rd 's  f la g s h ip  v e r s io n  o f  th e  p o p u la r  U n ix  o p e r a t in g  s y s t e m  ( H P - U X  1 l i )  is  
a  c a s e  in  p o in t .  L ik e  m a n y  o th e r  p r o d u c t  o f f e r in g s  in  t h e  m a r k e tp la c e , t h is  o p e r a t in g  
s y s t e m  is  im p le m e n t e d  o n  s y s t e m s  r a n g in g  f r o m  w o r k s ta t io n s  a n d  a c c e s s  s e r v e r s  to  
a p p lic a t io n  s e r v e r s  a n d  d a ta  c e n te r  s e r v e r s  -  s y s t e m s  w h e r e  h ig h  a v a i la b i l i t y  is  o f  
p a r a m o u n t im p o r ta n c e . H P - U X  l l i  s c a l e s  e a s i l y  to  6 4  p r o c e s s o r s  a n d  i s  d e s ig n e d  to  
a l l o w  fo r  fu tu r e  s c a l in g  t o  2 5 6  p r o c e s s o r s  in  a  s in g le  s y s t e m  [ 2 6 ] ,  O th e r  p la y e r s  in  th e  
o p e r a t in g  s y s t e m s  m a r k e tp la c e  p r o v id e  s im ila r  f u n c t io n a l i t y  in  th e ir  p r o d u c ts .  S u n  
M ic r o s y s t e m s ,  fo r  in s ta n c e , o f f e r s  S u n  F ir e  E 2 5 K  S e r v e r ;  a  m a s s iv e ly  s c a la b le ,  h ig h ly  
a v a ila b le  d a ta  c e n te r  s e r v e r  th a t  s c a l e s  to  7 2  U lt r a S P A R C  I V  p r o c e s s o r s .  A  k e y  fa c to r  in  
th e  d e s ig n  o f  t h e  S u n  F ir e  E 2 5 K  S e r v e r  i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  to  c o n s i s t e n t ly  d e l iv e r  h ig h  l e v e l s  o f  
r e l ia b i l i t y  a n d  a v a i la b i l i t y  [ 2 7 ] ,  Why then is performance perceived as an inhibitor to 
ASP uptake, when industry proven solutions exist that support high-availability, 
scalability and reliability?
T im e  a n d  t im e  a g a in  s e c u r i ty  a n d  p r iv a c y  a r e  c i t e d  a s  m a jo r  d r a w b a c k s  t o  th e  
u p ta k e  o f  th e  A S P  m o d e l .  A s  p r e v io u s ly  o u t l in e d  b y  W a ls h  [ 1 0 ] ,  A S P s  o f t e n  h a v e  t h e  
a b i l i t y  a n d  r e s o u r c e s  t o  p r o v id e  a  h ig h e r  le v e l  o f  s e c u r i ty  th a n  m a n y  s m a ll  t o  m id s iz e
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c o m p a n ie s  [ 1 0 ] .  T h e  a b o v e  b e g s  th e  q u e s t io n :  Is trust the key to viewing security as a 
benefit or a threat to the uptake o f the ASP model? In  a n  a tte m p t to  a n s w e r  th is  q u e s t io n  
w e  e x a m in e  s e c u r ity  a n d  s p e c i f i c a l ly  c o n s id e r  p h y s i c a l  s e c u r i ty ,  s o lu t io n  s e c u r ity  a n d  
s e c u r ity  a n d  in te g r ity  o f  c l i e n t  d a ta .
I n fo r m a t io n  T e c h n o lo g y  (I T )  o r g a n is a t io n s  h a v e  tr u s te d  d a ta  c e n te r s  w it h  th e  
s e c u r ity  o f  th e ir  s o lu t io n  h a r d w a r e  fo r  d e c a d e s .  D a t a  c e n te r s  h a v e  g a in e d  c u s t o m e r  tr u s t  
b y  im p le m e n t in g  s tr ic t  p h y s ic a l  s e c u r i ty  p o l i c i e s ,  e n s u r in g  a c c e s s  i s  r e s t r ic te d  to  
a u th o r is e d  p e r s o n n e l  th r o u g h  th e  u s e  o f  b io m e tr ic  s c a n n e r s  s u c h  a s  f in g e r p r in t  o r  IR IS  
id e n t if ic a t io n ,  in  a d d it io n  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  p a s s w o r d s  a n d  a r m e d  g u a r d  p r o te c t io n  o f  fa c i l i t i e s
[6 ] .  Surely ASPs have a vested interest in ensuring the physical security o f  their 
hardware? A u th e n t ic a t io n ,  a u th o r is a t io n  a n d  e n c r y p t io n  a l l  f a l l  u n d e r  th e  s o lu t io n  
s e c u r ity  u m b r e lla . O r g a n is a t io n s  h a v e  m a d e  s i g n i f i c a t io n  p r o g r e s s  in  s e c u r in g  s y s t e m s  
th r o u g h  a u th e n t ic a t io n  b y  e n f o r c in g  t h e  u s e  o f  s t r o n g  p a s s w o r d s .  R e s tr ic t io n  o f  a c c e s s  
(b o th  lo c a l  a n d  n e tw o r k )  i s  a c h ie v e d  th r o u g h  a u th o r is a t io n  p o l i c ie s .  A d v a n c e s  in  n e tw o r k  
s e c u r ity  h a v e  a l l e v ia t e d  th e  fe a r  o f  tr a n s fe r r in g  s e n s i t i v e  d a ta  s u c h  a s  b a n k  a n d  c r e d it  ca rd  
d e ta i ls .  H y p e r T e x t  T r a n s fe r  P r o to c o l  o v e r  S e c u r e  S o c k e t s  L a y e r  ( H T T P S )  e n s u r e s  th e  
p r iv a c y , in te g r ity  a n d  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  d a ta  t h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  e n c r y p t io n .  S e c u r e  
S o c k e t s  L a y e r  ( S S L )  h a s  b e e n  w id e ly  im p le m e n t e d  a n d  i s  n o w  th e  d e  f a c t o  sta n d a r d  fo r  
p r o v id in g  s e c u r e  e - c o m m e r c e  tr a n s a c t io n s  o v e r  t h e  w e b  [ 2 8 ] .  Are ASPs not equally 
dedicated to preventing unauthorised access to machines on their network as their 
clients? A lt h o u g h  a p p r o p r ia te  l e v e l s  o f  p h y s ic a l  a n d  s o lu t io n  s e c u r ity  a s s i s t  in  e n s u r in g  
s e c u r ity  a n d  p r iv a c y  o f  d a ta  i t  i s  a ls o  e s s e n t ia l  th a t  p r o v e n  e n c r y p t io n  t e c h n iq u e s  a re  u s e d  
a n d  r e d u n d a n t  h a r d w a r e  is  d is p o s e d  o f  in  a n  a p p r o p r ia te  m a n n e r . S o f t w a r e  a n d  d a ta  th a t  
i s  n o  lo n g e r  n e e d e d  s h o u ld  b e  u n in s ta l le d  a n d  e r a s e d  t o  e n s u r e  th a t  it  i s  n o t  a c c e s s ib le  to  
u n a u th o r is e d  in d iv id u a ls .  Y e t  a g a in  b y  im p le m e n t in g  a n  a p p r o p r ia te  s e c u r i ty  p o l i c y  A S P s  
c o u ld  o v e r c o m e  th i s  p e r c e iv e d  p r o b le m . Surely ASPs strive to meet or even exceed 
customer expectations?
Economies o f  scale, Performance a n d  Security h a v e  b e e n  id e n t i f i e d  a s  th e  k e y  
fa c to r s  th a t  in f lu e n c e  th e  u p ta k e  o f  th e  A S P  m o d e l .  H o w e v e r  o u r  a n a ly s is  o f  t h e s e  fa c to r s  
s u g g e s t s  th a n  ‘p e r c e p t io n ’ m a y  in  fa c t  b e  t h e  f a c t o r  m o s t  r e le v a n t  t o  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e
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A S P  m o d e l .  Is it possible that 'bad press ’ has influenced perception o f  the ASP model 
and ultimately its uptake?
4. C onclusion
O u r  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  fa c t o r s  in f lu e n c in g  t h e  u p ta k e  o f  t h e  A S P  m o d e l  s u g g e s t s  th a t  th e  
r e se a r c h  c o n d u c te d  to  d a te  i s  a t  b e s t ,  in c o m p le t e ,  o r  a t  w o r s t ,  v a g u e  a n d  a m b ig u o u s .  
F u rth er  r e s e a r c h  is  r e q u ir e d  to  f u l ly  c la r i f y  t h e  r e le v a n c e  o f  E c o n o m ie s  o f  S c a le ,  
P e r fo r m a n c e  a n d  S e c u r it y ,  a n d  m o s t  im p o r ta n t ly  Stakeholder Perceptions (U s e r s ,  IT  
M a n a g e r s , S o f t w a r e  D e v e lo p e r s ,  In d u str y  A n a ly s t s  a n d  A c a d e m ic s )  to  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  th e  
A S P  m o d e l  a s  a  w h o le .  Perceptions h a v e  in  t h e  p a s t  g r e a t ly  in f lu e n c e d  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o r  
o t h e r w is e  o f  n e w  p a r a d ig m s  a n d  /  o r  t h e  r a te  o f  a d o p t io n  o f  n e w  p r o d u c ts .  G lo b a l  
a d o p t io n  o f  th e  a u to m o b ile  fo r  in s ta n c e  w a s  in i t ia l ly  p r e d ic t e d  to  b e  in  th e  l o w  th o u s a n d s  
d u e  t o  th e  fac t th a t  n o t  e n o u g h  p e o p le  w o u ld  w o r k  a s  c h a u f fe u r s . H is t o r y  t e l l s  u s  th a t  th i s  
fact w a s  in  th e  e n d  a n  i l l - in fo r m e d  a n d  p o o r ly  v a l id a t e d  perception. C lo s e r  to  th e  w o r ld  
o f  A S P  th e r e  are  s im ila r  e x a m p le s  o f  p e r c e p t io n s  in f lu e n c in g  c r it ic a l th in k in g  — c o n s id e r  
s o m e  o f  th e  IT  in d u s tr y ’s  v i e w  o f  th e  p o te n t ia l  m a r k e t  f o r  p e r s o n a l  c o m p u t in g  s o m e  2 0  -  
2 5  y e a r s  a g o !  W e  s u g g e s t  th a t perception i s  in  fa c t  a  k e y  in h ib ito r  to  th e  u p ta k e  o f  th e  
A S P  m o d e l  a n d  s e e k  t o  fu r th e r  t h i s  h y p o t h e s is .  Highlighting t h e  i s s u e  th r o u g h  t h i s  p a p e r  
i s  a n  in it ia l  s te p . F u r th e r in g  th e  b o d y  o f  r e s e a r c h  f o c u s in g  o n  A S P  a d o p t io n  i s  a n o th e r  
s te p  in  a s s e s s in g  o u r  h y p o t h e s is .  T o  b e g in  to  a c h ie v e  t h is  s e c o n d  s te p  th e n ,  w e  p r o p o s e  a  
s u r v e y  o f  IT  o r g a n is a t io n s  th a t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  e x p lo r e s  a l l  th e  fa c to r s  p e r t in e n t  t o  A S P  
a d o p t io n  a t  a  m u c h  f in e r  l e v e l  o f  g r a n u la r ity . T h e  p r im a r y  f o c u s  o f  s u c h  a  s u r v e y  is  t o  
e x p lo r e  “p e r c e p t io n s ”  in  p a r t ic u la r  a n d  h o w  t h e y  in f lu e n c e  A S P  a d o p t io n  ra te s . 
I n t e r v ie w s  s h o u ld  s u p p le m e n t  th e  s u r v e y  w h e r e  a p p r o p r ia te  to  c la r i f y  a n y  a m b ig u it ie s  
th a t a r is e . It i s  in te n d e d  t o  f in a l i s e  th e  d e s ig n  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  a n d  ta r g e t  a  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
p o p u la t io n  in  I r e la n d  in  2 0 0 5 .  A n  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  m e t h o d o lo g y  a n d  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  
r e s u lt s  w i l l  b e  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  a  la ter  p a p e r .
X
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Appendix II
T h e  f o l lo w in g  s c r e e n s h o t s  w e r e  ta k e n  fr o m  th e  A p p lic a t io n  S e r v ic e  P r o v is io n  ( A S P )  
b il l in g  p r o to ty p e  c a s e  s tu d y , fo r m a lly  k n o w n  a s  B i l l in g 4 R e n t .  T h e  p r o to ty p e  is  
s u b d iv id e d  in to  th r e e  in te r c o n n e c te d  a p p lic a t io n s :  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  L td . w e b  a p p lic a t io n ,  
th e  b i l l in g  s o lu t io n  a n d  an  a d m in is tr a t io n  to o l .
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E ve ryo ne  needs to  b ill in o rd e r to  ta k e  in  reve nu e  " If you  can’t bill it, kill it" is w h a t 
large ca m e is  say abou t a p a rticu la r service
W h ile  i t  is  c r it ica l to  th e ir  reve nu e, ea rne rs  an d  s e rv ice  p ro v id e rs  d o  n o t n e ed  to  b e  b illin g  
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B iU ing4P.ent o f fe r  an onhne b illing  service b a sed  on  a ren ta l m od e l th a t any service 
p ro v id e r  can use to b il l their custom ers
U s in g  A S P  (a p p lica tio n  serv ice  p ro v id e r )  te c lin o lo g y , ve rs io n  upda tes to  the so ftw a re  are 
seemless to  th e  user
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E m otiona lity on  a sub scrip tion /ren ta l basis
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H um an  reso urces, ca ll cen tre services and cus tom er re la tionsh ip  m anagem ent, s o f lw a ie  ap p lica tion s all len d them selves 
to  the A S P  m o d e l T h e  A S P  p ro v id e r  agrees a service le ve l w rth  the c lien t co m p an y  and pro v id es  each c lien t w ith  
access to  the so ftw are  on a o n e -to -m a n y  basis
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T he  ho sting  in fra s tru c tu re  w e  o ffe r  th ro ug h  o u r h osbrig  p a r tn e r  has been crea ted  
m a k in g  use o f  th e  lead ing  v en d o rs  ai the  ind us try , f ro m  h ig h -q u a lity  redundant 
In te rn e t connections to  c lim ate c o n tro l systems to  ro b o tic  tape b a cku p s , etc 
T he  ho sting  in fras tructu re  is m o n ito re d  and sup po rted  b y  ce rtifie d  n e tw o rk  
ad m in is tra to rs  24 ho u rs  a d a y  11  days a  w e e k . H ie  n e tw o rk  is  p ro te c te d  b y  
various In tru s io n  D e te c tio n  System s and a h a rd w a re -b a se d  fire w a ll, as w e ll as 
loa d ba lancing appliance
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Careers
B iilin g4 R en t is  a  b u sy  energetic  o rgan isa tion , w h ich  o ffe rs  challenging ro le s  ™  
q u a lifie d  ind iv id ua ls  in a dyn am ic  an d  p ro a c tiv e  en v ironm ent Jo in ing  o u r p rog ress ive  team  
w i ll  p ro v id e  the o p p o rtu n ity  to  de ve lo p  you r existing sk ill set and to  p a rtic ip a te  in  w o rk in g  
to w a rd s  th e  g ro w th  and success o f  a y o u n g  and dynam ic com p an y
Billing4R ent are always keen  to hear from qualified and enthusiastic people and 
routinely recruit for die foil owing positions:
A c c o u n t M an ag ers  
S o ftw a re  Engineers 
System s A rch ite c ts  
W e b  D eve lop e rs  
Q u a lity  A ssu ra nce  E xp erts  
H e lp d e s k  A d m in is tra to rs
Y o u  can  send a  C V  to  cai eers@ billing4ient.ie or a lte rna tive ly  che ck  ou t the curren t 
vacancies
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Appendix III
The following is an extract from the Billing4Rent security policy namely the ‘Security 
Policy for the B4R ASP Service’ document. The security policy is composed o f a 
combination o f guidelines with regard to general security, physical security, host security, 
network security and data security adapted from the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, 
Security) Institute security policy templates. A security policy is an ever-changing 
document, constantly amended to cater for updates to the organisation’s systems and 
procedures.
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2 SECURITY STANDARDS & POLICIES
2.1 Standards
2.1.1 General Security
B il l in g 4 R e n t  r e s e r v e s  th e  r ig h t  t o  p e r io d ic a l ly  a u d it  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  in fr a str u c tu r e  
t o  e n su r e  c o m p l ia n c e  w it h  th e  S e c u r ity  P o l i c y  fo r  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  S e r v ic e .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h a ll  p r o v id e  a  c o m p le te  a r c h ite c tu r e  d o c u m e n t  th a t  in c lu d e s  a  f u l l  n e tw o r k  
d ia g r a m  o f  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  e n v ir o n m e n t ,  i l lu s tr a t in g  t h e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  th e  
A S P  e n v ir o n m e n t  a n d  a n y  o th e r  r e le v a n t  n e tw o r k s ,  w i t h  a  fu l l  d a ta  f lo w c h a r t  d e ta i l in g  
w h e r e  c l i e n t  d a ta  r e s id e s ,  th e  a p p lic a t io n s  th a t  m a n ip u la te  it , a n d  th e  s e c u r ity  th e r e o f .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h o u ld  b e  a b le  to  im m e d ia t e ly  d is a b le  a l l  o r  p a rt o f  t h e  f u n c t io n a l i t y  o f  th e  
A S P  s o lu t io n  s h o u ld  a  s e c u r ity  i s s u e  b e  id e n t i f ie d .  A  D is a s t e r  R e c o v e r y  P la n  s h o u ld  b e  
d o c u m e n t e d  a n d  t e s t e d ,  t o  m in im is e  t h e  im p a c t  o f  in te r r u p tio n  d u e  t o  u n a v o id a b le  e v e n t s  
a n d  to  e n s u r e  e a s e  o f  r e c o v e r y .
N o n - in t r u s iv e  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  A S P  n e tw o r k  a u d it s  ( b a s ic  p o r ts c a n s , e t c . )  m a y  b e  p e r fo r m e d  
r a n d o m ly , w it h o u t  p r io r  n o t ic e .  M o r e  in tr u s iv e  n e tw o r k  a n d  p h y s ic a l  a u d it s  m a y  b e  
c o n d u c te d  w it h  2 4  h o u r s  n o t ic e .
2.1.2 Physical Security
T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  in fr a s tr u c tu r e  (h o s t s ,  n e tw o r k  e q u ip m e n t , e t c . )  s h o u ld  b e  lo c a t e d  
in  a  p h y s ic a l ly  s e c u r e  fa c i l i t y  o t h e r w is e  k n o w n  a s  a  d a ta  c e n te r . A c c e s s  t o  th e  fa c i l i t y  
s h o u ld  b e  r e s tr ic te d  to  a u th o r is e d  p e r s o n n e l ,  th r o u g h  t h e  u s e  o f  b io m e tr ic  s c a n n e r s  p lu s  
u se r  p in s  o r  p a s s w o r d s .
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T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  in fr a str u c tu r e  s h o u ld  b e  fu r th er  s e c u r e d  p h y s ic a l ly ,  th r o u g h  th e  
u s e  o f  s e c u r ity  c a b le s ,  p a d lo c k s  a n d  o th e r  s u c h  d e v ic e s .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  in  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Access Control Policy s tr in g e n t  
a c c e s s  c o n tr o l p o l i c i e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s , o u t l in in g  w h o  is  a u th o r is e d  to  e n te r  th e  d a ta  
c e n te r , in  a d d it io n  t o  w h o  i s  a u th o r is e d  to  a c c e s s  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  in fr a str u c tu r e .
C lo s e d  c ir c u it  t e l e v i s i o n  s h o u ld  b e  in s ta l le d  in  o r d e r  t o  m o n ito r  a c t iv i t i e s  th r o u g h o u t  th e  
d a ta  c e n te r . B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h a ll  d o c u m e n t  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Closed Circuit 
Television Policy t h e  ty p e  o f  s y s te m  u s e d  a n d  s e c u r ity  f o o t a g e  s to r a g e  m e th o d s .
2.1.3 Host Security
A p p r o p r ia te  s e r v ic e  p a c k s  a n d  p a tc h e s  s h o u ld  b e  a p p lie d  t o  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  
o p e r a t in g  s y s t e m s  a n d  a p p lic a t io n s  a s  s o o n  a s  t h e y  a re  m a d e  a v a i la b le .  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  sh a ll  
d o c u m e n t  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Service Packs /Patches Policy a ll  c u r r e n t p a tc h e s  o n  
h o s t s ,  in c lu d in g  h o s t  o p e r a t in g  s y s t e m  p a tc h e s ,  w e b  s e r v e r s , d a ta b a s e s ,  a n d  a n y  o th e r  
a p p lic a b le  a p p lic a t io n s .
T h e  c o r p o r a te  s ta n d a r d  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e  s h o u ld  b e  in s ta l le d  o n  a ll  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  m a c h in e s .  T h e  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s i t e  s h o u ld  b e  c h e c k e d  p e r io d ic a l ly  
fo r  a  l i s t  o f  u p d a te s ,  w h ic h  s h o u ld  b e  in s ta l le d  a s  th e y  b e c o m e  a v a ila b le .  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  
s h a ll  d o c u m e n t  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Anti-virus/Anti-spyware Policy h o w  th e  
o r g a n is a t io n  w i l l  k e e p  u p  to  d a te  w ith  v ir u s  a n d  s p y w a r e  v u ln e r a b i l i t ie s  a n d  h o w  u p d a te s  
w i l l  b e  a p p lie d .
A c c e s s  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  s o lu t io n  s h o u ld  b e  r e s tr ic te d  to  a u th o r is e d  p e r s o n n e l  b y  
e n fo r c in g  s tr o n g  p a s s w o r d s . B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  
Password Policy g u id e l in e s  fo r  t h e  g e n e r a t io n  o f  p a s s w o r d s  fo r  a l l  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P
XXXIX
in fr a s tr u c tu r e , in c lu d in g  m in im u m  p a s s w o r d  le n g th  a n d  h o w  o f t e n  p a s s w o r d s  a re  
c h a n g e d .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Account Maintenance Policy th e  
a c c o u n t  g e n e r a t io n , m a in te n a n c e  a n d  te r m in a t io n  p r o c e s s ,  fo r  b o th  m a in te n a n c e  a s  w e l l  
a s  u s e r  a c c o u n ts .
C l ie n t  d a ta  s to r e d  lo c a l ly  s h o u ld  b e  e n c r y p te d  t o  e n s u r e  s e c u r ity  a n d  in te g r ity  o f  t h e  d a ta , 
a s  o u t l in e d  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Cryptography Policy.
B il l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  th e  o r g a n is a t io n s  p r o c e s s e s  fo r  m o n ito r in g  th e  in te g r ity  a n d  
a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  h o s t s  in  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  Audit Policy.
2.1.4 Network Security
T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  s o lu t io n  s h o u ld  b e  t e s t e d  r ig o r o u s ly  t o  e n s u r e  th a t  n e ith e r  th e  
a p p lic a t io n  n o r  t h e  c o n f ig u r a t io n  o f  t h e  A S P  e n v ir o n m e n t  p o s e  a  s e c u r ity  r isk .
T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  s o lu t io n  f i r e w a l l  s h o u ld  b e  c o n f ig u r e d  to  f i l t e r  u n d e s ir e d  tr a f f ic  
b e t w e e n  th e  In te r n e t  a n d  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  in fr a str u c tu r e . A l l  u n n e c e s s a r y  s e r v ic e s  
r u n n in g  o n  th e  A S P  in fr a str u c tu r e  s h o u ld  b e  d is a b le d ,  b y  s h u t t in g  d o w n  u n u s e d  p o r ts .
R e m o t e  a c c e s s  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  s o lu t io n  h a r d w a r e  s h o u ld  b e  l im i t e d  t o  a n  a b s o lu te  
m in im u m . B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  in  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Remote a n d  Dial-in 
Access Policies, s ta n d a r d s  fo r  c o n n e c t in g  t o  B iI l in g 4 R e n t 's  n e tw o r k  fr o m  r e m o te  h o s t s .
D a ta  s e n t  o v e r  th e  In te r n e t  s h o u ld  b e  e n c r y p te d  t o  e n s u r e  s e c u r ity  a n d  in te g r ity  o f  d a ta  
b e in g  tr a n s m it te d  a s  o u t l in e d  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  Cryptography Policy.
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2.1.5 Data Security
B il l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  th e  o r g a n is a t io n s  p r o c e s s e s  fo r  p r o te c t in g  s e n s i t i v e  d a ta  in  
th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  Information Sensitivity Policy.
R e d u n d a n t  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  h a r d w a r e  s h o u ld  b e  d is p o s e d  o f  in  an  a p p r o p r ia te  m a n n e r .  
S o f t w a r e  a n d  d a ta  s h o u ld  b e  u n in s ta l le d  a n d  e r a s e d  t o  g u a r a n te e  th a t  s e n s i t i v e  d a ta  i s  n o t  
a c c e s s ib le  t o  u n a u th o r is e d  in d iv id u a ls .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  s o lu t io n  s o f tw a r e  a n d  th e  c o n f ig u r a t io n  o f  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  
e n v ir o n m e n t  s h o u ld  b e  t e s t e d  r ig o r o u s ly  t o  e n s u r e  th e  s e c u r i ty  a n d  th e  in te g r ity  o f  c l i e n t  
d a ta . A S P  s o lu t io n  s e c u r ity  th r e a ts  s h o u ld  b e  id e n t i f ie d  a n d  t h e  a p p r o p r ia te  a c t io n  s h o u ld  
b e  ta k e n  t o  c o m b a t  u n a u th o r is e d  a c c e s s  t o  s e n s i t i v e  d a ta .
2.2 Security Policies
2.2.1 Cryptography Policy
P r o v e n , s ta n d a rd  a lg o r ith m s  s u c h  a s  A d v a n c e d  E n c r y p t io n  S ta n d a r d  ( A E S )  a n d  R o n  
R iv e s t ,  A d i  S h a m ir  a n d  L e n  A d le m a n  E n c r y p t io n  ( R S A )  s h o u ld  b e  u s e d  a s  th e  b a s is  fo r  
e n c r y p t io n  t e c h n o lo g ie s .  A E S  c o n s i s t s  o f  1 2 8 -b it  b lo c k s  w it h  a  1 2 8 -b i t ,  1 9 2 -b i t  o r  
a lt e r n a t iv e ly  a  2 5 6 - b i t  c ip h e r  k e y  le n g th . T h e  n u m b e r  o f  r o u n d s / it e r a t io n s  o f  th e  
e n c r y p t io n /d e c r y p t io n  a lg o r ith m  i s  d e p e n d e n t  o n  th e  c ip h e r  k e y  le n g th . R S A  e n c r y p t io n  
s e c u r ity  i s  b a s e d  o n  th e  d i f f ic u l t y  in  fa c t o r in g  la r g e  n u m b e r s , w ith  a  k e y  th a t  v a r ie s  
d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  im p le m e n t a t io n  u s e d .  R S A  c a n  a ls o  b e  u s e d  a s  a  d ig i ta l  s ig n a tu r e  to  
a u th e n t ic a te  th e  o r ig in a to r  a n d  e n s u r e  th e  in te g r ity  o f  th e  d a ta . F o r  e x a m p le ,  S e c u r e  
S o c k e t  L a y e r  (S S L )  u s e s  R S A  e n c r y p t io n . E n c r y p tio n  a lg o r i th m s  s h o u ld  b e  r e v ie w e d  
r e g u la r ly  a n d  u p d a te d  b a s e d  o n  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  a d v a n c e s .  T h e  u s e  o f  p r o p r ie ta r y  e n c r y p tio n  
a lg o r ith m s  is  p r o h ib ite d  fo r  a n y  p u r p o s e .
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C o n n e c t io n s  t o  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  u t i l i s in g  t h e  I n te r n e t  s h o u ld  b e  p r o te c te d  u s in g  a n y  
o f  th e  f o l lo w in g  c r y p to g r a p h ic  t e c h n o lo g ie s :  I P S e c , S S L , S S H /S C P , P G P .
2.2.2 Anti-virus/Anti-spyware Policy
C o m p u te r  s y s t e m s  s h o u ld  b e  p r o te c te d  a g a in s t  in f e c t e d  b y  v ir u s e s  ( m a l ic io u s  a p p lic a t io n s  
lo a d e d  o n to  a  c o m p u te r  s y s t e m  w it h o u t  o n e s  k n o w le d g e ) ,  w o r m s  ( m a l ic io u s  a p p lic a t io n s  
th a t  c a n  r e p lic a te  t h e m s e lv e s  a c r o s s  a  n e tw o r k )  a n d  s p y w a r e  ( s o f t w a r e  th a t  c o v e r t ly  
g a th e r s  u s e r  in fo r m a t io n  th r o u g h  th e  u se r 's  In te r n e t  c o n n e c t io n  w it h o u t  h is  o r  h e r  
k n o w le d g e ) .  T h e  f o l lo w in g  p r o c e d u r e  s h o u ld  b e  a d h e r e d  t o  in  o r d e r  t o  p r o v id e  o p t im a l  
p r o te c t io n  a g a in s t  v ir u s e s ,  w o r m s  a n d  s p y w a r e :
•  T h e  c o r p o r a te  s ta n d a r d  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e  s h o u ld  b e  in s ta l le d  o n  a ll  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  m a c h in e s .  T h e  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s i t e  s h o u ld  b e  c h e c k e d  
p e r io d ic a l ly  fo r  a  l i s t  o f  u p d a te s ,  w h ic h  s h o u ld  b e  in s ta l le d  a s  th e y  b e c o m e  
a v a ila b le .
•  U n d e r  n o  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  s h o u ld  f i l e s  o r  m a c r o s  a t ta c h e d  t o  a n  e m a i l  fr o m  a n
u n k n o w n , s u s p ic io u s  o r  u n tr u s tw o r th y  s o u r c e  b e  o p e n e d .  S u c h  f i l e s  s h o u ld  b e
d e le t e d  im m e d ia t e ly ,  a n d  e m p t ie d  fr o m  th e  d e le t e d  it e m s /tr a s h  fo ld e r .
•  U n d e r  n o  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  s h o u ld  s p a m , c h a in , a n d  o th e r  j u n k  e m a i l  b e  fo r w a r d e d
e ith e r  in te r n a lly  o r  e x te r n a l ly .  S u c h  f i l e s  s h o u ld  b e  d e le t e d  im m e d ia t e ly ,  a n d  
e m p t ie d  fr o m  th e  d e le t e d  it e m s /tr a s h  fo ld e r .
•  U n d e r  n o  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  s h o u ld  f i l e s  b e  d o w n lo a d e d  fr o m  u n k n o w n  o r  s u s p ic io u s  
so u r c e s .
•  D ir e c t  d is k  s h a r in g  w i t h  r e a d /w r it e  a c c e s s  s h o u ld  b e  a v o id e d  u n le s s  th e r e  i s  an  
a b s o lu te  b u s in e s s  r e q u ir e m e n t  t o  d o  s o .
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•  E x te r n a l m e d ia  s u c h  a s  f lo p p y  d i s k ’s , C D s  a n d  f la s h  d r iv e s  f r o m  u n k n o w n
s o u r c e s  s h o u ld  a lw a y s  b e  s c a n n e d  b e fo r e  u s a g e .
•  C r it ic a l d a ta  a n d  s y s t e m  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  s h o u ld  b e  b a c k e d  u p  o n  a  r e g u la r  b a s i s
a n d  s to r e d  in  a  s a f e  p la c e ,  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w ith  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  Disaster Recovery 
Policy.
•  I f  la b - t e s t in g  c o n f l ic t s  w i t h  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e ,  ru n  th e  a n t i­
v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  u t i l i ty  t o  e n s u r e  a  c le a n  m a c h in e ,  d is a b le  th e  s o f tw a r e ,  th e n  ru n  
t h e  la b  t e s t .  A f t e r  t h e  la b  t e s t ,  e n a b le  t h e  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e .  W h e n  
th e  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e  i s  d is a b le d ,  d o  n o t  ru n  a n y  a p p l ic a t io n s  th a t  
c o u ld  tr a n s fe r  a  v ir u s ,  e .g . ,  e m a i l  o r  f i l e  sh a r in g .
2.2.3 Password Policy
P a s s w o r d s  a re  a n  im p o r ta n t  a s p e c t  o f  c o m p u te r  s e c u r i ty  a s  th e y  a r e  th e  fr o n t l in e  o f  
p r o te c t io n  fo r  u s e r  a c c o u n ts .  A  p o o r ly  c h o s e n  p a s s w o r d  m a y  r e s u lt  in  th e  c o m p r o m is e  o f  
B il l in g 4 R e n t ' s  e n t ir e  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k . A s  s u c h , a l l  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  ( in c lu d in g  
c o n tr a c to r s  a n d  v e n d o r s  w ith  a c c e s s  to  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s y s t e m s )  a r e  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  ta k in g  
th e  a p p r o p r ia te  s t e p s , a s  o u t l in e d  b e lo w ,  t o  s e l e c t  a n d  s e c u r e  th e ir  p a s s w o r d s :
•  A l l  s y s t e m - le v e l  p a s s w o r d s  ( e .g . ,  r o o t ,  e n a b le ,  N T  a d m in , a p p lic a t io n
a d m in is tr a t io n  a c c o u n ts ,  e t c . )  s h o u ld  b e  c h a n g e d  o n  a t  le a s t  a  q u a r te r ly  b a s is .
P a s s w o r d  c h a n g e s  w i l l  b e  e n f o r c e d  w it h  a n  a u to m a t ic  e x p ir a t io n  a n d  p r e v e n t io n  
o f  r e p e a te d  o r  r e u s e d  p a s s w o r d s .
•  A l l  u s e r - le v e l  p a s s w o r d s  ( e .g . ,  e m a i l ,  w e b ,  d e s k t o p  c o m p u te r , e t c . )  s h o u ld  b e  
c h a n g e d  a t  le a s t  e v e r y  s i x  m o n th s . P a s s w o r d  c h a n g e s  w i l l  b e  e n fo r c e d  w it h  a n  
a u to m a t ic  e x p ir a t io n  a n d  p r e v e n t io n  o f  r e p e a te d  o r  r e u s e d  p a s s w o r d s .
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U s e r  a c c o u n ts  th a t  h a v e  s y s t e m - le v e l  p r iv i l e g e s  g r a n te d  th r o u g h  g r o u p  
m e m b e r s h ip s  s h o u ld  h a v e  a  u n iq u e  p a s s w o r d  fr o m  a l l  o th e r  a c c o u n ts  h e ld  b y  th a t  
u se r .
A l l  u s e r - le v e l  a n d  s y s t e m - le v e l  p a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  c o n fo r m  t o  th e  f o l lo w in g  
g u id e l in e s :
1 ) P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  c o n ta in  b o th  u p p e r  a n d  lo w e r  c a s e  c h a r a c te r s  ( e .g . ,  a - z ,  A -  
Z ).
2 )  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  in c lu d e  d ig i t s  a n d  p u n c tu a t io n  c h a r a c te r s  a s  w e l l  a s  le t te r s  
e .g . ,  0 - 9 ,  !@ # $ % A& * 0 _ + |~ - = V { } [ ] :" ; '< > ? ,. / ) .
3 )  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  b e  a t  le a s t  e ig h t  a lp h a n u m e r ic  c h a r a c te r s  lo n g .
4 )  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  w o r d  in  a n y  la n g u a g e , s la n g , d ia le c t ,  j a r g o n , e tc .
5 )  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  b a s e d  o n  p e r s o n a l  in fo r m a t io n , n a m e s  o f  fa m ily ,  
e tc .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  a c c o u n t s  s h o u ld  b e  d if f e r e n t  f r o m  a ll  n o n - B i l l in g 4 R e n t  p a s s w o r d s  
( e .g . ,  p e r s o n a l I S P  a c c o u n t , o p t io n  tr a d in g , b e n e f i t s ,  e t c .) .  W h e r e  p o s s ib le ,  
d if fe r e n t  p a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  b e  u s e d  fo r  v a r io u s  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  a c c e s s  n e e d s .  F o r  
e x a m p le ,  s e l e c t  o n e  p a s s w o r d  fo r  t h e  e n g in e e r in g  s y s t e m s  a n d  a  s e p a r a te  
p a s s w o r d  fo r  IT  s y s t e m s .
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  p a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  sh a r e d  w ith  a n y o n e , in c lu d in g  
a d m in is t r a t iv e  a s s is t a n t s  o r  s e c r e ta r ie s .  A l l  p a s s w o r d s  a r e  to  b e  tr e a te d  a s  
s e n s i t iv e ,  c o n f id e n t ia l  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  in fo r m a t io n . I f  s o m e o n e  d e m a n d s  a  
p a s s w o r d , r e fe r  t h e m  t o  th is  d o c u m e n t  o r  h a v e  th e m  s p e a k  to  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  te a m :
1) D o n 't  r e v e a l a  p a s s w o r d  o v e r  th e  p h o n e  t o  A N Y O N E .
2 )  D o n 't  r e v e a l  a  p a s s w o r d  in  a n  e m a i l  m e s s a g e .
3 )  D o n 't  r e v e a l  a  p a s s w o r d  t o  th e  b o s s .
4 )  D o n 't  ta lk  a b o u t  a  p a s s w o r d  in  fr o n t  o f  o th e r s .
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5 )  D o n 't  h in t  a t  th e  fo r m a t  o f  a  p a s s w o r d  ( e .g . ,  " m y  fa m ily  n a m e " ).
6 )  D o n 't  r e v e a l  a  p a s s w o r d  o n  q u e s t io n n a ir e s  o r  s e c u r i ty  fo r m s .
7 )  D o n 't  s h a r e  a  p a s s w o r d  w it h  f a m ily  m e m b e r s .
8 )  D o n 't  r e v e a l  a  p a s s w o r d  to  c o -w o r k e r s  w h i l e  o n  v a c a t io n .
•  T h e  " R e m e m b e r  P a ssw o r d "  fe a tu r e  o f  a p p l ic a t io n s  ( e .g .  E u d o r a , O u t lo o k ,  
N e t s c a p e  M e s s e n g e r )  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  u s e d .
•  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  w r it te n  d o w n  a n d  s to r e d  a n y w h e r e  in  y o u r  o f f i c e  o r  
s to r e d  e le c t r o n ic a l ly  o n  a n y  c o m p u te r  s y s t e m  ( in c lu d in g  P a lm  P i lo t s  o r  s im ila r  
d e v ic e s )  w i t h o u t  e n c r y p t io n .
•  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  in s e r te d  in to  e m a il  m e s s a g e s  o r  o th e r  fo r m s  o f  
e le c t r o n ic  c o m m u n ic a t io n .
•  I f  it  i s  s u s p e c te d  a n  a c c o u n t  o r  p a s s w o r d  h a s  b e e n  c o m p r o m is e d ,  th e  in c id e n t  
s h o u ld  b e  r e p o r te d  im m e d ia t e ly  to  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  
te a m  a n d  a ll p a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  b e  c h a n g e d .
•  A p p lic a t io n  d e v e lo p e r s  s h o u ld  e n s u r e  th e ir  p r o g r a m s  c o n ta in  t h e  f o l lo w in g  
s e c u r ity  p r e c a u t io n s :
1 ) S u p p o r t a u th e n t ic a t io n  o f  in d iv id u a l  u s e r s ,  n o t  g r o u p s .
2 )  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  s to r e d  in  c le a r  t e x t  o r  in  a n y  e a s i ly  r e v e r s ib le  fo r m .
3 )  P a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  p r o v id e  f o r  s o m e  so r t  o f  r o le  m a n a g e m e n t , s u c h  th a t  o n e  
u s e r  c a n  ta k e  o v e r  th e  fu n c t io n s  o f  a n o th e r  w it h o u t  h a v in g  to  k n o w  th e  
o th e r 's  p a s s w o r d .
•  A c c e s s  t o  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k s  v ia  r e m o te  a c c e s s  i s  t o  b e  c o n tr o l le d  u s in g  
e ith e r  a  o n e - t im e  p a s s w o r d  a u th e n t ic a t io n  o r  a  p u b lic /p r iv a te  k e y  s y s t e m  w ith  a  
s t r o n g  p a s s p h r a s e .
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P a s s p h r a s e s  a r e  g e n e r a lly  u s e d  fo r  p u b l ic /p r iv a te  k e y  a u th e n t ic a t io n . A  
p u b lic /p r iv a te  k e y  s y s t e m  d e f in e s  a  m a t h e m a t ic a l  r e la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  th e  p u b lic  
k e y  th a t i s  k n o w n  b y  a l l ,  a n d  t h e  p r iv a te  k e y ,  th a t  i s  k n o w n  o n ly  t o  th e  u se r .  
W ith o u t  th e  p a s s p h r a s e  to  " u n lo ck "  th e  p r iv a te  k e y , th e  u se r  c a n n o t  g a in  a c c e s s .
P a s s p h r a s e s  a r e  n o t  th e  s a m e  a s  p a s s w o r d s .  A  p a s s p h r a s e  i s  a  lo n g e r  v e r s io n  o f  a  
p a s s w o r d  a n d  is ,  th e r e fo r e , m o r e  s e c u r e .  A  p a s s p h r a s e  i s  t y p ic a l ly  c o m p o s e d  o f  
m u lt ip le  w o r d s .  B e c a u s e  o f  th is ,  a  p a s s p h r a s e  i s  m o r e  s e c u r e  a g a in s t  " d ic t io n a r y  
a tta ck s."
A  g o o d  p a s s p h r a s e  i s  r e la t iv e ly  lo n g  a n d  c o n ta in s  a  c o m b in a t io n  o f  u p p e r  a n d  
lo w e r c a s e  le t te r s  a n d  n u m e r ic  a n d  p u n c tu a t io n  c h a r a c te r s . A n  e x a m p le  o f  a  g o o d  
p a ss p h r a se :
" T h e*  ? # > *  @ T r a f f ic O n T h e  101 W a s  * & # !  # T h i s M o m in g "
A l l  o f  t h e  r u le s  a b o v e  th a t a p p ly  to  p a s s w o r d s  a p p ly  t o  p a s s p h r a s e s .
2.2.4 Dial-In Access Policy
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  th i s  p o l i c y  i s  t o  p r o te c t  B i l l in g 4 R e n t 's  e le c t r o n ic  in fo r m a t io n  fr o m  b e in g  
in a d v e r te n t ly  c o m p r o m is e d  b y  a u th o r is e d  p e r s o n n e l  u s in g  a  d ia l- in  c o n n e c t io n .
•  B iI l in g 4 R e n t 's  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  a u th o r is e d  th ir d  p a r t ie s  ( c u s to m e r s ,  v e n d o r s ,  e t c . )  
c a n  u s e  d ia l - in  c o n n e c t io n s  t o  g a in  a c c e s s  t o  th e  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k . D ia l - in  a c c e s s  
s h o u ld  b e  s t r ic t ly  c o n tr o l le d , u s in g  o n e - t im e  p a s s w o r d  a u th e n t ic a t io n .  D i a l - i n  
p a s s w o r d s  s h o u ld  b e  r e q u e s t in g  u s in g  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A c c o u n t  R e q u e s t  P r o c e s s .
•  It i s  t h e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  in d iv id u a ls  w ith  d ia l - in  a c c e s s  p r iv i le g e s  to  e n s u r e  
u n a u th o r is e d  in d iv id u a ls  d o  n o t  g a in  a c c e s s  to  c o m p a n y  in fo r m a t io n  s y s t e m
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r e s o u r c e s .  A n  e m p lo y e e  a n d /o r  a u th o r is e d  th ir d  p a r ty  w h o  i s  g r a n te d  d ia l - in  
a c c e s s  p r iv i le g e s  s h o u ld  r e m a in  c o n s t a n t ly  a w a r e  th a t d ia l - in  c o n n e c t io n s  b e tw e e n  
th e ir  lo c a t io n  a n d  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  a re  lite r a l e x t e n s io n s  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ' s  c o r p o r a te  
n e tw o r k , a n d  th a t th e y  p r o v id e  a  p o te n t ia l  p a th  t o  th e  c o m p a n y 's  m o s t  s e n s i t i v e  
in fo r m a t io n . T h e  e m p lo y e e  a n d /o r  a u th o r is e d  th ird  p a r ty  in d iv id u a l  s h o u ld  ta k e  
e v e r y  r e a s o n a b le  m e a s u r e  to  p r o te c t  B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ' s  a s s e t s .
•  A n a lo g  a n d  n o n -G S M  d ig ita l  c e l lu la r  p h o n e s  c a n n o t  b e  u s e d  to  c o n n e c t  to  
B il l in g 4 R e n t ' s  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k , a s  th e ir  s ig n a ls  c a n  b e  r e a d ily  s c a n n e d  a n d /o r  
h ija c k e d  b y  u n a u th o r is e d  in d iv id u a ls .  O n ly  G S M  sta n d a rd  d ig ita l  c e l lu la r  p h o n e s  
a re  c o n s id e r e d  s e c u r e  e n o u g h  fo r  c o n n e c t io n  to  B ilI in g 4 R e n t 's  n e tw o r k . F o r  
a d d it io n a l in fo r m a t io n  o n  w ir e le s s  a c c e s s  t o  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ' s  n e tw o r k , c o n s u l t  
th e  Wireless Communications Policy.
•  D ia l - in  a c c o u n t s  a re  c o n s id e r e d  'as n e e d e d ' a c c o u n t s .  A c c o u n t  a c t iv i ty  s h o u ld  b e  
m o n ito r e d , a n d  i f  a  d ia l- in  a c c o u n t  i s  n o t  u s e d  fo r  a  p e r io d  o f  s i x  m o n th s  th e  
a c c o u n t  s h o u ld  e x p ir e  a n d  n o  lo n g e r  f u n c t io n .  I f  d ia l - in  a c c e s s  i s  s u b s e q u e n t ly  
r e q u ir e d , th e  in d iv id u a l  s h o u ld  r e q u e s t  a  n e w  a c c o u n t .
2.2.5 Remote Access Policy
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  th i s  p o l i c y  is  t o  d e f in e  s ta n d a r d s  fo r  c o n n e c t in g  to  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ' s  n e tw o r k  
fr o m  a n y  h o s t .  T h e s e  s ta n d a r d s  are  d e s ig n e d  t o  m in im is e  th e  p o te n t ia l  e x p o s u r e  to  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  fr o m  d a m a g e s , w h ic h  m a y  r e s u lt  fr o m  u n a u th o r is e d  u s e  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  
r e s o u r c e s .  D a m a g e s  in c lu d e  th e  lo s s  o f  s e n s i t i v e  o r  c o m p a n y  c o n f id e n t ia l  d a ta , 
in t e l le c tu a l  p r o p e r ty , d a m a g e  to  p u b lic  im a g e ,  d a m a g e  to  c r it ic a l B i l l in g 4 R e n t  in tern a l  
s y s t e m s , e tc .
It is  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s ,  c o n tr a c to r s , v e n d o r s  a n d  a g e n ts  w ith  
r e m o te  a c c e s s  p r iv i le g e s  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ' s  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k  to  e n s u r e  th a t th e ir  r e m o te
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a c c e s s  c o n n e c t io n  is  g iv e n  th e  s a m e  c o n s id e r a t io n  a s  t h e  u ser 's  o n - s i t e  c o n n e c t io n  to  
B il l in g 4 R e n t .
G e n e r a l a c c e s s  to  th e  In te r n e t  fo r  r e c r e a t io n a l u s e  b y  im m e d ia t e  h o u s e h o ld  m e m b e r s  
th r o u g h  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  o n  p e r s o n a l c o m p u te r s  is  p r o h ib ite d .
T h e  f o l lo w in g  p o l i c i e s  p r o v id e  d e ta i ls  in  r e la t io n  t o  th e  p r o te c t in g  o f  in fo r m a t io n  w h e n  
a c c e s s in g  th e  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k  v ia  r e m o t e  a c c e s s  m e t h o d s ,  a n d  a c c e p ta b le  u s e  o f  
B il l in g 4 R e n t 's  n e tw o r k :
1) C r y p to g r a p h y  P o l ic y
2 )  V ir tu a l P r iv a te  N e t w o r k  ( V P N )  P o l i c y
3 )  W ir e le s s  C o m m u n ic a t io n s  P o l i c y
G e n e r a l R e m o t e  A c c e s s  G u id e lin e s :
•  S e c u r e  r e m o te  a c c e s s  s h o u ld  b e  s t r ic t ly  c o n tr o l le d .  C o n tr o l s h o u ld  b e  e n fo r c e d  v ia  
o n e - t im e  p a s s w o r d  a u th e n t ic a t io n  o r  p u b l ic /p r iv a te  k e y s  w ith  s tr o n g  p a s s -p h r a s e s .  F o r  
in fo r m a t io n  o n  c r e a t in g  a s tr o n g  p a s s -p h r a s e  s e e  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  P a s s w o r d  P o l ic y .
•  A t  n o  t im e  s h o u ld  a n y  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e  p r o v id e  th e ir  lo g in  o r  e m a i l  p a s s w o r d  
to  a n y o n e , n o t  e v e n  fa m ily  m e m b e r s .
•  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  c o n tr a c to r s  w it h  r e m o te  a c c e s s  p r iv i le g e s  s h o u ld  e n su r e  
th a t  th e ir  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  o w n e d  o r  p e r s o n a l  c o m p u te r  o r  w o r k s ta t io n , w h ic h  i s  r e m o te ly  
c o n n e c t e d  t o  B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ' s  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k , i s  n o t  c o n n e c te d  t o  a n y  o th e r  n e tw o r k  
a t th e  s a m e  t im e , w ith  th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  p e r s o n a l  n e tw o r k s  th a t a re  u n d e r  th e  c o m p le te  
c o n tr o l o f  th e  u se r .
•  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  c o n tr a c to r s  w it h  r e m o te  a c c e s s  p r iv i le g e s  to  
B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ' s  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k  s h o u ld  n o t  u s e  n o n - B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m a il  a c c o u n ts  
( i .e . ,  H o t m a il ,  Y a h o o ,  A O L ) , o r  o th e r  e x te r n a l  r e s o u r c e s  to  c o n d u c t  B i l l in g 4 R e n t
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b u s in e s s ,  th e r e b y  e n s u r in g  th a t o f f ic ia l  b u s in e s s  i s  n e v e r  c o n f u s e d  w it h  p e r s o n a l  
b u s in e s s .
•  R o u te r s  fo r  d e d ic a t e d  I S D N  l in e s  c o n f ig u r e d  fo r  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  
s h o u ld  m e e t  m in im u m  a u th e n t ic a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n ts .
•  R e c o n f ig u r a t io n  o f  a  h o m e  u se r 's  e q u ip m e n t  fo r  th e  p u r p o s e  o f  s p l i t - tu n n e l in g  o r  d u a l  
h o m in g  i s  n o t  p e r m it te d  a t  a n y  t im e .
•  F r a m e  R e la y  s h o u ld  m e e t  m in im u m  a u th e n t ic a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n ts  o f  D L C I  s ta n d a r d s .
•  A  m e m b e r  o f  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  te a m  s h o u ld  a p p r o v e  n o n -s ta n d a r d  
h a r d w a r e  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  a n d  s e c u r ity  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  f o r  a c c e s s  to  h a r d w a r e .
•  A l l  h o s t s  th a t  a r e  c o n n e c t e d  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  in te r n a l n e tw o r k s  v ia  r e m o te  a c c e s s  
t e c h n o lo g ie s ,  s h o u ld  u s e  th e  m o s t  u p - to -d a te  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e ,  th is  
in c lu d e s  p e r s o n a l  c o m p u te r s .
•  P e r s o n a l e q u ip m e n t  th a t  is  u s e d  t o  c o n n e c t  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ' s  n e tw o r k s  s h o u ld  m e e t  
th e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  o w n e d  e q u ip m e n t  fo r  r e m o t e  a c c e s s .
2.2.6 Wireless Communication Policy
T h is  p o l i c y  p r o h ib i t s  a c c e s s  t o  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k s  v ia  u n s e c u r e d  w ir e le s s
c o m m u n ic a t io n  m e c h a n is m s .  O n ly  w ir e le s s  s y s t e m s  th a t m e e t  th e  c r ite r ia  o f  t h i s  p o l i c y
a re  a p p r o v e d  fo r  c o n n e c t iv i t y  t o  B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ' s  n e tw o r k s .
•  P e r s o n a l e q u ip m e n t  th a t i s  u s e d  to  c o n n e c t  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ' s  n e tw o r k s  s h o u ld  m e e t  
th e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  o w n e d  e q u ip m e n t  fo r  r e m o te  a c c e s s .
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•  A l l  w ir e le s s  a c c e s s  p o in t s /b a s e  s t a t io n s  c o n n e c te d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k  s h o u ld  b e  
r e g is te r e d  a n d  a p p r o v e d  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  te a m . T h e s e  a c c e s s  p o in t s /b a s e  
s ta t io n s  a re  su b je c t  t o  p e r io d ic  p e n e tr a t io n  t e s t s  a n d  a u d it s .  A l l  w ir e le s s  N e t w o r k  
I n te r fa c e  C a r d s  ( i .e . ,  P C  c a r d s )  u s e d  in  c o r p o r a te  la p to p  o r  d e s k t o p  c o m p u t e r s  s h o u ld  
b e  r e g is te r e d  w it h  h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  te a m .
•  A l l  w ir e le s s  L A N  a c c e s s  s h o u ld  u s e  c o r p o r a te -a p p r o v e d  v e n d o r  p r o d u c ts  a n d  s e c u r ity  
c o n f ig u r a t io n s .
•  A i l  c o m p u te r s  w it h  w ir e le s s  L A N  d e v ic e s  s h o u ld  u t i l i s e  a  c o r p o r a te -a p p r o v e d  V ir tu a l  
P r iv a te  N e t w o r k  ( V P N )  c o n f ig u r e d  to  d r o p  a l l  u n a u th e n t ic a te d  a n d  u n e n c r y p te d  
tr a f f ic .  T o  c o m p ly  w ith  th is  p o l i c y ,  w ir e le s s  im p le m e n t a t io n s  s h o u ld  m a in ta in  p o in t  to  
p o in t  h a r d w a r e  e n c r y p t io n  o f  a t  le a s t  5 6  b it s . A l l  im p le m e n t a t io n s  s h o u ld  su p p o r t  a  
h a r d w a r e  a d d r e s s  th a t  c a n  b e  r e g is te r e d  a n d  tr a c k e d , i .e . ,  a  M A C  a d d r e s s .
•  T h e  S e r v ic e  S e t  I d e n t if ie r  ( S S I D )  sh a ll  b e  c o n f ig u r e d  s o  th a t it  d o e s  n o t  c o n ta in  a n y  
id e n t i fy in g  in fo r m a t io n  a b o u t  th e  o r g a n is a t io n , s u c h  a s  th e  c o m p a n y  n a m e , d iv is io n  
t i t le ,  e m p lo y e e  n a m e , o r  p r o d u c t  id e n t if ie r .
2.2.7 Information Sensitivity Policy
T h e  Information Sensitivity Policy i s  in te n d e d  to  h e lp  e m p lo y e e s  d e te r m in e  w h a t  
in fo r m a t io n  c a n  b e  d is c lo s e d  to  n o n - e m p lo y e e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  th e  r e la t iv e  s e n s i t iv i t y  o f  
in fo r m a t io n  th a t s h o u ld  n o t  b e  d i s c lo s e d  o u t s id e  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  w it h o u t  p r o p e r  
a u th o r isa t io n .
T h e  in fo r m a t io n  c o v e r e d  in  t h e s e  g u id e l in e s  in c lu d e s ,  b u t is  n o t  l im ite d  t o ,  in fo r m a tio n  
th a t is  e ith e r  s to r e d  o r  sh a r e d  v ia  a n y  m e a n s .  T h is  in c lu d e s :  e le c t r o n ic  in fo r m a t io n ,  
in fo r m a t io n  o n  p a p e r , a n d  in fo r m a t io n  sh a r e d  o r a lly  o r  v i s u a l ly  ( s u c h  a s  t e le p h o n e  a n d  
v id e o  c o n fe r e n c in g ) .
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A ll  e m p lo y e e s  s h o u ld  fa m il ia r is e  t h e m s e lv e s  w ith  th e  in f o r m a t io n  la b e l in g  a n d  h a n d lin g  
g u id e l in e s  th a t f o l l o w  th i s  in tr o d u c t io n . It s h o u ld  b e  n o te d  th a t  t h e  s e n s i t iv i t y  le v e l  
d e f in it io n s  w e r e  c r e a te d  a s  g u id e l in e s  a n d  t o  e m p h a s is e  c o m m o n  s e n s e  s t e p s  th a t  y o u  c a n  
ta k e  to  p r o te c t  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l  in fo r m a t io n  ( e .g . ,  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l  
in fo r m a t io n  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  le f t  u n a tte n d e d  in  c o n fe r e n c e  r o o m s ) .
Q u e s t io n s  a b o u t  th e  p r o p e r  c la s s i f ic a t io n  o f  a  s p e c i f ic  p i e c e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  o r  w ith  reg a rd  
to  t h e s e  g u id e l in e s  s h o u ld  b e  a d d r e s s e d  to  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  
te a m .
T h e  s e n s i t iv i t y  g u id e l in e s  b e lo w  p r o v id e  d e ta i ls  o n  h o w  t o  p r o te c t  in fo r m a t io n  a t v a r y in g  
s e n s it iv i t y  le v e l s .  U s e  t h e s e  g u id e l in e s  a s  a  r e f e r e n c e  o n ly ,  a s  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l  
in fo r m a t io n  in  e a c h  c o lu m n  m a y  n e c e s s i t a t e  m o r e  o r  l e s s  s t r in g e n t  m e a s u r e s  o f  p r o te c t io n  
d e p e n d in g  u p o n  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  a n d  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l  
in fo r m a t io n  in  q u e s t io n .
Minimal Sensitivity
G e n e r a l c o r p o r a te  in fo r m a t io n ;  s o m e  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  t e c h n ic a l  in fo r m a t io n .
Marking guidelines for information in hardcopy or electronic form:
M a r k in g  is  a t  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f  th e  o w n e r  o r  c u s t o d ia n  o f  th e  in fo r m a t io n . I f  m a r k in g  is  
d e s ir e d , th e  w o r d s  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  C o n fid e n t ia l"  m a y  b e  w r it te n  o r  d e s ig n a te d  in  a  
c o n s p ic u o u s  p la c e  o n  o r  in  th e  in fo r m a t io n  in  q u e s t io n .  O th e r  la b e ls  th a t m a y  b e  u s e d  
in c lu d e  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  P ro p r ie ta ry "  o r  s im ila r  la b e ls  a t t h e  d is c r e t io n  o f  y o u r  in d iv id u a l  
b u s in e s s  u n it  o r  d e p a r tm e n t. E v e n  i f  n o  m a r k in g  i s  p r e s e n t ,  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  in fo r m a tio n  is  
p r e s u m e d  to  b e  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l"  u n le s s  e x p r e s s ly  d e te r m in e d  to  b e  
B ilI in g 4 R e n t  P u b lic  in fo r m a t io n  b y  a  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e  w it h  a u th o r ity  t o  d o  s o .  A n y  
o f  t h e s e  m a r k in g s  m a y  b e  u s e d  w ith  th e  a d d it io n a l a n n o ta t io n  o f  "3rd  P a r ty  C o n f id e n t ia l" .
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Access: B il l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s ,  c o n tr a c to r s , p e o p le  w it h  a  b u s in e s s  n e e d  t o  k n o w .
Distribution within Billing4Rent: S ta n d a r d  in t e r o f f ic e  m a i l ,  a p p r o v e d  e le c tr o n ic  m a il  
a n d  e le c tr o n ic  f i l e  t r a n s m is s io n  m e th o d s .
Distribution outside of BiIling4Rent internal mail: A n  P h o s t  m a i l  a n d  o th e r  p u b lic  o r  
p r iv a te  c a r r ie r s , a p p r o v e d  e le c tr o n ic  m a i l  a n d  e le c tr o n ic  f i l e  t r a n s m is s io n  m e th o d s .
Electronic distribution: N o  r e s t r ic t io n s  e x c e p t  th a t  it  b e  s e n t  t o  o n ly  a p p r o v e d
r e c ip ie n ts .
Storage: K e e p  fr o m  v i e w  o f  u n a u th o r is e d  p e o p le ;  e r a s e  w h it e b o a r d s ,  d o  n o t  le a v e  in  
v i e w  o n  ta b le to p . M a c h in e s  s h o u ld  b e  a d m in is t e r e d  w ith  s e c u r ity  in  m in d . P r o te c t  fr o m  
lo s s ;  e le c t r o n ic  in fo r m a t io n  s h o u ld  h a v e  in d iv id u a l  a c c e s s  c o n tr o ls  w h e r e  p o s s ib le  a n d  
a p p r o p r ia te .
Disposal/Destruction: D e p o s i t  o u td a te d  p a p e r  in fo r m a t io n  in  s p e c ia l ly  m a r k e d  d is p o s a l  
b in s  o n  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  p r e m is e s ;  e le c t r o n ic  d a ta  s h o u ld  b e  e x p u n g e d /c le a r e d .  R e l ia b ly  
e r a s e  o r  p h y s ic a l ly  d e s t r o y  m e d ia .
Medium Sensitivity
B u s in e s s ,  f in a n c ia l ,  t e c h n ic a l ,  a n d  m o s t  p e r s o n n e l  in fo r m a t io n .
Marking guidelines for information in hardcopy or electronic form:
A s  th e  s e n s i t iv i t y  l e v e l  o f  t h e  in fo r m a t io n  in c r e a s e s ,  y o u  m a y , in  a d d it io n  o r  in s te a d  o f  
m a r k in g  th e  in fo r m a t io n  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l"  o r  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  P ro p r ie ta ry " , w is h  
to  la b e l th e  in fo r m a t io n  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  In tern a l U s e  O n ly "  o r  o th e r  s im ila r  la b e ls  a t th e  
d is c r e t io n  o f  y o u r  in d iv id u a l  b u s in e s s  u n it  o r  d e p a r tm e n t  t o  d e n o t e  a  m o r e  s e n s i t i v e  le v e l
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o f  in fo r m a t io n . H o w e v e r ,  m a r k in g  i s  d is c r e t io n a r y  a t  a ll  t im e s .  A n y  o f  t h e s e  m a r k in g s  
m a y  b e  u s e d  w ith  th e  a d d it io n a l a n n o ta t io n  o f  "3rd P a rty  C o n f id e n t ia l" .
Access: B il l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  n o n - e m p lo y e e s  w it h  s ig n e d  n o n - d is c lo s u r e
a g r e e m e n ts  w h o  h a v e  a  b u s in e s s  n e e d  to  k n o w .
Distribution within Billing4Rent: S ta n d a rd  in t e r o f f ic e  m a i l ,  a p p r o v e d  e le c t r o n ic  m a i l  
a n d  e le c t r o n ic  f i l e  t r a n s m is s io n  m e th o d s .
Distribution outside of Billing4Rent internal mail: S e n t  v ia  A n  P h o s t .  m a il  o r
a p p r o v e d  p r iv a te  ca rr ier s .
Electronic distribution: N o  r e s t r ic t io n s  to  a p p r o v e d  r e c ip ie n t s  w it h in  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ,  b u t  
s h o u ld  b e  e n c r y p te d  o r  s e n t  v ia  a  p r iv a te  l in k  t o  a p p r o v e d  r e c ip ie n t s  o u t s id e  o f  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  p r e m is e s .
Storage: I n d iv id u a l a c c e s s  c o n tr o ls  a r e  h ig h ly  r e c o m m e n d e d  fo r  e le c t r o n ic  in fo r m a t io n .
Disposal/Destruction: In  s p e c ia l ly  m a r k e d  d is p o s a l  b in s  o n  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  p r e m is e s ;
e le c t r o n ic  d a ta  s h o u ld  b e  e x p u n g e d /c le a r e d .  R e l ia b ly  e r a s e  o r  p h y s ic a l ly  d e s t r o y  m e d ia .
Maximum Sensitivity
T ra d e  s e c r e t s  &  m a r k e t in g , o p e r a t io n a l ,  p e r s o n n e l ,  f in a n c ia l ,  s o u r c e  c o d e ,  &  t e c h n ic a l  
in fo r m a t io n  in te g r a l to  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  o u r  c o m p a n y .
Marking guidelines for information in hardcopy or electronic form:
T o  in d ic a te  th a t  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l  in fo r m a t io n  is  v e r y  s e n s i t i v e ,  y o u  m a y  s h o u ld  
la b e l  th e  in fo r m a t io n  " B il l in g 4 R e n t  In tern a l:  R e g is t e r e d  a n d  R e s tr ic te d " , " B il l in g 4 R e n t  
E y e s  O n ly " , " B il l in g 4 R e n t  C o n f id e n t ia l"  o r  s im ila r  la b e ls  a t  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f  y o u r
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in d iv id u a l b u s in e s s  u n it  o r  d e p a r tm e n t . O n c e  a g a in , th i s  ty p e  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  
C o n f id e n t ia l  in fo r m a t io n  n e e d  n o t  b e  m a r k e d , b u t  u s e r s  s h o u ld  b e  a w a r e  th a t  th is  
in fo r m a t io n  i s  v e r y  s e n s i t i v e  a n d  b e  p r o te c te d  a s  s u c h . A n y  o f  t h e s e  m a r k in g s  m a y  b e  
u s e d  w it h  th e  a d d it io n a l a n n o ta t io n  o f  "3rd P a r ty  C o n f id e n t ia l" .
Access: O n ly  t h o s e  in d iv id u a ls  (B iI l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  n o n - e m p lo y e e s )  d e s ig n a te d  
w ith  a p p r o v e d  a c c e s s  a n d  s ig n e d  n o n - d is c lo s u r e  a g r e e m e n ts .
Distribution within Billing4Rent: D e l iv e r e d  d ir e c t  -  s ig n a tu r e  r e q u ir e d , e n v e lo p e s
s ta m p e d  c o n f id e n t ia l ,  o r  a p p r o v e d  e le c tr o n ic  f i l e  t r a n s m is s io n  m e t h o d s .
Distribution outside of Billing4Rent internal mail: D e l iv e r e d  d ir e c t;  s ig n a tu r e
req u ir e d ; a p p r o v e d  p r iv a te  ca rr iers .
Electronic distribution: N o  r e s t r ic t io n s  to  a p p r o v e d  r e c ip ie n t s  w ith in  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ,  b u t  
i t  i s  h ig h ly  r e c o m m e n d e d  th a t a l l  in fo r m a t io n  b e  s t r o n g ly  e n c r y p te d .
Storage: I n d iv id u a l a c c e s s  c o n tr o ls  a re  v e r y  h ig h ly  r e c o m m e n d e d  fo r  e le c t r o n ic
in fo r m a t io n . P h y s ic a l  s e c u r ity  i s  g e n e r a lly  u s e d ,  a n d  in fo r m a t io n  s h o u ld  b e  s to r e d  in  a  
p h y s ic a l ly  s e c u r e d  c o m p u te r .
Disposal/Destruction: S tr o n g ly  E n c o u r a g e d :  In  s p e c ia l ly  m a r k e d  d is p o s a l  b in s  o n
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  p r e m is e s ;  e le c t r o n ic  d a ta  s h o u ld  b e  e x p u n g e d /c le a r e d .  R e l ia b ly  e r a s e  o r  
p h y s ic a l ly  d e s tr o y  m e d ia .
2.2.8 Virtual Private Network (VPN) Policy
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  th i s  p o l i c y  i s  t o  p r o v id e  g u id e l in e s  fo r  R e m o t e  A c c e s s  I P S e c  o r  L 2 T P  
V ir tu a l P r iv a te  N e t w o r k  ( V P N )  c o n n e c t io n s  t o  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k .  
A p p r o v e d  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  a u th o r is e d  th ird  p a r t ie s  ( c u s to m e r s ,  v e n d o r s ,  e t c .)
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m a y  u t i l i s e  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  V P N s ,  w h ic h  a re  a  " u ser  m a n a g e d "  s e r v ic e .  T h is  m e a n s  th a t  
t h e  u s e r  is  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  s e l e c t in g  a n  In te r n e t  S e r v ic e  P r o v id e r  ( I S P ) ,  c o o r d in a t in g  
in s ta l la t io n , in s ta l l in g  a n y  r e q u ir e d  s o f tw a r e , a n d  p a y in g  a s s o c ia t e d  f e e s .  F u r th e r  d e ta i ls  
m a y  b e  fo u n d  in  th e  Remote Access Policy.
•  It i s  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  e m p lo y e e s  w it h  V P N  p r iv i l e g e s  t o  e n s u r e  th a t u n a u th o r is e d  
u s e r s  a re  n o t  a l l o w e d  a c c e s s  t o  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  in te r n a l n e tw o r k s .
•  V P N  u s e  i s  t o  b e  c o n tr o l le d  u s in g  e ith e r  a  o n e - t im e  p a s s w o r d  a u th e n t ic a t io n  s u c h  a s  a  
to k e n  d e v ic e  o r  a  p u b lic /p r iv a te  k e y  s y s t e m  w i t h  a  s t r o n g  p a s s p h r a se .
•  W h e n  a c t iv e ly  c o n n e c t e d  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k , V P N s  w i l l  f o r c e  a l l  t r a f f ic  t o  a n d  
f r o m  th e  P C  o v e r  t h e  V P N  tu n n e l:  a ll  o th e r  tr a f f ic  w i l l  b e  d r o p p e d .
•  D u a l ( s p l i t )  t u n n e l in g  i s  N O T  p e r m itte d ;  o n ly  o n e  n e tw o r k  c o n n e c t io n  is  a l l o w e d .
•  V P N  g a te w a y s  w i l l  b e  s e t  u p  a n d  m a n a g e d  b y  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  o p e r a t io n a l  
g r o u p s .
•  A l l  c o m p u te r s  c o n n e c t e d  t o  B iI l in g 4 R e n t  in te r n a l n e tw o r k s  v ia  V P N  o r  a n y  o th e r  
t e c h n o lo g y  s h o u ld  u s e  th e  m o s t  u p - to -d a te  a n t i -v ir u s /a n t i - s p y w a r e  s o f tw a r e  th a t is  th e  
c o r p o r a te  s ta n d a rd  t h i s  in c lu d e s  p e r s o n a l c o m p u te r s .
•  V P N  u s e r s  w i l l  b e  a u to m a t ic a l ly  d is c o n n e c t e d  fr o m  B il l in g 4 R e n t ' s  n e tw o r k  a fte r  
th ir ty  m in u te s  o f  in a c t iv i ty .  T h e  u s e r  s h o u ld  th e n  lo g o n  a g a in  t o  r e c o n n e c t  t o  th e  
n e tw o r k . P in g s  o r  o th e r  a r t if ic ia l  n e tw o r k  p r o c e s s e s  a r e  n o t  to  b e  u s e d  t o  k e e p  th e  
c o n n e c t io n  o p e n .
•  T h e  V P N  c o n c e n tr a to r  i s  l im i t e d  to  a n  a b s o lu t e  c o n n e c t io n  t im e  o f  2 4  h o u r s .
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•  U s e r s  o f  c o m p u te r s  th a t  a re  n o t  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  o w n e d  e q u ip m e n t  s h o u ld  c o n f ig u r e  th e  
e q u ip m e n t  to  c o m p ly  w ith  B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ' s  V P N  a n d  N e t w o r k  p o l i c ie s .
•  O n ly  V P N  c l i e n t s  a p p r o v e d  b y  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  te a m  m a y  b e  u s e d .
•  B y  u s in g  V P N  t e c h n o lo g y  w it h  p e r s o n a l e q u ip m e n t ,  u s e r s  s h o u ld  u n d e r s ta n d  th a t  
th e ir  m a c h in e s  a re  a  d e  fa c t o  e x t e n s io n  o f  B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ’ s  n e tw o r k , a n d  a s  s u c h  a re  
s u b je c t  t o  th e  s a m e  r u le s  a n d  r e g u la t io n s  th a t  a p p ly  to  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  o w n e d  
e q u ip m e n t .
2.2.9 Account Maintenance Policy
B il l in g 4 R e n t  lo g in  a c c o u n t s  a re  a n  im p o r ta n t a s p e c t  o f  c o m p u t e r  s e c u r ity , a s  a lo n g  w ith  a  
c o r r e s p o n d in g  p a s s w o r d  t h e y  p r o v id e  a c c e s s  t o  d a ta  s to r e d  lo c a l ly  a n d  o n  o th e r  m a c h in e s  
c o n n e c te d  t o  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  c o r p o r a te  n e tw o r k . A s  s u c h , a l l  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  
( in c lu d in g  c o n tr a c to r s  a n d  v e n d o r s  w ith  a c c e s s  to  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s y s t e m s )  a re  r e s p o n s ib le  
fo r  ta k in g  th e  a p p r o p r ia te  s t e p s  t o  s a fe g u a r d  a c c o u n t  lo g in  in fo r m a t io n .
•  T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a t io n  i s  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  t h e  g e n e r a t io n ,  
m a in te n a n c e  a n d  te r m in a t io n  o f  a ll  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  a c c o u n ts  i .e .  u s e r , s y s t e m , e m a i l  e t c .  
a n d  a s s o c ia t e d  p r iv i le g e s .
•  It is  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  d e p a r tm e n t  m a n a g e r  to  n o t i f y  th e  
B iI I in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  e m p lo y e e  ( in c lu d in g  c o n tr a c to r s  a n d  v e n d o r s  
w it h  a c c e s s  to  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s y s t e m s )  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o r  te r m in a t io n .
•  O n  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  e m p lo y m e n t  an account maintenance fo r m  s h o u ld  b e  
c o m p le te d  b y  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  d e p a r tm e n t  m a n a g e r  a n d  r e tu r n e d  v ia  e m a il  to  th e  
n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r . T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  w i l l  c o n f ir m  a c c o u n t  
c r e a t io n  v ia  re tu rn  e m a il .
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•  A l l  u se r s  a re  r e q u ir e d  t o  s ig n  a  d e c la r a t io n  th a t th e y  a g r e e  to  c o m p l y  w ith  th e
B i l l in g 4 R e n t  Acceptable Use Policy, p r io r  t o  u s in g  th e ir  c o m p u te r  a c c o u n t .
•  W h e r e  p o s s ib le ,  s y s t e m s  w i l l  b e  c o n f ig u r e d  in  o r d e r  t o  f o r c e  u s e r s  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  f ir s t
lo g - o n  p a s s w o r d .
•  A n y  u se r , w h o  h a s  b e in g  a s s ig n e d  an  a c c o u n t  t o  a c c e s s  a  n e tw o r k  o r  r e s o u r c e ,  s h o u ld  
k e e p  th e  a c c o u n t  d e ta i ls  a n d  c o r r e s p o n d in g  p a s s w o r d  c o n f id e n t ia l .
•  O n  te r m in a t io n  o f  e m p lo y m e n t  an account maintenance fo r m  s h o u ld  b e  c o m p le t e d  b y  
th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  d e p a r tm e n t  m a n a g e r  a n d  r e tu r n e d  v ia  e m a i l  t o  th e  n e tw o r k  
a d m in is tr a to r . T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  w i l l  c o n f ir m  a c c o u n t  d e le t io n  
v ia  retu rn  e m a i l .
•  T h e  a l lo c a t io n  o f  s y s t e m  p r iv i le g e s  i s  t o  b e  s t r ic t ly  c o n tr o l le d .  U s e r s  a r e  t o  b e  g iv e n
s p e c i f ic  a c c o u n t  p r o f i le s  a n d  p r iv i le g e s  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w it h  th e ir  p a r t ic u la r  fu n c t io n  o r  
r o le .  W h e r e  a d d it io n a l  p r iv i le g e s  a re  r e q u ir e d  an account maintenance fo r m  s h o u ld  
b e  c o m p le te d  b y  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  d e p a r tm e n t  m a n a g e r  a n d  r e tu r n e d  v ia  e m a i l  t o  th e  
n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r . T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  w i l l  r e v ie w  a n d  
r e s p o n d  to  th e  r e q u e s t  v ia  retu rn  e m a il .
•  A c c o u n t s  w i l l  b e  fr o z e n  a fte r  th r e e  f a i le d  lo g o n  a t te m p ts . A l l  e r r o n e o u s  p a s s w o r d
e n tr ie s  w i l l  b e  r e c o r d e d  in  a n  a u d it  l o g  fo r  la te r  in s p e c t io n  a n d  a c t io n , a s  n e c e s s a r y .
•  A l l  P C s , la p to p s  a n d  w o r k s ta t io n s  s h o u ld  b e  s e c u r e d  b y  lo c k in g  o r  lo g g i n g - o f f
( c o n t r o l-a l t -d e le t e  fo r  W in 2 K  u s e r s )  w h e n  th e  h o s t  w i l l  b e  u n a tte n d e d .
•  T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  w i l l  d e le t e  a c c o u n ts  u n u s e d  fo r  a  p e r io d  o f
s i x  m o n th s  fr o m  t h e  s y s t e m .
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•  T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  m a y  r e v o k e  a c c o u n ts  a t  a n y  t im e  i f  
c o m p u t in g  p r iv i le g e s  a re  a b u s e d .
2.2.10 Closed Circuit Television Policy
C lo s e  C ir c u it  T e le v i s io n ’s  (C C T V )  s h o u ld  b e  u s e d  in  th e  d a ta  c e n te r  a s  a  s e c u r i ty  d e v ic e  
a n d  a ls o  a  d e te r r e n t . C a m e r a s  s h o u ld  b e  p la c e d  th r o u g h o u t  t h e  d a ta  c e n te r  t o  e n s u r e  th a t  
a ll c r it ic a l  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  s y s t e m s  a re  m o n ito r e d .
T h e  C C T V  c a m e r a  o u tp u t  s h o u ld  b e  r e c o r d e d  o n to  d ig i ta l  s to r a g e , w h ic h  e l im in a t e s  d a ily  
ta p e  c h a n g in g  a n d  s to r a g e .
D ig it a l  V id e o  R e c o r d e r s  s h o u ld  b e  n e tw o r k e d  to  a l l o w  s to r e d  o r  l i v e  im a g e s  t o  b e  v ie w e d  
o v e r  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  b y  m u lt ip le  u s e r s .
T h e  fr a m e  p e r  s e c o n d  ( f p s )  r e c o r d  r a te  s h o u ld  b e  a  m in im u m  o f  1 5  fp s .  T h e  h ig h e r  th e  fp s  
ra te  i s ,  th e  m o r e  n a tu r a l th e  f o o t a g e  w i l l  lo o k  w h e n  p la y e d  b a c k . T h e  lo w e r  t h e  f p s  ra te  
th e  m o r e  f o o t a g e  y o u  c a n  f i t  o n  th e  h a rd  d r iv e .
2.2.11 Service Pack and Patches Policy
T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  s h a l l  b e  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  m a in ta in in g  a  l i s t  o f  
s o f tw a r e ,  s e r v ic e  p a c k s  a n d  p a tc h e s  fo r  a ll  B i l l i n g 4 R e n t  m a c h in e s  a n d  e n s u r in g  a ll  
m a c h in e s  a r e  p a tc h e s  a p p r o p r ia te ly .
T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  s h a l l  b e  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  t h e  im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  a  
s ig n  in /o u t  p o l i c y  fo r  a l l  s o f tw a r e  C D s / D V D s .
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R e le v a n t  s o f tw a r e  v e n d o r  s i t e s  (o p e r a t in g  s y s t e m s ,  w e b  s e r v e r s , d a ta b a s e s  e t c . )  s h o u ld  b e  
c h e c k e d  p e r io d ic a l ly  fo r  a  l i s t  o f  u p d a te s .  T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  n e tw o r k  a d m in is tr a to r  sh a ll  
e n s u r e  s e r v ic e  p a c k s  a n d  p a tc h e s  a re  r o l l e d  o u t  t o  a ll  m a c h in e s .
2.2.12 Audit Policy
B il l in g 4 R e n t  s h a l l  d o c u m e n t  th e  o r g a n is a t io n s  p r o c e s s e s  fo r  m o n ito r in g  th e  in te g r ity  a n d  
a v a ila b il i t y  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  A S P  h o s t s  in  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  ^Wi/z7 Policy.
2.2.13 Acceptable Use Policy
T h e  f o l lo w in g  a c t iv i t i e s  are , in  g e n e r a l, p r o h ib ite d . E m p lo y e e s  m a y  b e  e x e m p t e d  fr o m  
t h e s e  r e s t r ic t io n s  d u r in g  th e  c o u r s e  o f  th e ir  le g i t im a te  j o b  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  ( e .g . ,  s y s t e m s  
a d m in is tr a t io n  s t a f f  m a y  h a v e  a  n e e d  to  d is a b le  th e  n e tw o r k  a c c e s s  o f  a  h o s t  i f  th a t  h o s t  is  
d is r u p t in g  p r o d u c t io n  s e r v ic e s ) .  U n d e r  n o  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  i s  a n  e m p lo y e e  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  
a u th o r is e d  t o  e n g a g e  in  a n y  a c t iv i ty  th a t  i s  i l l e g a l  u n d e r  lo c a l ,  s ta te , f e d e r a l o r  
in te r n a t io n a l la w  w h i l e  u t i l i s in g  B i l l in g 4 R e n t - o w n e d  r e s o u r c e s .
T h e  l i s t s  b e lo w  a r e  b y  n o  m e a n s  e x h a u s t iv e ,  b u t  a tte m p t to  p r o v id e  a  fr a m e w o r k  fo r  
a c t iv i t ie s  w h ic h  fa l l  in to  th e  c a te g o r y  o f  u n a c c e p ta b le  u s e .
2.2.13.1 System and Network Activities
T h e  f o l lo w in g  s y s t e m  a n d  n e tw o r k  a c t iv i t i e s  a re  s t r ic t ly  p r o h ib ite d , w i t h  n o  e x c e p t io n s :
•  V io la t io n s  o f  th e  r ig h ts  o f  a n y  p e r s o n  o r  c o m p a n y  p r o te c te d  b y  c o p y r ig h t , tr a d e  
s e c r e t ,  p a te n t  o r  o th e r  in t e l le c tu a l  p r o p e r ty , o r  s im ila r  la w s  o r  r e g u la t io n s , in c lu d in g ,
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b u t n o t  l im ite d  t o ,  th e  in s ta l la t io n  o r  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  " p ira ted "  o r  o th e r  s o f tw a r e  
p r o d u c ts  th a t  a re  n o t  a p p r o p r ia te ly  l i c e n s e d  f o r  u s e  b y  B i l l in g 4 R e n t .
•  U n a u th o r is e d  c o p y in g  o f  c o p y r ig h t e d  m a te r ia l in c lu d in g ,  b u t  n o t  l im i t e d  to ,  
d ig i t i s a t io n  a n d  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  p h o to g r a p h s  fr o m  m a g a z in e s ,  b o o k s  o r  o th e r  
c o p y r ig h te d  s o u r c e s ,  c o p y r ig h te d  m u s ic ,  a n d  th e  in s ta l la t io n  o f  a n y  c o p y r ig h te d  
s o f tw a r e  fo r  w h ic h  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  th e  e n d  u s e r  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  a n  a c t iv e  l i c e n s e  is  
s t r ic t ly  p r o h ib ite d .
•  E x p o r t in g  s o f tw a r e ,  t e c h n ic a l  in fo r m a t io n , e n c r y p t io n  s o f tw a r e  o r  t e c h n o lo g y ,  in  
v io la t io n  o f  in te r n a t io n a l o r  r e g io n a l  e x p o r t  c o n tr o l la w s ,  i s  i l l e g a l .  T h e  a p p r o p r ia te  
m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u ld  b e  c o n s u l t e d  p r io r  t o  e x p o r t  o f  a n y  m a te r ia l th a t  i s  in  q u e s t io n .
•  In tr o d u c t io n  o f  m a l ic io u s  p r o g r a m s  in to  th e  n e tw o r k  o r  s e r v e r  ( e .g . ,  v ir u s e s ,  w o r m s ,  
T ro ja n  h o r s e s ,  e - m a il  b o m b s , e t c .) .
•  R e v e a l in g  y o u r  a c c o u n t  p a s s w o r d  to  o th e r s  o r  a l lo w in g  u s e  o f  y o u r  a c c o u n t  b y  o th e r s .  
T h is  in c lu d e s  f a m i ly  a n d  o th e r  h o u s e h o ld  m e m b e r s  w h e n  w o r k  i s  b e in g  d o n e  a t h o m e .
•  U s in g  a  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  c o m p u t in g  a s s e t  t o  a c t iv e ly  e n g a g e  in  p r o c u r in g  o r  tr a n s m it t in g  
m a te r ia l th a t  i s  in  v io la t io n  o f  s e x u a l  h a r a s s m e n t  o r  h o s t i le  w o r k p la c e  la w s  in  th e  
u se r 's  lo c a l  ju r is d ic t io n .
•  M a k in g  fr a u d u le n t  o f f e r s  o f  p r o d u c ts ,  it e m s ,  o r  s e r v ic e s  o r ig in a t in g  fr o m  a n y  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  a c c o u n t .
•  M a k in g  s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t  w a r r a n ty , e x p r e s s ly  o r  im p lie d ,  u n le s s  it  i s  a  p a r t  o f  n o r m a l  
j o b  d u t ie s .
•  E f f e c t in g  s e c u r ity  b r e a c h e s  o r  d is r u p t io n s  o f  n e tw o r k  c o m m u n ic a t io n .  S e c u r ity  
b r e a c h e s  in c lu d e ,  b u t  are  n o t  l im i t e d  t o ,  a c c e s s in g  d a ta  o f  w h ic h  th e  e m p lo y e e  i s  n o t
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a n  in te n d e d  r e c ip ie n t  o r  lo g g in g  in t o  a  s e r v e r  o r  a c c o u n t  th a t  th e  e m p lo y e e  i s  n o t  
e x p r e s s ly  a u th o r is e d  t o  a c c e s s ,  u n le s s  t h e s e  d u t ie s  a re  w it h in  t h e  s c o p e  o f  r e g u la r  
d u t ie s .  F o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h i s  s e c t io n ,  " d isru p tio n "  in c lu d e s ,  b u t  i s  n o t  l im ite d  to ,  
n e tw o r k  s n i f f in g ,  p in g e d  f lo o d s ,  p a c k e t  s p o o f in g ,  d e n ia l  o f  s e r v ic e ,  a n d  fo r g e d  r o u t in g  
in fo r m a t io n  fo r  m a l ic io u s  p u r p o s e s .
•  P o r t  s c a n n in g  o r  s e c u r ity  s c a n n in g  i s  e x p r e s s ly  p r o h ib ite d  u n le s s  p r io r  n o t i f ic a t io n  to  
B il l in 4 R e n t  i s  m a d e .
•  E x e c u t in g  a n y  fo r m  o f  n e tw o r k  m o n ito r in g  w h ic h  w i l l  in t e r c e p t  d a ta  n o t  in te n d e d  fo r  
th e  e m p lo y e e 's  h o s t ,  u n le s s  th i s  a c t iv i t y  i s  a  p a r t o f  t h e  e m p lo y e e 's  n o r m a l jo b /d u ty .
•  C ir c u m v e n t in g  u s e r  a u th e n t ic a t io n  o r  s e c u r ity  o f  a n y  h o s t ,  n e tw o r k  o r  a c c o u n t .
•  I n te r fe r in g  w ith  o r  d e n y in g  s e r v ic e  t o  a n y  u s e r  o th e r  th a n  th e  e m p lo y e e 's  h o s t  ( fo r  
e x a m p le ,  d e n ia l o f  s e r v ic e  a tta c k ) .
•  U s in g  a n y  p r o g r a m /s c r ip t /c o m m a n d , o r  s e n d in g  m e s s a g e s  o f  a n y  k in d , w i t h  th e  in te n t  
to  in te r fe r e  w it h ,  o r  d is a b le ,  a  u se r 's  te r m in a l  s e s s io n ,  v ia  a n y  m e a n s ,  lo c a l ly  o r  v ia  th e  
In te m e t/In tr a n e t /E x tr a n e t .
•  P r o v id in g  in fo r m a t io n  a b o u t , o r  l i s t s  o f ,  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s  to  p a r t ie s  o u t s id e  
B il l in g 4 R e n t .
2.2.13.2 Email and Communications Activities
T h e  f o l lo w in g  e m a i l  a n d  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  a c t iv i t i e s  a r e  s t r ic t ly  p r o h ib ite d , w i t h  n o
e x c e p t io n s :
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•  S e n d in g  u n s o l ic i t e d  e m a i l  m e s s a g e s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  s e n d in g  o f  " ju n k  m a il"  o r  o th e r  
a d v e r t is in g  m a te r ia l t o  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  d id  n o t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  r e q u e s t  s u c h  m a te r ia l  
( e m a il  sp a m ).
•  A n y  fo r m  o f  h a r a s s m e n t  v ia  e m a i l ,  t e l e p h o n e  o r  p a g in g ,  w h e th e r  th r o u g h  la n g u a g e ,  
f r e q u e n c y , o r  s i z e  o f  m e s s a g e s .
•  U n a u th o r is e d  u s e , o r  fo r g in g ,  o f  e m a il  h e a d e r  in fo r m a t io n .
•  S o l i c i t a t io n  o f  e m a il  fo r  a n y  o th e r  e m a i l  a d d r e s s , o th e r  th a n  th a t  o f  t h e  p o s te r 's  
a c c o u n t ,  w ith  th e  in te n t  t o  h a r a ss  o r  t o  c o l l e c t  r e p lie s .
•  C r e a t in g  o r  fo r w a r d in g  " ch a in  le t te r s" , " P o n z i"  o r  o th e r  " p yram id "  s c h e m e s  o f  a n y  
ty p e .
•  U s e  o f  u n s o l ic i t e d  e m a i l  o r ig in a t in g  fr o m  w it h in  B i l l in g 4 R e n t , s n e t w o r k s  o f  o th e r  
In te m e t/In tr a n e t /E x tr a n e t  s e r v ic e  p r o v id e r s  o n  b e h a l f  o f ,  o r  t o  a d v e r t is e ,  a n y  s e r v ic e  
h o s t e d  b y  B i l l in g 4 R e n t o r  c o n n e c t e d  v ia  B i l l in g 4 R e n t ’ s n e tw o r k .
•  P o s t in g  th e  s a m e  o r  s im ila r  n o n -b u s in e s s - r e la t e d  m e s s a g e s  to  la r g e  n u m b e r s  o f  U s e n e t  
n e w s g r o u p s  (n e w s g r o u p  sp a m ).
2.2.14 Email Policy
T h e  g e n e r a l p u b l ic  t e n d s  t o  v i e w  e m a i ls  s e n t  fr o m  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  a d d r e s s e s  a s  a n  o f f ic ia l
p o l i c y  s ta te m e n t . T h e  f o l lo w in g  p r o c e d u r e  s h o u ld  b e  a d h e r e d  to  in  o r d e r  t o  p r o te c t
B i l l i n g 4 R e n t ’s  p u b lic  im a g e :
R e a s o n a b le  u s a g e  o f  B i l I in g 4 R e n t  r e s o u r c e s  fo r  p e r s o n a l e m a i ls  i s  a c c e p ta b le ,  b u t  n o n ­
w o r k  r e la te d  e m a i l  s h o u ld  b e  s a v e d  in  a  se p a r a te  fo ld e r  fr o m  w o r k  r e la te d  e m a il .
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•  T h e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m a il  s y s t e m  sh a ll  n o t  t o  b e  u s e d  fo r  th e  c r e a t io n  o r  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  
a n y  d is r u p t iv e  o r  o f f e n s iv e  m e s s a g e s ,  in c lu d in g  o f f e n s iv e  c o m m e n ts  a b o u t  r a c e ,  
g e n d e r , h a ir  c o lo u r , d is a b i l i t i e s ,  a g e ,  s e x u a l  o r ie n ta t io n , p o r n o g r a p h y , r e l ig io u s  b e l i e f s  
a n d  p r a c t ic e , p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s ,  o r  n a t io n a l o r ig in . E m p lo y e e s  w h o  r e c e iv e  a n y  e m a i ls  
w it h  t h is  c o n te n t  fr o m  a n y  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e  s h o u ld  r e p o r t  th e  m a tte r  t o  th e ir  
m a n a g e r  im m e d ia te ly .
•  S e n d in g  c h a in  le t te r s  o r  j o k e  e m a i ls  fr o m  a  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m a i l  a c c o u n t  is  s tr ic t ly  
p r o h ib ite d . S e n d in g  v ir u s  o r  o th e r  m a lw a r e  w a r n in g s  a n d  m a s s  m a i l in g s  fr o m  a  
B il l in g 4 R e n t  e m a il  a c c o u n t  s h o u ld  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  
m a n a g e m e n t  te a m  p r io r  t o  t r a n s m is s io n .  T h e s e  r e s t r ic t io n s  a ls o  a p p ly  to  th e  
fo r w a r d in g  o f  m a i l  r e c e iv e d  b y  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m p lo y e e s .
•  M o n it o r in g  o f  B i l l in g 4 R e n t  e m a i l  a c c o u n ts  is  p u r e ly  a t t h e  d is c r e t io n  o f  th e  
o r g a n is a t io n  a n d  th u s  e m p lo y e e s  s h a l l  h a v e  n o  e x p e c t a t io n  o f  p r iv a c y  in  a n y th in g  
th e y  s to r e , s e n d  o r  r e c e iv e  o n  th e  c o m p a n y ’s  e m a il  s y s t e m .
2.3 Enforcement
A n y  in d iv id u a l  fo u n d  t o  h a v e  v io la t e d  th i s  p o l i c y  m a y  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  d is c ip l in a r y  a c t io n ,  
u p  to  a n d  in c lu d in g  c iv i l  a n d /o r  c r im in a l  p r o s e c u t io n  t o  th e  fu l l  e x t e n t  o f  th e  la w  a n d  
w h e r e  a p p lic a b le  t e r m in a t io n  o f  e m p lo y m e n t .
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